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Preface
Carbon pricing (CP), in the form of, for example, an emissions trading scheme
(ETS) or a carbon tax, has reentered the global spotlight since the Paris Agreement
entered into force. In Japan, the government has set a long-term reduction target for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and consequently, the importance of CP has been
reaffirmed as a tool of effective mitigation measures. However, Japan has failed to
adopt carbon pricing at a level that can substantially reduce GHGs: The carbon tax
introduced in 2012 was set at a very low level, and a nationwide emission trading
program has not been introduced. In contrast, two local governments, Tokyo and
Saitama, have introduced ETSs. The initiatives of these two local governments are
little known to the rest of the world.
The research project underlying this book is “An ex post analysis of carbon
pricing and the proposal of policy options to achieve the Japanese long-term GHG
emissions reduction target (Principal Investigator: Toshi H. Arimura).” Seven
research groups at six universities/institutes in Japan joined this project under the
Research Institute for Environmental Economics and Management (RIEEM) at
Waseda University. The project was a three-year endeavor from April 2017 to
March 2020 and was supported by the Environmental Research and Technology
Development Fund (2-1707) of the Environmental Restoration and Conservation
Agency. Without this generous financial support, we could not have completed this
book.
This research project conducted an empirical study of Japanese mitigation policy
with a focus on CP by examining the impacts on firms and households.
Furthermore, we proposed possible policy options by using a newly constructed
economic model. The project consists of the following two teams: the Empirical
Analysis Team (four subthemes) and the Economic Modeling Team (three sub-
themes) and aims to contribute to Japanese environmental policy and institutional
design for achieving the long-term emission reduction target.
The aim of this book is to evaluate various measures introduced in Japan to
mitigate carbon emissions from an economic perspective. Although countries have
created several such policies in response to pressing climate change issues, the
effectiveness of those programs has not been sufficiently analyzed or compared.
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In particular, policy evaluations in the Asian region lag far behind those in North
America and Europe due to data limitations and political reasons. We offer a series
of empirical analyses of Japanese mitigation policies to satisfy research needs.
Moreover, the domestic policies implemented in Asia are less known to the rest
of the world. The second aim of this book is to introduce various mitigation policies
in various Japanese sectors to the world. The book covers mitigation policies
targeting the sectors of manufacturing, electric power, services, households, and
transport. This aspect of the book will be useful for academics and policy makers in
emerging countries seeking to design carbon mitigation policies in corresponding
sectors.
Finally, we intend to offer policy options for the Japanese economy. Although
the Japanese government set a long-term emission reduction target of 80% by 2050,
it has not specified policy measures to achieve this target. We offer a carbon pricing
option for the long-term target and assess the economic burden at both the firm and
household levels.
The book consists of three parts. In the first part of the book, Japanese climate
mitigation policies are summarized by sector, and their progress is assessed.
Although emissions trading and carbon taxation have been used in Japan, there are
few studies that have assessed their impacts. The second part of the book shows
how those policies have changed the behavior of firms and households. In addition,
macroeconomic simulations are offered that account for the potential of renewable
energy. Given these comprehensive assessments, the effectiveness of measures to
prevent climate change is compared between Japan and Western countries. Each
chapter is written independently, and the contents are related across each chapter.
Therefore, readers can start from any chapter following their own interest.
Part I addresses policy issues and reviews Japanese climate policies in various
sectors. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter for the entire book and provides an
overall assessment of current carbon pricing in Japan. Based on the concept of
effective carbon rates proposed by the OECD, this chapter illustrates that Japan’s
nationwide average effective carbon rate is lower than the average effective carbon
rates of OECD countries and rejects the claim that Japan has already introduced
sufficiently high-carbon prices through energy taxes.
Chapter 2 focuses on the commercial sector, which faces the highest reduction
targets among all sectors. After explaining the carbon policies in the commercial
sector, the chapter summarizes the results of a survey on the implementation of
energy efficiency measures in office buildings. The results show that Tokyo leads
the other regions of Japan in the implementation of energy efficiency measures.
Chapter 3 studies energy consumption in the household sector, where energy
conservation measures are slow to progress. The Japanese government has intro-
duced various energy conservation measures to reduce household energy usage for
the past several decades. The chapter selects several major energy conservation
measures and evaluates their cost effectiveness.
Chapter 4 addresses the transport sector, which faces high effective carbon rates
but accounts for a high share of greenhouse gas emissions. Japanese vehicle users
need to pay acquisition, ownership, and gasoline taxes to use their vehicles. In the
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first half of the chapter, the authors combine those taxes and estimate the effective
carbon rate. The Japanese government has promoted electric vehicles (EVs). In the
latter half of the chapter, the authors conduct a cost–benefit analysis of EVs.
Chapter 5 uses oligopoly models to analyze two policies that have actually been
implemented in Japan. The first policy is to improve the efficiency of fossil fuel
power generation, and it is shown that efficiency improvement does not necessarily
lead to a reduction in CO2 emissions. The second policy is a combination of feed-in
tariffs and carbon taxes, and the analysis shows that social welfare can be enhanced
by combining the two policies.
Part II assesses the impact of two local ETSs currently implemented in Japan,
i.e., the Tokyo ETS and Saitama ETS. Chapter 6 illustrates the design of the
Tokyo ETS and evaluates its impact on energy consumption by universities. The
authors collect the data from a mail survey administered to universities in Japan and
conduct a difference-in-differences analysis before and after the implementation
of the Tokyo ETS. The empirical results demonstrate that the Tokyo ETS has
decreased CO2 emissions by 3–5%.
Chapter 7 investigates whether the Target-Setting Emissions Trading (TSET)
Program (Saitama ETS) in Saitama Prefecture has reduced CO2 emissions. The
author finds that the TSET program was successful in reducing emissions even
though the program includes no penalty for facilities that do not meet emission
goals. The analysis also revealed that the program functioned as an incentive for
facilities that are not covered by the program to lower their energy consumption.
Chapter 8 uses nationwide facility-level data to compare CO2 reductions in the
manufacturing sector between the Tokyo ETS and Saitama ETS. The authors find
that the Tokyo ETS reduced electricity consumption by 16 percent, but the
Saitama ETS did not reduce it in a statistically meaningful way. The authors further
examine whether manufacturers switched from dirty fuels to clean fuels after ETS
implementation.
Part III conducts a top-down model analysis to assess the macro-level impact of
carbon pricing. Chapter 9 develops input–output tables for the analysis of the next
generation energy systems (IONGES) to analyze the ripple effects of CO2 emissions
from the introduction of renewable energy power plants and to analyze the three
types of carbon tax: upstream, midstream, and downstream. The authors revealed
that the taxation effects of one unit of carbon tax differ depending on the type of
carbon tax. Their empirical results also have implications for changes in household
energy consumption attitudes according to carbon tax types.
Chapter 10 conducts a computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, which is
the most commonly used approach for the assessment of tax impacts and examines
how carbon pricing affects the international competitiveness of the Japanese
economy. The CGE simulation shows that the CO2 reduction planned by the
Japanese government generates large negative impacts on the Japanese economy in
the absence of preventive measures. Border adjustments can only slightly mitigate
the negative macroeconomic impact.
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Chapter 11 focuses on the effective carbon rate and estimates the effects of
carbon policies that increase the effective carbon rate to a 30 euro threshold. The
findings indicate that the short-term effect of a carbon tax that raises the effective
carbon rate for all industries above 30 euros will affect not only energy-intensive
industries but also downstream industries that already have high effective carbon
rates. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the carbon tax implemented in 2012
increased the difference between taxed emitters and non-taxed emitters. Thus, tax
exemptions for energy-intensive industries reduce economic efficiency.
Chapter 12 compares the impact of carbon pricing across various households.
The chapter shows that there is significant heterogeneity in the tax burden across
geographical regions and income classes. In particular, low-income households
living in cold regions are expected to be seriously affected by carbon pricing. The
chapter proposes redistribution policies to avoid damaging the living standards of
vulnerable people.
Chapter 13 addresses the issue of double dividends. To obtain public support for
carbon pricing, several countries use revenue from a carbon tax to reduce existing
distortionary taxes. The authors first show that the Japanese long-term emissions
reduction target can be achieved through a carbon tax with revenue recycling. Then,
the authors assess two types of tax revenue recycling (RR): reductions in corporate
taxes and social security payments. Their simulation results demonstrate that RR
can increase public support for a carbon tax.
The knowledge offered by this book is valuable for various readers. First, we
expect it will be useful to academic and non-academic researchers who work on
environmental economics and environmental policy. Another group of target
readers consists of graduate students in economics or public policy. We also believe
that the contents of this book will help inform government officials and policy
makers who seek cost-effective measures to mitigate carbon emissions in devel-
oping and emerging economies.
We are indebted to a number of colleagues and researchers for insightful
comments and feedback on our research. We are grateful to the formal advisors
of the project: Akira Yokoyama (Chyuo University), Kanemi Ban (Osaka
University), Toru Morotomi (Kyoto University), and Kyoshi Fujikawa (Nagoya
University). Most of the chapters were presented at the annual meetings of the
Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, where we received useful
comments for the revision. We also hosted three annual symposiums at Waseda
Neo in Tokyo by inviting David Brown (University of Alberta), Yukari Takamura
(University of Tokyo), and Hyungna Oh (Kyung Hee University) as keynote
speakers. All the speakers helped us improve our research. We also appreciate
administrative support from Mriduchhanda Chattopadhyay, Yukie Iwatuska, and
Yuki Mikami.
Many of the chapters have been presented at international workshops and
conferences. We benefitted from comments from Jian Zhou, Alun Gu, and Bin Liu,
who generously hosted a workshop at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Several
chapters of this book were presented at the annual meeting of East Asian
Association of Environmental and Resource Economics, Beijing 2019. We
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appreciate Maosheng Duan (Tsinghua University) for his useful comments in the
thematic session that we organized jointly with Hyungna Oh. Moreover, we were
fortunate to have presented several chapters at workshops at Resources for the
Future in the USA and the University of Manheim/Center for European Economic
Research in Germany. We benefited from comments from Dick Morgenstern,
Karen Palmer, Dallas Burtaw, Alan Krupnick, Joshua Linn, Ulrich Wagner, and
other participants in the workshops.
With respect and gratitude, we want to dedicate this book to Prof. Kanemi Ban,
who supported the project from the outset and attended our first symposium at the
annual meeting of the Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies,
Kochi University of Technology. Unfortunately, he passed away in 2018 without
seeing the completion of the project. Without his encouragement and support, we
could not have completed this project or the book.
Tokyo, Japan Toshi H. Arimura
Tokyo, Japan Shigeru Matsumoto
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Chapter 1
Expectations for Carbon Pricing in Japan
in the Global Climate Policy Context
Satoshi Kojima and Kenji Asakawa
Abstract Realizing a decarbonized society in consistent with the Paris Agreement,
a fundamental transformation of the entire economic and social system is needed, and
not only carbon intensive sectors but also all sectors and all stakeholders including
householdsmust be decarbonized. This chapter demonstrates increasing expectations
for carbon pricing in Japan in this global policy context. After the review of the global
trend of carbon pricing, historical progress of carbon pricing in Japan and the existing
nation-wide carbon tax, i.e. the Global Warming Countermeasure Tax, is explained.
There are also two sub-national carbon pricing schemes in Japan, Tokyo ETS and
Saitama ETS, which are explained in Chaps. 6 and 7 respectively, and not focused
in this chapter. We examine the claim that Japan has already implemented high level
carbon pricing in terms of various forms of energy taxes. Based on the effective
carbon rate which is defined by OECD as the sum of explicit carbon prices and
fossil fuel taxes per carbon emission, the nationwide average effective carbon rate
of Japan is lower than the average effective carbon rates of OECD countries and its
key partner countries. The current carbon pricing schemes in Japan are too modest to
realize decarbonization transition and there is a room to upgrade them to exploit full
potential of carbon pricing. This chapter discusses adequate levels of carbon prices
in compatible with decarbonization transition.
Keywords Paris agreement · Decarbonization · Transition · Carbon pricing ·
Effective carbon rates
1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 sets out the trend toward decar-
bonization, which calls for net zero GHG emissions by the latter half of this century.
Along with this trend not a few countries have set ambitious emission reduction
targets to address it, and among them Japan officially set an 80% reduction target for
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greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 in the Plan for Global Warming Coun-
termeasures adopted by the Cabinet in May 2016. The IPCC 1.5°C Special Report
(IPCC 2018) published in November 2018 further corroborates this trend, and now
international society seriously discusses decarbonization measures to reduce CO2
emissions to net zero around 2050. In order to realize such a decarbonized society, a
fundamental transformation of the entire economic and social system is needed and
not only carbon intensive sectors such as the power generation sector and the iron
and steel sector but also all sectors and all stakeholders including households must
be decarbonized.
How to realize such a fundamental transformation is apparently an extremely
difficult question, but there are number of existing studies tackling this daunting task
to answer this question and there seems to be a general agreement that carbon pricing
is necessary to realize a fundamental systemic change toward a decarbonized society.
The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP), an international research
project that aimed to chart a pathway to reach the 2050 reduction target using back-
casting methods to be consistent with the Paris Agreement, placed carbon pricing as
a key element in all policy packages (DDPP 2015). It is explained that the realization
of decarbonization assumes that a large number of discrete (decentralized) actors will
make the right choices, and carbon pricing is essential to harmonize such discrete
decisions (DDPP 2015). Rockström et al. (2017), in their “Roadmap for RapidDecar-
bonization“ to achieve net zero CO2 emissions by 2050, stated that carbon pricing
of at least USD 50/t-CO2 in 2020 for all CO2 emissions needs to be introduced, and
that it needs to be raised to a level above USD 400/t-CO2 by 2050.
There are strong calls for carbon pricing from several influential stakeholders at
the global level. At COP21 in December 2015, the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coali-
tion (CPLC) was officially launched. As of 2019 CPLC brings together more than
33 national and sub-national governments, 162 private sector organizations, and
80 strategic partners representing NGOs, business organizations, and universities,
aiming at promoting carbon pricing towards the long-term objective of introducing
carbon pricing all over the world (World Bank 2019a). Actually it was not by chance
that the launch of CPLC and the adoption of the Paris Agreement happened simul-
taneously at COP21. There was a strong synergy between these two events. The call
for ambitious climate actions, through carbon pricing, by both heads of governments
and CEOs of leading companies gave momentum to raise the level of ambition of
the Paris Agreement, and ambitious climate goals stipulated in the Paris Agreement
built momentum to introduce carbon pricing as a key instrument to attain the climate
goals. From the business sector, the World Business Council for Sustainable Devel-
opment (WBCSD) stated in their 2019 report that “carbon pricing mechanisms are
critical to support the urgent efforts required to drive the transition towards a low
carbon future and achieving the 1.5 °C goal” (WBCSD 2019, p. 6). As WBCSD
(2019) declared, the time for debating the need for carbon pricing was over and it
is time to strongly call for the need of carbon pricing as long-term polices towards
decarbonized society.
Carbon pricing is expected to contribute to decarbonization through several func-
tions. Two key functions are price signalling and revenue generation functions. The
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price signalling function means that carbon pricing improves economic efficiency
by reflecting the cost of carbon emissions, i.e. the damage costs of climate change.
Ideally carbon prices should be set at the true cost of carbon emissions, but in reality
any level of carbon pricing will raise the relative prices of carbon intensive commodi-
ties and can contribute to mitigation. This function is common across all forms
of explicit carbon pricing, including both carbon tax and cap-and-trade (emission
trading system), and it makes low-carbon products relatively cheaper than carbon-
intensive alternatives, which results in steering consumers to make low-carbon
choices, as well as making low-carbon business profitable and creating business
opportunities. The revenue generation function means that revenues from the carbon
pricing schemes can be utilised to finance climate actions. This function is limited
to carbon taxes or cap-and-trade mechanisms with auction of emission allowances.
This function may enable low-carbon and decarbonization investment, including
infrastructure development, without which systemic changes towards decarbonized
society cannot be materialised. In addition, a carbon tax with a clearly announced
future price schedule may serve to inform the general public the strong commitment
of governments to achieve climate goals and enable them to accommodate expected
levels of carbon prices in their decision making, which is termed as an announce-
ment effect. Through these functions, carbon pricing is expected to provide enabling
conditions of a systemic transformation towards decarbonized society.
On the other hand, existing research on carbon pricing has advanced around
either theoretical studies supporting that carbon pricing is the most cost-effective
emission reduction measure (e.g., Pearce 1991; Schneider and Goulder 1997; Moro-
tomi 2000; Nordhaus 2010) or research on the double dividend hypothesis (e.g.,
Fullerton and Metcalf 1997; De Mooij 2000; Arimura et al. 2018), which argues
that emissions reductions and positive economic impacts can be achieved simulta-
neously by appropriating revenues from carbon pricing to reduce market-distorting
taxes such as income tax and corporate tax. Tvinnereim and Mehling (2018) review
empirical studies on carbon pricing, including examples of ex-post evaluations by
econometric analysis, and point out that although the emission reduction effect of
carbon pricing was empirically supported, the reduction effects were only in the
range of a few percent to 10% even in countries that have introduced expensive
carbon pricing, including Sweden, and does not support that carbon pricing is effec-
tive for the large emission reductions needed for decarbonization. Patt and Lilliestam
(2018) claim that most of the existing theoretical studies on carbon pricing are based
on the short-term and static demand-supply curves of neoclassical economics, but in
order to handle system transitions such as decarbonization, a theoretical framework
of transition theory from a long-term and dynamic perspective is needed, such as a
decrease in supply price due to an increase in supply due to learning effects and a
product value that is determined by regimes such as infrastructure, social networks
and institutions.
This chapter demonstrates increasing expectations for carbon pricing in Japan
in the context of global climate policy corresponding to the Paris Agreement, in
particular the 1.5 °C goal, with keeping mind of the abovementioned research gap.
The following Sect. 2 explains the global trend of carbon pricing with introducing
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advanced cases of carbon pricing across the world. Section 3 explains historical
progress of carbon pricing discussion in Japan and outlines the current nation-wide
carbon pricing scheme, i.e. Global Warming Countermeasure Tax. There are also
sub-national carbon pricing schemes in Japan, that is, ETSs in Tokyo and Saitama,
of which explanation are provided in Chaps. 6 and 7 respectively, and this chapter
focuses on carbon tax including the currently implementedGlobalWarmingCounter-
measure Tax. Section 4 argues that the current carbon pricing schemes in Japan are too
modest and there is a room to upgrade them to exploit full potential of carbon pricing,
with arguing expected price ranges in compatible with decarbonization transition,
and Sect. 5 concludes this chapter.
2 Global Trend of Carbon Pricing
2.1 Carbon Pricing Initiatives in the World
Since the first carbon tax was introduced by Finland in 1990, only a limited number
of European countries implemented carbon tax and the emissions covered by these
schemes were very small until the early 2000s. In 2005 EU-ETS was started and the
emissions covered by carbon pricing significantly increased, around 4% of global
emissions (World Bank 2019b). In 2007 the number of carbon pricing initiatives
reached 10, and 4 years later the number of initiatives exceeded 20. Since then the
number of initiatives have steadily increased, and as of April 2019, 46 countries and
28 cities/states/regions, which represent 56% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions, have introduced carbon pricing initiatives, according to World Bank (2019b).
The levels of carbon prices vary significantly across countries/schemes as shown in
Fig. 1.
Currently three Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland), Switzerland,
Liechtenstein and France set high carbon prices above USD 50/t-CO2, with Sweden
implementing the highest carbon price of USD 127/t-CO2. 18 initiatives employ
moderate carbon prices between USD 10/t-CO2 and USD 50/t-CO2, and the
remaining initiatives employ low carbon prices less than USD 10/t-CO2. Japan’s
carbon tax (Global Warming Countermeasure Tax) is JPY 289/t-CO2 (around USD
2.6/t-CO2), which is among the lowest carbon prices.
2.2 Lessons Learned from Advanced Carbon Pricing
Initiatives
In order to make the debate over carbon pricing in Japan more productive and
proactive towards decarbonization transition, advanced cases of carbon pricing in
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Fig. 1 Prices in existing carbon pricing initiatives. Source World Bank (2019b), adopted by the
authors
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Europe, which were often introduced after intense debate with opponents, provide
good reference cases.
InGermany, compared to Japan, ecological tax reform itself has become a political
point of contention and has been elevated to a national debate through the election
campaign. The lesson to be learned from this is that the larger the national debate
became, the more each stakeholder’s “real opinions” (the real points of contention)
came up for discussion, rather than superficially contesting theoretical and academic
points of contention (Kreiser et al. 2015). As a result, it was decided to focus on indi-
vidual benefits, such as the international competitiveness, performance, and employ-
ment issues of the stakeholders affected by the carbon tax, particularly the manufac-
turing industry, rather than themacro and general discussion such as impacts on GDP
growth rates. In this way, we believe that the political contentiousness has stimulated
a wide range of stakeholders to discuss their “true feelings” and, because the issues
were thoroughly addressed, it was possible to design the system for a carbon tax and
other measures accordingly, and relatively quickly consensus was formed.
France was more concerned about the international competitiveness of its own
industry, and discussion of border tax adjustment in cooperation with other countries
was rendered in parallel with the introduction of a carbon tax and other measures
(Asakawa et al. 2016). In EU, many countries have already traded emissions credits
through EU-ETS and many countries have also introduced carbon taxes. Therefore,
at least a fairer competitive market in terms of carbon pricing has been developed
than in the other regions. Nevertheless, the fact that border tax adjustments were
being considered suggests that international competitiveness is an issue that should
be handled with caution.
In the United Kingdom, from the beginning of policy process the priority is given
to stakeholder consultation in order to reflect the opinions of citizens and industry in
the design of the system, including consideration for the energy poor (Force 1998). In
response to industry concerns, the government exempted energy-intensive industries
from taxation, but instead forced them to sign a climate change agreement with the
government with voluntary reduction targets. This active adoption of a policy mix of
agreements and carbon taxes is also instructive in designing carbon pricing in Japan.
In Sweden, the success factor of early introduction of carbon tax was the fact that
tax on fossil fuels was sought as an alternative revenue source to income taxes that
had been a high tax burden (Asakawa et al. 2016). This suggests that in addition to the
importance of revenue neutrality, the choice of alternative taxes also contributes to
public support. In addition, the abundance of biomass, which became an alternative
heat source for local heat supply with the introduction of the carbon tax, could be
another important factor in increasing public support.
2.3 The Current Status of Effective Carbon Rates
There is an argument that energy taxes also function as carbon pricing instru-
ments. For example, taxation on fossil fuels provides incentives to reduce fossil
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fuels consumption and consequently has the same effect as a carbon tax, if we just
focus on one type of fossil fuel. The important difference between carbon tax and
energy tax is that the former tax rates per carbon content are identical across different
types of fossil fuels while those of the latter differ between different fossil fuels, and
in the worst case the latter could give incentive to increase carbon emissions through
lowering relative price of high carbon content fossil fuel such as coal comparing
with that of low carbon content fossil fuel such as natural gas. Bearing this caveat in
mind, energy tax can be regarded as an extension of carbon pricing. Following this
line of argument, OECD defines effective carbon rates (ECR) as the sum of explicit
carbon prices (carbon taxes and ETS) and fossil fuel taxes per carbon emission, and
estimates the effective carbon rates of OECD countries and its key partner countries
as shown in Table 1 (OECD 2016).
Switzerland records the highest national average effective carbon rate at EUR
104.4/t-CO2, followed by Luxemburg (EUR 95.3/t-CO2) and Norway (EUR 93.0/t-
CO2). Interestingly the national average effective carbon rate of Sweden (EUR69.3/t-
CO2) is significantly lower than its carbon tax rate (USD 127/t-CO2), which means
that substantial portion of carbon emissions are exempted from carbon tax.
The effective carbon rates vary greatly across sectors. Inmany countries including
Japan, road transport energy is heavily taxed and is associated with much higher
effective carbon rates than those of remaining energy usages, as shown in Table 1.
For example, in Japan, the average effective carbon rate of road transport energy is
high at EUR 188.3/t-CO2 while that of other energies is much low at EUR 7.7/t-CO2,
which result in the country’s average effective carbon rate at EUR 34.8/t-CO2.
3 The Current Status of Carbon Pricing in Japan
3.1 The Current Carbon Pricing Initiatives in Japan
Currently there are three carbon pricing initiatives in Japan, Tokyo ETS started in
2010, SaitamaETS started in 2011 and linked to TokyoETS, and theGlobalWarming
Countermeasure Tax, a national carbon tax, started in 2012. As two local ETSs are
addressed in the following Chap. 6 (Tokyo ETS) and Chap. 7 (Saitama ETS), this
section focuses on the Global Warming Countermeasure Tax.
Japan introduced the Global Warming Countermeasure Tax in April 2012 after
long discussion at the Central Environment Council. In particular, the Special
Committee on Global Warming Countermeasures and Taxation, which was estab-
lished under the Joint Committee of Comprehensive Policy andGlobal Environment,
the Central Environment Council, from 2001 to 2003, carried out intensive discus-
sions on carbon taxes with the aim of creating a basis for public debate on carbon
taxes as a part of evaluation and review of the Charter of Countermeasures against
Global Warming in 2004. Based on these discussions the Ministry of the Environ-
ment (MOE) submitted a series of tax proposals based on the examination of the
8 S. Kojima and K. Asakawa

















Australia 21.2 82 2.4 18 106.6
Austria 56.2 75 20.2 25 164.4
Belgium 40.6 79 7.4 21 165.7
Canada 10.7 73 3.4 27 30.6
Chile 12.5 84 0.0 16 78.2
Czech 33.2 84 6.7 16 172.3
Denmark 80.3 77 47.4 23 190.4
Estonia 29.1 87 9.5 13 160.4
Finland 48.7 87 23.7 13 216.1
France 65.8 67 9.7 33 179.9
Germany 58.7 82 23.4 18 219.5
Greece 60.4 82 20.7 18 241.4
Hungary 35.4 77 5.0 23 137.4
Iceland 80.1 58 18.1 42 165.6
Ireland 71.9 73 20.6 27 210.6
Israel 79.6 75 26.3 25 239.4
Italy 60.4 82 20.4 18 242.7
Japan 34.8 85 7.7 15 188.3
Rep. Korea 28.4 87 9.8 13 153.3
Luxemburg 95.3 31 5.8 69 135.5
Mexico 2.7 69 0.2 31 8.1
Netherlands 88.7 80 54.6 20 224.8
New Zealand 30.5 67 1.2 33 90.2
Norway 93.0 76 46.7 24 239.3
Poland 28.6 85 10.6 15 130.6
Portugal 48.4 72 6.6 28 156.1
Slovakia 40.0 83 16.3 17 155.7
Slovenia 67.8 62 16.6 38 151.5
Spain 43.4 74 11.1 26 135.1
Sweden 69.3 78 30.7 22 206.5
Switzerland 104.4 64 21.5 36 251.7
Turkey 39.2 85 7.6 15 218.6
UK 75.5 77 14.3 23 280.6
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USA 5.7 72 0.8 28 18.4
Argentina 33.0 77 3.7 23 130.9
Brazil 3.8 72 1.8 28 9.1
China 4.0 94 1.6 6 42.0
India 2.9 93 1.0 7 29.1
Indonesia 2.4 83 0.0 17 13.9
Russia 0.0 92 0.0 8 0.1
South Africa 13.7 91 3.0 9 122.1
Source OECD (2016), adopted by the authors
characteristics of carbon taxes, institutional issues as taxes, the use of tax revenues,
and preliminary estimation of the effects of carbon taxes. Table 2 shows changes in
proposals made byMOE and the Central Environment Council until the introduction
of the Global Warming Countermeasure Tax.
It is observed that basic features of the implemented Global Warming Counter-
measure Tax as well as most proposals, except for those in 2003, 2004 and 2009,
are low tax rate with spending tax revenue for global warming countermeasures.
Kawakatsu et al. (2017) reported that the study group on possible tax system reform
established by the Environmental Agency (the current MOE) already suggested in
1998 that a possible Japanese carbon tax should have a low tax rate and that the
revenues should be solely used for GHG reduction, according to Environmental
Agency (1997). In many countries carbon intensive sectors such as the fossil fuel
industry, the iron and steel industry and the paper industry strongly oppose carbon
pricing that significantly increases production costs if other conditions remain the
same, and Japanese business community strongly opposed introducing the carbon
tax, which was one of the factors explaining why the realized tax rate (JPY 289/t-
CO2) was much lower than the originally proposed rates (JPY 655/t-CO2 in the
proposals during 2004–2008, and JPY 1,064/t-CO2 in the 2009 proposal).
Another interesting feature of carbon tax debate in Japan and the implemented
Global Warming Countermeasure Tax is lack of double dividend perspective, which
has been intensively discussed associated with carbon pricing and has provided
orientation of green tax reform in many countries. The double dividend hypoth-
esis claims that the reduction of externality by a carbon tax (the first dividend) and
the effect of reducing market distortions caused by taxation (the second dividend)
can be achieved simultaneously by using carbon tax revenues to reduce other taxes
(Goulder 1995; Schob 2003). The original double-dividend hypothesis is that the tax
revenue from the optimal solution for the first dividend, which is the Pigouvian tax,
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Table 2 Contents of tax proposals towards the Global Warming Countermeasure Tax
Proposal
date












































































































































































































































Source MOE, ‘Greening taxation’, accessed 15 January 2020 at https://www.env.go.jp/policy/tax/
kento.html, adopted by the authors
can be used to reduce other taxes that have the effect of distorting the market, in order
to attain additional benefit of further improvement in resource allocation efficiency
by correcting market distortions (the second dividend). For this form of the double
dividend hypothesis, partial equilibrium model analyses by Nichols (1984), Terkla
(1984), and Lee and Misiolek (1986) in the 1980s provided results supporting the
hypothesis (Schob 2003). There are various variations in the double dividend hypoth-
esis in terms of the definition of the second dividend such as an increase in employ-
ment rather than general GDP growth (e.g., Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1998) or
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in the effect of correcting inequality in the income distribution (e.g., Klenert et al.
2016). In either case the possibility of double dividend from carbon tax can contribute
to improve social and political acceptability of carbon tax. In Japan, however, the
possibility of double dividend through revenue recycling to reduce other taxes or
social insurance cost was reflected only in the MOE’s tax proposals in 2004 and
2009, and the implemented Global Warming Countermeasure Tax does not have
this possibility. Replacing existing taxes, such as corporate tax and income tax, with
carbon tax in order to pursue double dividend would have financial implications to
related ministries, not onlyMOE and theMinistry of Finance but also theMinistry of
Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, and so on.
Consequently, incorporation of double dividend feature into carbon tax very likely
requires inter-ministerial coordination, which might have hindered active discussion
on double dividend issues in Japan.
3.2 The Current Sectoral Effective Carbon Rates in Japan
Broadly, there are three types of energy taxes in Japan, that is, upstream fossil fuel
tax (the Petroleum and Coal Tax), downstream fossil fuel taxes (the Gasoline Tax, the
Light Fuel Oil Tax, and the Aviation Fuel Tax), and electricity tax (the Electric Power
Development Promotion Tax). The tax rates of downstream fossil fuel taxes are in
general high, e.g. that of the Gasoline Tax is around USD 200/t-CO2 and that of the
Light Fuel Oil Tax is around USD 100/t-CO2, but only selected types of fossil fuels
are covered (Kawakatsu et al. 2017). Upstream fossil fuel tax, i.e. the Petroleum and
Coal Tax, is levied on the import or extraction of all types of fossil fuels including
natural gas, and the Global Warming Countermeasure Tax is implemented as an
additional tax on the Petroleum and Coal Tax (Arimura and Iwata 2015). It should
be noted that tax rates of the Petroleum and Coal Tax vary across different types of
fossil fuels, i.e., around USD 7/t-CO2 for crude oil, USD 4/t-CO2 for natural gas,
and USD 2.7/t-CO2 for coal, which would give price advantage to coal against other
cleaner fossil fuels.
Some opponents to carbon pricing often claim that Japan has already implemented
quite high carbon pricing through the abovementioned energy taxes. The effective
carbon rates estimated byOECD (2016) shed light on this claim.As shown in Table 1,
Japan’s effective carbon rate of road transportation energy is EUR 188.8/t-CO2,
which is higher than the average of listed countries in Table 1 (EUR 146.6/t-CO2) but
not extremely high among OECD countries. In terms of national average effective
carbon rates, Japan is EUR 34.8/t-CO2, which is lower than the average of listed
countries in Table 1 (EUR 43.9/t-CO2).
In order to identify potential of carbon pricing in Japan further, we estimated
Japan’s sectoral average effective carbon rates of 6 sectors, that is, the road trans-
portation, the offroad transportation, the industry, the agriculture and fishing, the
residential and commercial, and the electricity sectors, as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3 Sectoral effective carbon rates of Japan
Sector Average ECR
(EUR/t-CO2)
Emission (1000 t-CO2) Emission share (%)
Road transport 188.3 196,028 14.7
Offroad transport 56.7 20,719 1.6







Electricity 10.4 508,103 38.0
Source OECD (2016), adopted by the authors
It is striking that the average effective carbon rate of the industrial sector, which
emit 33.8% of total carbon emissions, is EUR 3.3/t-CO2, which is only marginally
above the rate of Global Warming Countermeasure Tax. In terms of effective carbon
rate it is clear that only transportation sectors (road transportation and offroad trans-
portation) bear disproportionally heavy burden, which may result in sub-optimal
mitigation outcome as a whole country.
4 Expectations for Carbon Pricing in Japan
4.1 Discussion on Required Price Level
As we discussed in the previous section, the current carbon pricing schemes in Japan
are modest and there is a room to upgrade them to exploit full potential of carbon
pricing in the context of decarbonization transition. The first key issue is adequate
level of carbon pricing. In order to get ideas from the existing literature, it seems
important to distinguish two approaches in estimating the carbon price corresponding
to the given reduction target. One is the marginal abatement cost approach, which
assumes that the carbon price to achieve the given reduction target is equal to the
marginal abatement cost corresponding to that target, and the other is explicit carbon
pricing approach in which the reduction target is achieved as a result of stakeholders
response to explicit carbon pricing. In hypothetical first best world two approaches
result in the same carbon price, but this does not hold in the real world as explained
below.
The marginal abatement cost is the cost to reduce one unit in addition to the
current amount of abatement. Since the cost to reduce one unit differs depending on
abatement technologies and the amount of abatement, and since it is used from less
expensive abatement technologies to achieve the required abatement, the marginal
abatement cost increases as the required amount of emission reduction increases
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(Fig. 2). When the marginal abatement cost corresponding to the given reduction
target is collected as a carbon price, the reduction target is achieved as a result of the
emitter’s rational action of cost minimization. In this case, the marginal abatement
cost corresponding to the given reduction target is equal to the carbon price to achieve
the target (Fig. 2). IPCC (2018) reports the marginal abatement costs in the scenarios
corresponding to the 1.5°C and 2°C targets as the prices of carbon emissions.
On the other hand, Kesicki and Ekins (2012) point out that an approach in which
reduction targets are achieved through the introduction of a carbon price equal to
the marginal abatement cost corresponding to the reduction target does not reflect
the various interactions associated with the dynamic processes, and it is necessary
to consider marginal abatement costs separately from explicit carbon prices such
as carbon taxes and ETS. Bataille et al. (2016) point out that prior to COP 15,
majority of research focused on the marginal abatement cost curve for discussing
economically efficient emission reductions since themain challenge there was partial
emission reductions, but when addressing the challenge of full decarbonization, such
as the DDPP, the marginal abatement cost approach is not useful because it may
lead to lock-into carbon-intensive infrastructure and technologies or solutions that
are inconsistent with social and economic priorities. For utilizing carbon pricing
to realize a decarbonized society, it is important to go beyond the framework of the
statistic equilibrium analysis of themarginal abatement cost approach and to conduct
a dynamic analysis of the processes that significantly change the marginal abatement
cost curve itself and the possibility of lowering total emissions and target reductions
through a reduction of emitting activities as a result of influencing decision-making
of all actors such as producers, consumers, and investors.
For example, the introduction of carbon pricing gives renewable energy a price
advantage over fossil fuels, while the introduction of renewable energy in large
quantities as a result of this price advantage makes renewable energy technologies
Fig. 2 Marginal abatement cost curve and carbon price. Source The authors
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Fig. 3 Possibility of lowering carbon price through various dynamic effects. Source The authors
cheaper due to economies of scale, and this virtuous cycle will lead to substantial
emission reduction. Taking these dynamic effects into account, the explicit carbon
price required to achieve the reduction target is expected to be substantially lower
than the corresponding marginal abatement cost for achieving the reduction target in
the statics framework, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Furthermore, the downward shift in the marginal reduction cost curve and the
reduction in total emissions can also be caused by systemic changes such as the
transition to a digital economy or a circular economy, which are not necessarily
caused by the introduction of carbon pricing. Obviously the above argument still
applies in this case. Regardless of the impact of carbon pricing, the dynamic analysis
of system conversions that significantly change the marginal abatement cost curve
itself and the possibility of lowering total emissions and the reduction target through
a reduction in emitting activities is important to support actual implementation of
carbon pricing.
In addition to the above arguments, the fact that individual bounded rationality
plays a major role in real-world decision-making can also be a factor in the discrep-
ancy between themarginal abatement cost estimates and the carbon price. It is known
that there are negative marginal abatement costs, i.e., technologies that benefit from
the implementation of reduction measures, when a marginal abatement cost curve is
drawn by ordering the reduction cost per unit and the amount that can be reduced
for each reduction measure technology from the one with the lowest reduction cost
per unit. The fact that not all of these technologies with negative marginal abate-
ment costs have been introduced shows that in the real world, the assumption that all
measures with marginal abatement costs lower than the carbon price will be imple-
mented is not necessarily valid. Therefore, a distinction needs to be made between
estimating the marginal abatement cost corresponding to a given reduction target
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and how much is reduced through each stakeholder’s responses when that marginal
abatement cost is introduced as an explicit carbon price.
As the above discussion suggests, estimated carbon prices in consistent with
decarbonization transition significantly vary between two approaches. In general,
the marginal abatement cost approach resulted in much higher carbon prices than the
explicit carbon pricing approach.
IPCC (2018) estimates global marginal abatement costs for emission pathways
meeting the 2°C target to be USD 15-220/t-CO2eq (2010 prices) in 2030 and USD
45-1,050/t-CO2eq (2010 prices) in 2050, while marginal abatement costs for emis-
sion pathways meeting the 1.5°C target to be USD 135-6,050/t-CO2eq (2010 prices)
in 2030 and USD 245-14,300/t-CO2eq (2010 prices) in 2050. Oshiro et al. (2017)
estimated marginal abatement costs using the AIM/Enduse [Japan] model, a sequen-
tial dynamic bottom-up energy model, for seven different scenarios for Japan’s
decarbonization paths corresponding to the 2°C and 1.5°C targets, with and without
utilizing carbon sequestration through nuclear power and bioenergy CCS (BECCS),
and with and without making early abatement efforts in 2030 that exceed the NDC
reduction target. It is also argued that without the use of BECCS, the 1.5°C target
cannot be achieved and the marginal reduction cost in 2050 under the 2°C target
achievement scenario rises to USD 860/t-CO2. Sugiyama et al. (2019) analyzed
the decarbonization paths of achieving the 2030 NDC and 80% reduction in 2050
using 7 different models with different characteristics, including sequential and full
dynamics, global model and Japan single country model, general equilibrium model
and partial equilibrium model, and estimated the marginal abatement cost in 2030
as USD 44-346/t-CO2 (median USD 150/t-CO2) and the marginal abatement cost in
2050 as USD 273-7,730/t-CO2 (median USD 2,818/t-CO2).
On the other hand, the studies in explicit carbon pricing approach estimate rela-
tively moderate carbon price to achieve decarbonization transition. DDPP (2015)
identifies carbon pricing as an important element in all policy packages, but Canada
and France are the only countries to place explicit carbon pricing in their policy
packages in the DDPP country reports (Bataille et al. 2015; Criqui et al. 2015). As
part of its policy to reduceGHG emissions by 90% from 2005 levels by 2050, Canada
assumes to introduce carbon pricing at CAD 50/t-CO2 in 2020 and raise it by CAD
10/t-CO2 each year thereafter until it reaches CAD 350/t-CO2 in 2050 through a
combination of an ETS for heavy industry and a flexible carbon pricing system with
an upstream ETS or carbon tax option for other stakeholders. Revenues from carbon
pricing are assumed to be used to reduce income taxes for individuals and corpora-
tions (Bataille et al. 2015). In France, as part of the policy to reduce GHG emissions
by 75% of 1990 levels by 2050, a carbon tax of EUR 90/t-CO2 in 2030 and EUR
280/t-CO2 in 2050 is introduced for all sectors under the scenario of 50% share of
nuclear power and 40% share of renewable energy in the power supply mix in 2050,
and a carbon tax of EUR 120/t-CO2 in 2030 and EUR 360/t-CO2 in 2050 is intro-
duced for all sectors under the scenario of 25% share of nuclear power and 70% share
of renewable energy in the power supply mix in 2050, and the carbon tax revenue is
returned equally to households (Criqui et al. 2015). Rockström et al. (2017) argue
that in an effort to achieve a “roadmap for rapid decarbonization” to achieve net
1 Expectations for Carbon Pricing in Japan in the Global … 17
zero CO2 emissions globally by 2050, they would eliminate all fossil fuel subsidies
by 2020, which currently amount to USD 500–600 billion per year, and introduce
an explicit carbon price of at least USD 50/t-CO2 for all CO2 emissions in 2020
through international ETS scheme and a carbon tax on air and sea transport, gradu-
ally increasing to a level above USD 400/t-CO2 by 2050. This roadmap assumes that
all CO2 emissions, estimated to be around 5 Gt by 2050, will be captured by BECCS
to achieve net zeroCO2 emissions. To realize a decarbonized society in Japan,Kojima
et al. (2018) propose a policy package consisting of carbon tax and a tax recycling
scheme in which a portion of the carbon tax revenues is allocated to energy effi-
ciency investments in order to achieve the 2030 NDC target and the long-term goal
of the Global Warming Action Plan, an 80% reduction by 2050. Based on E3ME
macro-measurement model analysis, Kojima et al. (2018) propose a carbon tax of
JPY 11,400/t-CO2 (around USD 100/t-CO2) in 2030 and JPY 57,300/t-CO2 (around
USD 500/t-CO2) in 2050 in a phased manner from 2021 to 2050, with allocating
2–4% of the carbon tax revenue to energy efficiency investments and returning the
remainder of the tax revenue to households in a lump-sum manner. More recently,
Kobayashi et al. (2019) incorporate an assumption of a full transition to a digital
economy and estimate the carbon tax rate to achieve 80% reduction in CO2 emis-
sions in 2050 (compared to 2013), which corresponds to the 2°C target, and zero CO2
emissions in 2050, which corresponds to the 1.5°C target, using the static computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model. Their assumption of a full transition to a digital
economy include widespread use of artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things
(IoT), and big data. In introducing the carbon tax, the existing energy tax portion
of the tax is reduced so as not to be double taxed with the existing energy tax. It is
also assumed that all carbon tax revenues will be returned to households. This study
assumes that CO2 emissions in 2050 will be reduced by 61% in comparison with
2013 even without carbon pricing, because the transition to the digital economy will
result in a reduction in manufacturing and a shift to an industrial structure dominated
by the service industry along with a decline in the population and an aging of the
population. Furthermore, this study assumes a structural change accompanying the
transition to the digital economy, such as the use of plastic as a substitute for steel in
automobile manufacturing due to the improved safety of automobile traffic caused
by the spread of automated driving, or an 80% reduction in the number of automo-
biles due to the development of the sharing economy, and the elimination of auto-
mobile purchases by ordinary households. Based on these assumptions, Kobayashi
et al. (2019) conclude that a carbon tax of JPY 9,700/t-CO2 (around USD 90/t-CO2)
would be necessary to achieve 80% reduction, which means additional 19% reduc-
tion on the baseline reduction of 61%, with an additional assumption that carbon
pricing triggers the introduction of CCS and additional renewable energy. Without
assuming carbon pricing-induced CCS and additional renewable energy deployment,
the carbon tax rate required to achieve an 80% reduction in 2050 will jump to more
than JPY 30,000/t-CO2 (around USD 270/t-CO2). In order to further reduce emis-
sions and achieve zero emissions in 2050, Kobayashi et al. (2019) estimate that a
carbon tax of JPY 21,400/t-CO2 (aroundUSD 200/t-CO2) will be required, assuming
the introduction of CCS and additional renewable energy through carbon pricing.
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4.2 Careful Consideration for Revenue Recycling
The revenue generation function of carbon pricing is associated with both potential
and challenges and it must be carefully considered.
In terms of potential, there are various options of spending of the revenue of carbon
pricing. In case of the Global Warming Countermeasure Tax its revenue is solely
spent for global warming countermeasures. However as explained in Sect. 3, wisely
designed revenue recycling may be able to achieve double dividend in some forms
(Chap. 13). Considering the problems Japan is facing now, such as low birthrate and
aging population, declining local population, in addition to various challenges asso-
ciated with decarbonization transition including infrastructure investment, revenue
recycling for solving these problems may generate double dividend or even multiple
dividend. When the level of carbon price will be as high as discussed in 4.1, the
expected revenue could be very large and appropriate revenue recycling could have
huge positive impacts.
On the other hand, there is a potential conflict between themitigation function and
the revenue generating functions of carbon pricing (Morotomi 2000). This concern
is particularly important when carbon pricing is introduced in order to achieve major
emissions reduction. For example, if Japan could achieve an 80%emissions reduction
by 2050with carbon tax as one of key policy instruments for this purpose, the tax base
of the carbon tax would fall by 80%. Some may argue that no tax can escape revenue
fluctuations, but the point here is not just revenuefluctuations but also implications for
policy design. If, for example, a carbon tax is intended to generate stable revenue,
either a sufficiently low tax rate should be chosen or a gradually increasing tax
schedule would be needed to compensate for the reduction in the tax base. In the
former case, the mitigation effect is sacrificed. The latter case, starting with an initial
low rate may be reasonable as in any case, but a very high rate of carbon tax would be
politically infeasible and keeping a certain revenue level would become very difficult.
5 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the current carbon pricing in Japan, in terms of not only explicit
carbon pricing but also effective carbon rates, along with the current status of carbon
pricing worldwide, in the context of global climate policy after the Paris Agreement
and the IPCC 1.5°C Special Report (IPCC 2018).
There seems a general agreement among the literature addressing decarbonization
pathways corresponding to post Paris Agreement climate policy that carbon pricing
with high price level plays indispensable roles to realize systemic transition towards
decarbonized society. The rationale is that high level of carbon pricing can provide
effective and consistent signals to all stakeholders which is essential to harmonize
their decentralized decision making towards decarbonization.
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In this context, there is a large potential of improvement in Japan’s carbon pricing
schemes. Japan has implemented nationwide carbon tax, i.e. the Global Warming
Countermeasure Tax, since April 2012. The tax rate of this carbon tax is JPY 289/t-
CO2 (around USD 2.6/t-CO2), which is one of the lowest among carbon pricing
initiatives in the world. There are also two municipality level ETS schemes in Tokyo
(since 2010) and in Saitama (since 2011), which will be addressed in Chaps. 6 and
7, respectively. There is an argument that Japan has already implemented high level
carbon pricing in terms of various forms of energy taxes. However, the nationwide
average effective carbon rate of Japan is EUR34.8/t-CO2 according toOECD (2016),
which is lower than the average effective carbon rates of OECD countries and its
key partner countries (EUR 43.9/t-CO2). Our estimates of Japan’s sectoral average
effective carbon rates based on OECD (2016) highlight that only the transportation
sectors are associated with high effective carbon rates. In Japan the sectoral average
effective carbon rates of two large emitters, i.e. the industrial sector and the elec-
tricity sector, are EUR 3.3/t-CO2 and EUR 10.4/t-CO2, respectively. For improving
mitigation efficiency of carbon pricing, one candidate option is energy tax reform
based on carbon content of energy carriers, which is discussed in Chap. 11.
In order to exploit full potential of carbon pricing inmaterializing decarbonization
transition, much higher carbon price than the current Global Warming Countermea-
sure Tax is needed. In order to get ideas about adequate level of carbon pricing
from the existing literature, we distinguished two approaches in estimating carbon
price corresponding to the given reduction target, that is, the marginal abatement
cost approach that assumes carbon price to achieve the given reduction target is
equal to the marginal abatement cost corresponding to the target, and the explicit
carbon pricing approach in which the reduction target is achieved as a result of
stakeholders response to explicit carbon pricing. In general the former is associated
with much higher carbon prices than the latter due to lack of dynamic interactions
between carbon pricing and marginal abatement cost curves, such as downward shift
of marginal abatement cost curves due to innovation induced by carbon pricing. The
literature based on the explicit carbon pricing approach tend to estimate carbon prices
corresponding to decarbonization paths at around USD 100-500/t-CO2 (c.f. DDPP
2015; Rockström et al. 2017; Kojima et al. 2018; Kobayashi et al. 2019).
Another important issue of carbon pricing is the revenue recycling design. As
in many European cases green tax reform in which revenue of carbon tax is spent
to reduce other forms of taxes or social insurance costs may result in double divi-
dend (Chap. 13), or even multiple dividend. While careful consideration of revenue
recycling design is necessary because of potential conflict between the mitigation
function and the revenue generating functions of carbon pricing, carbon pricing with
adequate price level with wisely designed revenue recycling is expected to play
important roles to materialize decarbonization transition.
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Chapter 2
Climate Policy in the Commercial Sector:
A Survey of Commercial Buildings
in Japan
Hiroki Onuma and Toshi H. Arimura
Abstract In Japan, the government has set a target for a reduction in greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions by 26% from 2013 levels by 2030. The commercial sector
has the highest reduction target—39.8%—among all Japanese sectors. This chapter
first presents the current GHG situation in Japan and Japanese climate policy in the
commercial sector. Second, we introduce a nationwide survey that we conducted
on the implementation of energy efficiency measures (EEMs) in office buildings
with large-scale emissions in Japan. The survey results show that energy-saving
technology adoption is more advanced in Tokyo than in other prefectures and that
there is more space for the adoption of energy-efficient technologies nationwide.
To accelerate EEM adoption to achieve the 2030 target, regulatory agencies must
improve the way they promote energy audits and subsidies and provide information
on energy savings.
Keywords Energy efficiency measures · Office building · Emissions trading
scheme · Energy conservation act · Energy audit
1 Commercial Sector’s Position in Japan’s NDC
To accomplish the ParisAgreement goals of holding the increase in the global average
temperature towell below 2 °C above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit
the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, countries all over the
world have set their targets for post-2020 climate actions. In Japan, the government
has set a target for a reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 26% from
2013 levels by 2030 (see Table 1).
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Table 1 Japan’s GHG emissions target (by 2030)










Energy-originated CO2 927 1235 −25.0 −21.9
Industry sector 401 429 −6.5 −2.0
Commercial and other
sectors
168 279 −39.8 −7.9
Residential sector 122 201 −39.3 −5.6
Transport sector 163 226 −27.6 −4.5
Energy conversion sector 73 101 −27.7 −2.0
Other GHGs 152.4 173 −11.9 −1.5
Non-energy-originated
CO2
70.8 75.9 −6.7 −0.4
Methane (CCH4) 31.6 36.0 −12.3 −0.3
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 21.1 22.5 −6.1 −0.1
Fluorinated gases (HFCs,
PFCs, SF6, NF3)




Total 1042.4 1408.0 −26.0 −26.0
aLULUCF stands for land use, land use change and forestry
Within this national emission reduction target, the government has set different
emission target levels for each sector. The reduction target for the industrial sector
is 6.9%, and the target for the transportation sector is 26.9%. The commercial sector
has the highest reduction target—39.8%—among all Japanese sectors.
Japan’s GHG emissions had not declined below 1990 levels since statistics started
being collected in 1990 (excluding 2009 due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers)
before finally doing so in 2018 (MOE 2019). In 2018, the emission level was 1244
million tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent, representing a decrease of 3.6%
(47 million tons) from the previous year, after decreasing for five consecutive years.
Although the main contributor to emission reductions relative to 1990 levels is the
industrial sector, emissions over the past five years in other sectors, such as the
commercial, residential, and transportation sectors, have also declined (see Fig. 1).
However, the commercial and residential sectors have not reduced their emissions
enough compared to 1990 levels. The reasons for the higher emissions in these
two sectors are the increase in fossil fuel power generation after the Great East Japan
Earthquake onMarch 11, 2011; the expansion of building floor areas; and the increase
in the number of households, which has led to a growth in energy use.
To achieve Japan’s emissions target under the Paris Agreement, it is crucial to
accelerate the adoption of energy efficiency measures (EEMs) for the reduction of
GHGs. In 2010 and 2011, respectively, Tokyo and its neighboring prefecture Saitama
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Fig. 1 CO2 emissions change by sector since 1990
introduced an emissions trading scheme (ETS), which is a policy tool involving
effective mitigation measures for the commercial sector.1 These schemes seem to
have led to a reduction inGHGs inbothprefectures (Arimura andAbe2020), although
it is unclear how the reduction was achieved.
Based on this background, we conducted a nationwide survey of EEM imple-
mentation in 906 commercial buildings with large-scale emissions to clarify how
GHGs were reduced. This chapter explains the outline of the survey and compares
the EEMs and technology adoption status of commercial buildings in Tokyo, where
an ETS is implemented, with those of commercial buildings in areas where there is
no ETS. Based on the survey results, we discuss the possibility of EEM diffusion
among commercial buildings by introducing ETSs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes
Japan’s current energy and climate change policies in the commercial sector.
Section 3 presents how office buildings can conserve the energy consumption and
GHG emissions. Section 4 provides an overview of our survey and the survey results.
Section 5 concludes the chapter.
1See Chap. 6 for the Tokyo ETS and Chap. 7 for the Saitama ETS in this book.
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2 Japan’s Energy and Climate Change Policies
in the Commercial Sector
This section provides an overview of Japan’s energy and climate change policies
in the commercial sector (based on the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI) 2018; Arimura and Iwata 2015).
Japan’s energy consumption efficiency (final energy consumption amount/real
GDP) has improved by approximately 40% since the oil crises in the 1970s due to
the combined efforts of the public and private sectors.
After the first oil crisis in 1973, an act on the rational use of energy (known as
the “Energy Conservation Act”; ECA) was enacted in 1979 (enforced in October
1979) with the goal of efficient energy use in the context of energy security. The act
obligates plants and offices with a large amount of energy consumption (crude oil
equivalent of 1500 kl/year) to report the state of their EEMs and improvements in
energy consumption efficiency every year and to develop medium- and long-term
plans for energy efficiency.2 It also establishes a target of a 1% reduction in energy
intensity annually. In addition, regulated facilities must appoint qualified energy
managers to promote energy management at plants and offices.
The initial objective of the ECA was to reduce energy consumption rather than
GHG emissions, but reducing energy consumption results in a decline in fossil
fuel consumption. Therefore, the goal of the ECA was aligned with reducing GHG
emissions even before climate change was recognized as a major policy issue.
In the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, energy conservation in
Japan had two purposes. The first purpose was energy conservation to address energy
security issues motivated by the oil shocks in the 1970s. Now, the purpose of energy
conservation is to reduce GHG emissions.
Naturally, when the first commitment period began, the act was viewed as a
measure to combat climate change and to contribute to achieving the Kyoto Protocol
target plan published by theCabinet PublicRelationsOffice (2005). This plan empha-
sized that the objective of the ECA included reducing GHG emissions. The plan
projected a 3 million ton reduction in emissions in the commercial and residential
sectors.
In 2016, METI introduced a new system, the evaluation system for business oper-
ator classification. In this system, METI refers to facilities or a group of facilities as
“business operators”, which is a unit of regulation. Business operators that submit
periodic reports are categorized into four classes. If the performance of a business
operator is superior, the operator is ranked as Class S3 and is publicized as “superior
in energy conservation efforts” on METI’s homepage. If the performance is average,
the operator is categorized as Class A and recognized as a “general business opera-
tor”. If the energy conservation efforts are not progressing as expected, the operator
is ranked as Class B. Class B business operators receive a written notice that their
2In 2002, the ECA was revised to require the commercial sector to submit regular reports.
3In 2016, 56.7% of firms were categorized as Class S. Class A composed 29.2%, and Class B
accounted for 14.0% of the total. No firms were categorized as Class C (METI website).
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energy conservation efforts are not progressing, and they may face various levels of
intervention, such as on-site inspections or collection of reports by the regulatory
organization. A business operator can be classified as Class C after inspection if its
efforts toward energy conservation are poor. If an operator is ranked as Class C, it
must receive administrative guidance (shido). If the performance is still poor even
after receiving guidance, the operator is required to make a plan for energy conser-
vation. If it does not follow the directions, the business operator’s name is published
as a penalty, and it faces an order from the regulatory agency. In 2016, no business
operator was classified as Class C.
Among policy measures under the act, the Top Runner Program, which includes
fuel efficiency standards, is well known. The Top Runner Programwas introduced by
an amendment to the ECA in 1998. This measure designates products with distinc-
tions such as appliances and cars, indicates numerical criteria based on the best
products in energy efficiency at that time, and requires manufacturers and importers
to make their products comply with the threshold by a target year. Until now, energy-
saving efforts in the commercial and residential sectors have progressed under the
Top Runner Program. For example, as of FY2016, compared to FY2001 levels, the
efficiency of air conditioners improved by 28%, that of TV sets improved by 71%,
and that of household electric refrigerators improved by 252%.
In the commercial and residential sectors, energy efficiency improvements in
buildings and houses are expected to be the most effective way to conserve energy.
Using high-performance construction materials for openings and walls in which
heat dissipates is especially effective. However, these materials were not originally
included in the items of the Top Runner Program, which sets the standards for the
energy consumption efficiency of machines and instruments in Japan.
To promote EEMs in the building and housing sector as above, the government of
Japan added products that contribute to the improvement of the energy efficiency of
buildings, houses, and other products in the scope of the Top Runner Program. For
that purpose, the ECA was revised in 2013, and as a result, construction materials
were added to the scope of the program.
The Top Runner Program for building insulation materials now includes building
materials that contribute to the prevention of heat loss in buildings and/or houses.
More specifically, “insulation used in envelope” and “glass and frames used in
windows” are now included in the program. The program includes the following
three types of building materials: extruded polystyrene foam, glass wool, and rock
wool. The following three categories of materials are excluded from the scope of
building materials covered by the new Top Runner Program: (1) building materials
used for special applications, (2) building materials for which no technical measure-
ment or assessment methods have been established, and (3) building materials whose
share of use in themarket is exceedingly small. The insulation standards for insulation
materials, windows, and sashes are specified.
Setting energy efficiency standards can be expected to reduce energy consump-
tion through technological innovation. Using data from seven European countries,
Noailly (2012) investigates the impact of environmental policy instruments such as
regulatory energy standards in building codes on technological innovations aiming
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to improve energy efficiency in buildings. The study finds that strengthening the
minimum insulation standards for walls by 10% would increase the likelihood of
additional patent filings for specific technologies related to energy efficiency in
buildings by approximately 3%.
In addition, energy-consuming equipment such as commercial electric refrigera-
tors and freezers, multifunction devices, printers, electric water heaters (heat pump
water heaters) and light-emitting diode (LED) lamps were newly added to the items
of the Top Runner Program in 2013. The Japanese government has positioned LED
lighting as an important measure against global warming and plans to replace all
conventional (incandescent and fluorescent) lamps and lighting in homes, offices,
and factories with LED lamps and lighting on a flow basis by 2020 and on a stock
basis by 2030. To that end, in April 2019, the energy consumption efficiency target,
which had been set separately for conventional lamps and lighting and LED lamps
and lighting, was unified into a common target.
Furthermore, the government of Japan has promoted the renovation and rebuilding
of existing buildings andhouseswith high energy efficiencyperformance. In addition,
the government has encouraged the adoption of energy-efficient technologies such
as high thermal insulation in new buildings and houses. As of the end of FY2017,
the government had supported approximately 28,000 projects as measures to achieve
net zero energy4 by introducing the abovementioned energy-efficient technologies
in public and commercial buildings, houses and hospitals across the nation.
The Japanese government also aims to achieve net zero energy buildings (ZEBs)
on average in newly constructed nonresidential buildings by 2020 and newly
constructed public buildings by 2030 nationwide. For this goal, the government
utilizes theTopRunnerProgram for buildingmaterials and coordinateswithmeasures
pertaining to the promotion of the introduction of renewable energy, which is essen-
tial for ZEBs. Moreover, in promoting ZEBs, it is important to demonstrate how the
prices of high-energy performance building materials can be reduced.
With the aim of achieving ZEBs, the government of Japan has also decided to
phase in an obligation for newly constructed buildings and houses to meet the energy
efficiency standards by 2020, with due consideration given to the need for and degree
of regulation. The obligation to meet the standards has started to be phased in for
large-scale nonresidential buildings based on the Act for the Improvement of Energy
Consumption Performance of Buildings (Building Energy Efficiency Act) estab-
lished in 2015. The act was revised in 2019 and will be expanded to small and
medium-sized buildings starting in April 2021.
The realization of a low-carbon society will be advanced by implementing various
policymeasures, such as the TopRunner Program based on the ECA and the Building
Energy Efficiency Act. These policy measures have contributed to the progress of
energy-efficient technological innovation. However, the extent to which new energy-
efficient technologies have been adopted in society remains an open question.
4“Net zero” means zero by subtracting energy production from energy consumption. This can be
achieved if energy demands such as electricity and heat can be met with energy that does not emit
GHGs. For more details, please see Chap. 3.
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As a policy measure aiming to spread technology use in society, carbon pricing
(CP), such as an ETS or carbon tax, has come under the global spotlight after the Paris
Agreement entered into force. In Japan, the government has set a long-term target
for the reduction of GHG emissions, and the importance of CP has been reaffirmed
as an effective mitigation tool. At the national level, however, Japan has failed to
adopt CP at a level that can substantially reduce GHGs: only two prefectures, Tokyo
and Saitama, have introduced an ETS. Additionally, a carbon tax was set in 2012,
but the price level is insufficient compared with that of other countries that have set a
carbon tax. The Tokyo ETS is the first ETS in the world adopted for the commercial
sector. For more details about the Tokyo ETS, please see Chap. 6 and Arimura and
Abe (2020). One year after the introduction of the Tokyo ETS, Saitama launched the
Target Setting Emissions Trading System. This system is similar in many respects
to the Tokyo ETS but differs from the Tokyo ETS in that there are no penalties if the
target facility does not meet its emissions targets. For more details about the Saitama
ETS, please see Chap. 7 and Hamamoto (2020).
In addition to the lack of an appropriate CP level, there are other barriers to the
adoption of energy-efficient technologies. For example, facilities do not adopt such
technologies even though the savings from the installation of the technologies exceed
the costs. This is known as the energy efficiency gap (Gillingham and Palmer 2014).
There are several reasons for this gap. First, facility managers may not have accurate
information on energy-efficient technologies. Second, facilities may face liquidity
constraints and hence be unable to invest in expensive technologies even though the
net benefit of the investment is positive. Finally, it may be difficult for stakeholders
to reach a consensus on investment due to the complexity of organizations (DeCanio
1998).
The Japanese government is implementing policy measures to overcome these
barriers in energy. For example, the Ministry of the Environment Japan implements
energy audits5 called the “Assessment of CO2 Emission Reduction Potential (CO2
sakugen potensharu shindan)”,6 and METI implements the “Energy-saving Diag-
nostic (sho-ene shindan)”.7 These two types of diagnostics by the MOE and METI
often come with subsidies for energy-efficient technologies or appliances, often
in compliance with the Top Runner Program (MOE website). They also provide
reduced-rate loans for investments in energy-efficient technologies (DBJ website).
Furthermore, they often implement demonstrations of new innovative technologies
such as ZEBs. Through these various programs, the national government and local
5According to Babatunde et al. (2019), an energy audit is effective as an energy management tool
that helps in the identification and implementation of strategies for achieving energy efficiency
and conservation. It can also help extend the equipment/system lifespan, which, in the long run,
translates into savings in terms of capital and reductions in emissions.
6In 2014 (2015), CO2 emission reduction potential was assessed at 362 (138) facilities. Among
them, 238 (26) facilities belonged to service centers including commercial buildings (MRI 2016).
7For example, with funding from METI and the MOE, Energy Conservation Center Japan
has conducted more than 10,000 audits (https://www.asiaeec-col.eccj.or.jp/energy-audit-program/,
accessed on March 15, 2020).
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governments in Japan are engaged in the promotion of low carbon or decarbonization
in commercial buildings.
The next section introduces a survey that tried to clarify the effect of CP, especially
in the Tokyo ETS, on technology adoption in office buildings. The results of the
survey are presented.
3 How Can Energy Efficiency Be Promoted in Office
Buildings?
How can we promote energy conservation in office buildings? There are two chan-
nels to that end. First, buildings can adopt energy-efficient technologies. Olsthoorn
et al. (2017) present some examples of energy-efficient technologies related to the
energy use of buildings in the commerce and service sectors. These examples include
replacing lighting with more efficient alternatives, such as LED bulbs; applying insu-
lating materials to the outer faces of a building, such as the roof or the outer walls;
installing better insulating windows; substituting older, less efficient heating systems
withmore efficient ones, such as new condensing boilers; and adopting add-on digital
technology for the optimization of heating system operations, which involves ener-
getic optimization of the heating system, such as through hydraulic adjustments,
nighttime turndown, dynamic control, or thermostat lowering. We refer to these
methods of energy efficiency improvement as technological measures (TMs).
Second, improvement in energy efficiency can be achieved through non-
technological measures (NTMs). For example, buildings can reduce their energy
consumption by appropriately setting the temperatures of air conditioners. The
MOE recommends air conditioner temperatures of 28 °C in summer and 20 °C in
winter. Other examples are turning off lights or PCs when unused, operating existing
equipment in a highly efficient way and encouraging equipment users to perform
energy-saving actions.
4 Survey of Office Buildings in Japan
4.1 Overview of the Survey
This section first explains the survey sampling period andmethod. Then, it introduces
the main questions about EEMs and basic building information.
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4.1.1 Survey Period and Target Buildings
We conducted a nationwide survey in Japan of buildings whose main usage was for
offices. We sent questionnaires and collected responses from October to December
2018. The surveyed office buildings were so-called large-scale GHG emission build-
ings, which consumed 1500 kl or more of crude oil equivalent of energy (electricity,
gas, fuel, etc.) per year in FY2015. As of 2006, these buildings are obligated to report
their GHG emissions annually under the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Accounting,
Reporting, and Disclosure System, in accordance with the Act on Promotion of
Global Warming Countermeasures. We surveyed 906 commercial buildings. The
respondents were qualified energy managers (energy experts, facility managers) in
the buildings of the surveyed facilities. The questionnaire was answered in paper-
based or electronic form. We received responses from 167 buildings, for a response
rate of 18.4%.
The questionnaire inquired about the implementation status of EEMs, including
CO2 emissions reduction measures; basic physical and operational information on
the buildings; and investments in energy savings. The next subsection explains the
question items.
4.1.2 Survey Questions
The survey consisted of three parts. The first part asked questions regarding the
general characteristics of buildings. The second part included questions about EEMs
implemented in the buildings. The third part asked EEM adoption-related questions.
Buildings’ Physical and Operational Characteristics
The buildings’ physical characteristics included the year of construction of the
building, gross floor area, and number of gross floors by use. The building oper-
ational characteristics included the number of workers and visitors on workdays,
vacancy rates, building operating time (hours per day) by use, operating frequency
(“every day” or “weekday”) by use, and experience of large-scale repairs/renovations
for energy savings after the completion of the building construction.
EEMs in a Building
Regarding the implementation status of EEMs, we asked about the following cate-
gories: (1) lighting, (2) thermal insulation, (3) building energy management system
(BEMS), (4) elevators, air conditioning (AC) and heat source, and (5) miscellaneous.
In comprehensively selecting EEM items, we referred to the energy-saving measures
of the ZEB Roadmap Follow-up Committee (2018). We elaborate on each category
below.
First, six items were related to lighting-related EEMs: lighting fixtures with
an automatic brightness adjustment function by sensor, scheduled switching (time
scheduling), initial illumination correction, motion sensors, adjusting illuminance to
less than 500 lx on the work plane in the office, and thinning out unnecessary lights.
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The first five EEMs are TMs, which require investment in expensive technology. The
last EEM is an NTM, which does not require much extra cost.
Second, we selected three thermal insulation-related EEMs. First, the most basic
measures of thermal insulation are blinds, eaves and sunshades. In the summer,
closing blinds can keep direct sunlight out of the office and reduce unwanted solar
heat gain. In the winter, closing window blinds can save energy by preserving
heat even on cold days.8 Second, we inquired about the adoption of highly effi-
cient thermal insulation materials. Finally, we asked about highly efficient thermal
insulation windows.
Third, we asked about the BEMS, which is a management system that reduces
energy consumption in buildings “while maintaining occupants’ comfort” (Manic
et al. 2016). There are three levels of BEMS implementation. First, buildings are
engaged in monitoring and storing historical data on energy consumption. Second,
buildings use the stored data to make a plan of energy savings. Finally, buildings
use a demand control system, e.g., alerts when electricity demand is expected to be
higher than the upper limit of the electricity supply.
Fourth, regarding elevator-related EEMs,we askedwhether buildings had adopted
a “reduction in the number of elevators operating outside regular hours” as opera-
tionally feasible in the existing facilities. We also asked if they had installed energy-
efficient elevators, i.e., elevators with variable voltage variable frequency (VVVF)
inverters. The former measure is an NTM, and the latter is a TM.
Finally, we asked whether the buildings had installed automatic water taps or
solar panels. We inquired whether they had set temperatures in an environmentally
friendly manner (28 °C for cooling, 20 °C for heating) as recommended by theMOE.
Other Questions Related to Energy Efficiency
We also asked three questions related to EEM adoption. First, we asked whether the
buildings had received energy audits and, if so, what types of energy audits they
had received. There are various types of energy audits in Japan. First, internal audits
by experts inside the firm itself are easiest to implement. Second, external experts
can conduct energy audits by visiting facilities on site. For instance, energy service
companies (ESCOs)9 provide services for energy audits. Alternatively, suppliers
and manufacturers of energy-efficient appliances conduct energy audits as part
of sales. Further, power companies and gas companies conduct energy audits for
their customers. Moreover, local governments and municipalities have energy audit
support services, which have increased in recent decades due to growing interest
in global warming. Other public organizations, such as the MOE and the Energy
Conservation Center, Japan (ECCJ), offer similar services, but these energy audits
have been implemented for medium- and small-sized enterprises as well as factories
and buildings with annual energy consumption (crude oil equivalent) of 100 kl or
8However, there is an energy use trade-off between light and heating and cooling.
9An ESCO is a company that offers energy services, usually design, retrofitting and implementation
of energy efficiency projects, after identifying energy-saving opportunities through energy audits
of existing facilities. As payment, the ESCO can receive part of the return from the energy savings
realized by their advice.
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more and less than 1500 kl in principle. Therefore, our surveyed buildings do not
focus on these public energy audits.
Second, we asked about the types of energy subsidies, if any, that the buildings had
received. In Japan, regulatory agencies under national and local governments offer
subsidies for investment in energy savings. For example, the ECCJ implemented
several schemes for subsidy provision under both the MOE and METI.
Third, we obtained information on past investment in energy efficiency. We asked
how the buildings had acquired information on energy efficiency. For example,
persons in charge such as energy managers may ask vendors or search for informa-
tion by themselves. Alternatively, they may receive information from energy audits
or obtain information from industrial associations.
4.2 Survey Results
Thebreakdownof theprefectural distributionof the responding facilities is as follows.
Of the 167 responding buildings, 65 were in Tokyo and seven were in Saitama.10
These two prefectures have implemented ETSs. The 95 facilities located in other
prefectures are further divided into two groups. We refer to the first group as the
five major prefectures, which include Aichi, Fukuoka, and Osaka, which have major
metropolitan cities, and Chiba and Kanagawa, which are adjacent to Tokyo and the
Greater Tokyo area. The rest of the facilities located in other prefectures compose
the second group, the rest of the prefectures. We compare the implementation rate
of each EEM in Tokyo with that in the above two groups to identify differences in
technology adoption between areas with implementation and non-implementation of
ETSs. Note that the samples of each question for basic building information andEEM
implementation status contain only facilities from which we obtained responses.
4.2.1 Basic Building Information
Before explaining the results of EEM adoption, we present the basic information
of the buildings for which responses were obtained. In this chapter, we gather key
information on the basic building information questions. Table 2 shows summary
statistics of this information.
First, we explain the physical characteristics of the buildings. The years of
construction are, on average, 1993 in Tokyo and 1991 in the five major prefectures.
In the rest of the prefectures, the average year of construction is 1986. Thus, build-
ings in metropolitan areas, including Tokyo, tend to be newer than those elsewhere.
There are also regional differences in the number of floors. Buildings in Tokyo are,
on average, 6.7 stories higher than those in the five major prefectures. Moreover,
10We focus only on Tokyo as an implementation prefecture in this chapter due to the small sample
in Saitama.
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Table 2 Basic information on surveyed buildings by group
Tokyo Five major prefectures Rest of the prefectures
Physical characteristics
Year of construction 1993.5 1991.2 1986.4
(64) (64) (28)
Number of floors 25.8 19.1 11.6
(65) (63) (29)
Total floor area (m2) 85,205.0 59,794.0 36,106.8
(64) (64) (23)
Floor area by office use (m2) 61,660.2 33,328.9 14,278.4
(48) (41) (20)
Operation characteristics











Note Numbers in parentheses indicate number of samples
buildings in Tokyo are much taller than those in other regions. The average number
of floors in buildings in Tokyo is more than twice that in other prefectures, excluding
the five major prefectures. Consequently, the total floor area of buildings is largest
in Tokyo. The share of office usage in buildings is higher in Tokyo than in other
prefectures. Offices compose 72.4% of the total office floors in Tokyo, 55.7% in the
five major prefectures, and 39.5% in the rest of the prefectures.
Next, we present the building operational characteristics. The number of workers
and visitors in the buildings on workdays is 6828.9 in Tokyo. This number is more
than twice that in the five major prefectures and more than seven times that in the rest
of the prefectures. The vacancy rate does not differ greatly between the prefecture
groups and is approximately 4%. The share of the buildings that have carried out
large-scale repairs and renovations with energy savings is largest in the five major
prefectures, at 35%. This proportion is 25% in Tokyo, which is approximately 10%
lower than that in the five major prefectures, and 7.4% in the rest of the prefectures,
which represents a large difference from that in the other prefecture groups.
4.2.2 Implementation Status of Energy Efficiency Measures
In the questionnaire, we asked about the implementation status of each EEM. It
should be mentioned that implementation is not a binary choice. In some cases,
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buildings may install new equipment on all floors, and in other cases, they may adopt
new technology on only a limited number of floors, such as in the main entrance
of the building. Therefore, we asked respondents to answer regarding the degree
of the implementation of each EEM by its percentage. To enable respondents to
answer easily, we asked them to choose from seven categorical answers, i.e., (1)
not implemented at all (0%), (2) 0–20%, (3) 20–39%, (4) 40–59%, (5) 60–79%, (6)
80–99% and (7) fully implemented (100%).
We show the results of EEM implementation by prefecture groups, Tokyo, the





























Blinds, eaves, and sunshades
Highly efficient thermal insulation windows
Highly efficient thermal insulation materials
Thinning out unnecessary lights*
Adjusting illuminance less than 500 lx
on the work plane in the office
Motion sensor
Initial illumination correction
Scheduled switching (time scheduling)
Lighting fixtures with automatic brightness
adjustment function by sensor
Tokyo Five major prefectures Rest of the prefectures
Lighting related measures
Thermal insulation-related measures
Fig. 2 Implementation status of lighting-related EEMs. Note Saitama prefecture is excluded from
this aggregation because of the Saitama ETS effect. * indicates non-technological measures (NTM)
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Solar panel installation
Setting AC temperatures at an eco-friendly 
level
(28℃ for cooling, 20℃ for heating)*
Automatic water taps
Reduction in the number of elevators operating
outside regular hours*
VVVF inverter for elevator(s)
Demand control system
Utilizing stored data
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Fig. 3 Implementation status of BEMS, elevator, and other related EEMs. Note Saitama prefecture
is excluded from this aggregation because of the Saitama ETS effect. * indicates non-technological
measures (NTM). VVVF stands for variable voltage variable frequency
of responses for each EEM implementation status ranged from 56 to 64 buildings
in Tokyo, from 54 to 62 buildings in the five major prefectures, and from 24 to 30
buildings in the rest of the prefectures.
Figure 2 illustrates the adoption of lighting-related EEMs and thermal insulation-
related EEMs. The top five lighting-related EEMs, defined as TMs, in the figure are
most advanced in Tokyo, followed by the five major prefectures and the rest of the
prefectures. The implementation rate of thinning out unnecessary lights, defined as
an NTM, is approximately 50% in all groups.
For thermal insulation-related measures, the adoption of highly efficient materials
and windows is most advanced in Tokyo among all groups. The adoption ratio of
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the conventional measures “blinds, eaves and sunshades” is high in all groups. It
seems that this is basically standard equipment of building facilities even without
the consideration of energy savings. For this reason, the implementation rates in
all prefecture groups are quite high compared to the implementation rates of other
measures.
Figure 3 shows the implementation status of BEMSs, elevators, and other related
EEMs by prefecture group. For BEMS-related measures, Tokyo leads the other
regions in every aspect. In particular, the implementation ratio of a “demand control
system” in Tokyo is greater than that in the two other groups by at least 16%. The
adoption of “monitoring and storing historical data” and “utilizing stored data” is
scarce in the rest of the prefectures.
Next, we examine the elevator-related EEMs. For TMs, the adoption of VVVF
inverters in Tokyo is advanced compared to that in the five major prefectures and
the rest of the prefectures. For NTMs, there is also a difference between Tokyo and
the other two groups. The difference in a “reduction in the number of elevators
operating outside regular hours” between Tokyo and the five major prefectures is
approximately four percent and thus not significant. In contrast, a “reduction in the
number of elevators operating outside regular hours” is not implemented as much in
the rest of the prefectures. Among other EEMs, there is a clear difference between
Tokyo and the two other groups in the adoption of “automatic water taps”, which is
also a TM. Interestingly, the practice of setting AC temperatures at an eco-friendly
level is less common in Tokyo than in the two other groups. In particular, the rest
of the prefectures has the highest implementation rate. In all groups, solar panel
installation is low compared to the other EEMs discussed above.
To summarize these results, the ranking patterns for most of the EEMs appear
similar. Regarding most EEMs, the adoption of TMs is higher in Tokyo than those
in the other two groups. One plausible reason for this observation is the Tokyo ETS.
Under the Tokyo ETS, the CO2 emissions from Tokyo must be reduced compared to
their baseline (Chap. 6). In contrast, there is not much difference in the implementa-
tion of NTMs among the three groups. In fact, for some NTMs, the implementation
rate is higher in the rest of the prefectures than in Tokyo.
4.2.3 Energy Audits, Energy-Related Subsidies, and Information
on Energy Savings
Figure 4 shows the results regarding the implementation status of energy audits. In-
house, subsidiary, or affiliated company technicians’ energy audits compose 17.2%
(26 facilities) of the total responses. More than half of those facilities (16 cases)
are in Tokyo. External company energy audits have the same implementation rate
as the rate of in-house, subsidiary, and affiliated company audits. Of all energy
audits, 28 were performed by external companies, eight of which were performed by
ESCOs. The rest of the cases were audits by private companies, such as equipment
manufacturers/vendors, general contractors, and energy companies. Fifteen facilities
(10.3%) had experienced an ECCJ energy audit. As mentioned in Chap. 4, Sect. 1.2,
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External company
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Fig. 4 Proportion of facilities with energy audits.Note Examples of external companies are ESCO,
equipment manufacturer, general contractor, energy company, etc.
the ECCJ is currently implementing energy audits only for small and medium-sized
enterprises and facilities with an annual energy consumption (crude oil equivalent)
of 100 kl or more and less than 1500 kl in principle. However, before 2017, the ECCJ
conducted energy audits in large-scale facilities as well. The facilities in our survey
had experienced these energy audits before 2017. Finally, four energy audits were
conducted by local governments andmunicipalities, and this number is much smaller











Fig. 5 Usage rate and breakdown of energy subsidies
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Others
Seminars, product briefings, and subsidized
business solicitations
Competitors
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journal/magazine
Energy audits
Pamphlet created by the ECCJ or industry
associations/group
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Researching on the internet by a person in
charge
Inquiring with equipment vendors by a person in
charge
Fig. 6 Proportion of facilities how they acquired information on energy efficiency
Figure 5 illustrates whether the buildings had used subsidies when investing in
energy-saving equipment.Of the 161 valid responses, 26 facilities (16.1%) responded
that they had used subsidies. Of these 26 facilities, the number of facilities using
subsidies was the largest in Tokyo, at 13. In addition, we asked about the types of
subsidies the buildings had used. Among 24 facilities that responded to this question,
a few had used subsidies several times. Buildings that used national government
subsidies accounted for 25 examples (92.6%). There was only one case each of local
government and private organization subsidies.
Figure 6 shows how information on energy conservation investments was
obtained. The most common source of information was an inquiry from the person
in charge of energy conservation, followed by sales from vendors/manufacturers of
energy-efficient equipment. Eleven percent of facilities had obtained information
from energy auditors. In other categories, there were multiple information sources,
such as building design companies, the head office, and building management
contractors.
5 Conclusions
This chapter has mainly aimed to review Japanese climate and energy conservation
policies in the commercial sector and the current EEM implementation status in
large-scale commercial buildings in Japan.
The first section explains the current GHG emissions in Japan and the long-
term reduction goal. We observe that emission reduction in the commercial sector
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is urgently needed to achieve the Japanese NDC. Section 2 describes the mitigation
policies implemented in Japan. In Sect. 3, we explain the current situations of energy-
saving technologies and practices in office buildings using the results of the survey
we conducted in 2018.
In our survey,we found that there is potential for energy savings in office buildings.
Recent research by Arimura and Abe (2020) and Chap. 7 show that ETSs have
reduced GHG emissions in Japan. This chapter indicates that emission reduction
was achieved by the adoption of energy-efficient technologies. Thus, CP such as
an ETS or carbon tax may be useful in promoting energy-efficient technologies.
However, the identification of a causal relationship between ETSs and the adoption
of technologies needs more rigorous analysis.
Our survey reveals that some relatively expensive EEMs have been adopted in
Tokyo but not as much in other parts of Japan. In contrast, the implementation rate of
relatively inexpensive measures does not differ across regions. These observations
are consistent with the interviews that we conducted with energy managers of office
buildings. In general, they have started to implement relatively inexpensive measures
to save energy consumption. According to Thollander et al. (2015), as of 2007,
energy audits in Japan were provided for firms in non-energy-intensive industries
that did not have enough expertise in energy management in-house. The authors
point out that most of the recommendations from the results of energy audits are
operational improvement that requires no investment but also include investment
measures with short payback periods (usually less than three years). This observation
was especially true in buildings outside Tokyo. Typical examples are “turning off
lights when unnecessary” and “installing LED lights”. As explained in Sect. 2, policy
measures adopted by the government seem to have been effective in some aspects
to certain degrees. However, our survey results indicate that these policy measures
were not effective in promoting TMs. CP, such as the Tokyo ETS, is expected to
play a crucial role in promoting TMs that have not been adopted outside Tokyo.
Therefore, CP can be expected to contribute to the spread of relatively expensive
energy-efficient technologies.
We also found that the usage of energy audits or subsidies for energy-efficient
technologies is limited among office buildings. To remove barriers to the adoption
of EEMs, the provision of proper information can be helpful for the promotion of
energy efficiency in office buildings. According to our survey, more than half of
energy audits have been implemented in Tokyo. By looking at the office buildings
in Tokyo, we found that the buildings that experienced energy audits are more likely
to adopt energy-efficient technologies than those without energy audit experience.
This observation hints that energy audits may make managers or decision makers of
office buildings aware of the benefits of energy-saving technologies under the CP
of the Tokyo ETS. Thus, in addition to CP, policy measures promoting awareness
of the merits of energy savings, such as energy audits, seem to be effective for the
diffusion of these technologies.
Finally, energy-saving efforts in buildings are strongly dependent on the capacity
and awareness of energy managers. Unless energy managers exert great effort to
obtain proper information on energy savings, they will lack this information. The
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government should work harder so that managers of buildings can have more access
to energy audits and subsidies.
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Chapter 3
Climate Policy in Household Sector
Jiaxing Wang and Shigeru Matsumoto
Abstract Compared to the industry sector, the progress of energy conservation of
the household sector is very slow. It is because the household sector is more diverse
than the industrial sector, and regulatory enforcement is much more difficult. The
government can stop firms’ operation if their environmental burden is too heavy but
cannot stop household’s activities. Therefore, the government needs to find energy
conservation policies that are supported by the public. Like other countries, the
Japanese government has introduced various energy conservationmeasures to reduce
the energy usage from households for the past several decades. It has introduced
energy efficiency standards for energy-consuming durables and provided subsidies
to promote energy-efficient products in recent years. At the same time, it has raised
the price of energy in order to provide households with an appropriate incentive
to conserve. In addition, it has promoted renewable energy usage in the household
sector. Facing climate change, the Japanese government has not introduced energy
conservation measures systematically but rather on an ad hoc basis. In this chapter,
we review energy conservation measures implemented in the household sector in
Japan.We thenmake policy recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of energy
conservation measures in the household sector.
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1 Introduction
Households use energy for transport and housing. Excluding fuel consumption
for passenger vehicles, household energy consumption accounts for about one-
fifth of global energy consumption. However, the share exceeds one-third if the
fuel consumption is included (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2016). For the
past several decades, countries have implemented various energy saving measures
to reduce household energy consumption. However, energy saving in the house-
hold sector has not been so successful, vis-à-vis other sectors. For example, in EU
countries, while industry energy consumption decreased by 16.4% from 2005 to
2016, household energy consumption decreased only by 8.0% (European Environ-
ment Agency 2019). This trend is also visible in Japan: industrial energy consump-
tion decreased by 17.9% from 1990 to 2017, while household energy consumption
increased by 42.0% (National Institute for Environmental Studies 2019).
The Japanese government’s mid-term target is a 26.0% reduction in greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from their 2013 level by the year 20301 and to reduce household
GHG emissions by 39.3% during this period (Ministry of the Environment 2020).
Although household energy consumption began decreasing in 2012, the reduction
over the past fiveyears is only 12.3%,which is obviously too slow to achievemid-term
target.
Japan has had another difficult energy policy problem since 2011: The Fukushima
accident increased awareness of the risks of nuclear power, while decreasing its
public support. The share of nuclear power in the Japan’s electricity supply before
the accident was about 30%, and decreased to 1% in 2017 (Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy 2017). Although the government states that the desirable
share of nuclear power in 2030 is approximately 20–22%, there is strong objection
to this plan (nippon.com2015). On the other hand, Japan lags other developed nations
in introducing renewable energy (see Chap. 4).
Slow progress in energy conservation measures and the difficulty in shifting
toward alternative energy highlight the importance of household energy conserva-
tion measures. The objectives of this chapter are to investigate Japanese household
energy conservation measures, and to propose policies to achieve the 2030 target.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we examine energy
usage among Japanese households.2 We reviewmajor energy conservation measures
implemented in Japan and summarize their distinguishable features in Sect. 3. We
conclude with policy recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of household
energy conservation measures.
1The long-term target is an 80.0% reduction by the year 2050. Chapter 1 discusses the long-term
target in detail with its context.
2We exclude the energy consumption for vehicle usage from the analysis and focus on the energy
consumption inside the household.
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2 Energy Consumption Among Japanese Households
2.1 Characteristics of Japanese Households: International
Comparison
Japan’s energy consumption is characterized by a high share in the industrial sector
and a low share in the household sector. Although its market share has declined in
recent year, the industrial sector still has the greatest share of 46% in 2016. In contrast,
the Japanese share of household to total energy consumption was 14% (Agency
Natural Resources for Energy 2017). This share is much lower than that of the EU,
26%, (Euro Stat 2016), or the US, 21% (US Energy Information Administration
(EIA) 2018).
Although US household energy consumption differs widely among the states, the
annual energy consumption of the average American household was 81.3 GJ (EIA
2015). Similarly, although there is a wide variation in energy consumption between
countries, that of the average EU household was 54.0 GJ, according to the Eurostat
(2016). In contrast, the average Japanese household consumed only 33.5GJ (Ministry
of the Environment of Japan 2016). The energy consumption per household in Japan
is about the level of Spain and Bulgaria.
Japanese shares of electricity, natural gas, propane gas, and kerosene of total
energy sources were 52%, 19%, 11%, and 18%, respectively (Survey on Carbon
Dioxide Emission from Households (SCDEH) by Ministry of the Environment
(2016)). In contrast, those in the USwere 47%, 44%, 4%, and 5%, respectively (Resi-
dential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) by US Energy Information Admin-
istration (2015)). In the EU, natural gas accounted for 36% of household energy
consumption, electricity 24%, renewables 18%, and petroleum products for 11%,
according to Eurostat (2016). Pertaining to CO2 emissions, the shares of electricity,
natural gas, propane gas, and kerosene, are 70%, 13%, 5%, and 12%, respectively in
Japan. These statistics indicate that Japanese households heavily rely on electricity.
Table 1 compares energy use purpose across several countries, and indicates that
Japanese households use less energy for space heating, but more for lighting and
appliances. It is interesting to know that Japanese households use more energy also
Table 1 Final energy consumption by purpose (%)
Japan US EU
Space heating 22.4 44.1 64.1
Space cooling 2.6 8.9 0.3
Water heating 23.8 18.5 14.8
Cooking, Lighting, Appliances etc. 51.0 28.6 21.0
Source Japan (SCDEH 2016) , US (RECS 2015), EU (Eurostat 2016)
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for water heating. Perhaps, this result reflects Japanese habit having a bath instead
of taking a shower.3
2.2 Historical Change in Household Energy Consumption
The National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure by Statistical Bureau of
Japan (1980–2014) (NSFE) is a nationwide cross-sectional survey initiated in year
1959, and conducted every five years. It collects data on households’ socioeconomic
characteristics, such as income/expenditure, savings/liabilities, and ownership of
durables, as well as housing information such as dwelling characteristics and site
area. Using household micro data from NSFE, we report the change in household
energy consumption from 1989 to 2014 below.
The NSFE data pose two major drawbacks. First, the data do not report the actual
energy consumption; rather, only the average monthly expenditure. We calculated
the average monthly energy consumption from the monthly electricity energy expen-
diture, which contains measurement errors, since the price of energy varies across
regions and depends on the type of contract held by the household. Second the
NSFE’s sampling period is limited to between September and November, that corre-
sponds to the fall season and require less energy for room temperature control.
Therefore, the estimation based on the NSFE data may underestimate household
energy consumption.
Although it is preferable to analyze the annual data to take account of the seasonal
variation in energy consumption, we focus on energy usage in autumn due to the
above-mentioned data limitation. Figure 1 shows the change in monthly energy
consumption of Japanese households from 1989 to 2014. Electricity consumption
increased until 2004 while natural gas and kerosene consumption decreased steadily;
consequently, the overall energy consumption decreased from 4.70 to 3.61 GJ.
The share of energy sources varies between regions. Warmer urban regions use
electricity mainly, while cold suburban regions use kerosene more intensively. More
specifically, the share of kerosene in Hokkaido, the coldest prefecture in Japan, was
60.4% in 2014, while in Tokyo it was 19.6%; and the share of electricity in Hokkaido
was 24.7% while in Tokyo it was 40.6% (NSFE 2014).
2.3 Electric Appliance Ownership
As explained so far, Japanese households depend on electricity for much of their
energy consumption. Households use home electric appliances. Here, we report
how the ownership of home electric appliances has changed among Japanese house-
holds since 1980s. Given that approximately 60% of the electricity is consumed for
3More than 50% of Japanese household take bath every day during the winter (SCDEH 2016).
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Fig. 1 Change in household energy consumption. Source NSFE (1989–2014)
air-conditioning (AC), television (TV), refrigerators (REF) and lighting (Bureau of
Environment Tokyo Metropolitan Government (BETMG) 2018), we focus on the
ownership of these four electric appliances in this sub-section.
The 2014 NSFE reports that 98.9% of households own REF, 98.3% own a TV, and
89.12% own an AC. The penetration of these electric appliances has completed and
Japanese households have increased the number of TVs or ACs for the past 30 years.
The 2014 NSFE reports that 79.87% of households own multiple TVs, and 79.87%
own multiple ACs.
The 2014 NSFE asked respondents whether they were using light-emitting diode
(LED), which is more energy efficient than conventional fluorescent lamps, and
found that only 31.42%of households installedLEDs, suggesting a significant energy
saving potential.
The ownership of home electric appliances is associated with households’ charac-
teristics. Table 2 shows the number ofAC/LED/TV/REFused in the average Japanese
Table 2 AC/LED/TV/REF used in the average Japanese household





Detached house The other types
AC 1.83 2.74 2.96 1.57 2.66
LED 0.48 0.80 0.83 0.57 0.77
TV 1.50 2.21 2.33 1.47 2.15
REF 1.10 1.25 1.30 1.02 1.24
Source NSFE (2014)
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household. The average household owns 2.66 ACs, 0.77 LEDs, 2.15 TVs, and 1.24
REF. Single-person households tend to own fewer appliances than multi-person
households. For example, the average multi-person household owns 2.74 ACs while
the average single-person household owns only 1.83 ACs. However, multi-person
households more likely tend to install LEDs than single households, suggesting that
multi-person households may be more energy saving.
Pertaining to the relationship between appliance ownership and housing charac-
teristics, Table 2 indicates that households living in a detached house tend to own
more appliances than those living in apartments; whereas the former uses LEDsmore
frequently than the latter.
In the Tokyo metropolitan area, the number of households increased from about
429 million to about 670 million from 1980 to 2015. However, the ownership of ACs
per 100 households increased from 95 units to 301 units between 1982 and 2015
(BETMG 2018). Therefore, the growth rate of ACs is substantially higher than that
of households. This is because Japanese households began purchasing additional
air conditioners in order to make spending time at home more comfortable. This
comparison growth rate suggests that the reduction of energy consumption is not an
easy task even in a society with a declining population.
2.4 Electric Appliance Usage
Household appliance ownership is not directly associated with energy consumption
and it is necessary to know how intensively households use appliances, in order to
understand household energy consumption.Here, we report the intensity of appliance
use from the SCEDH (2016).
Table 3 indicates a large variation in the time of TV andAC use across households.
The median time of TV use is around 4–8 h. However, about 8% of households do
not watch TVs on weekdays, and about 7.5% of households keep TVs on for more
Table 3 Intensity of appliance daily use
Not
use (%)





Japan 4.5 8.0 27.0 38.8 14.3 5.4 2.1
Tokyo 1.3 5.6 21.9 39.8 17.9 8.8 4.7







Japan 13.7 16.9 31.6 18.2 9.9 4.3 5.4
Tokyo 4.9 9.2 28.3 20.0 15.1 9.8 12.6
Osaka 4.5 15.7 31.0 22.3 14.6 6.6 5.2
Source SCDEH (2016)
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than 12 h. Similarly, the median time of AC use on summer weekdays is around
4–8 h. However, about 13.7% of households do not use AC on weekdays, and about
9.7% of households keep AC on for more than 12 h.
Table 3 compares time ofTVandACuse across regions. It shows that people living
in Tokyo and Osaka (the second largest city) use both TVs and ACs more intensively
than those in other regions. The average household in Japan owns 2.32 ACs. The
average household in Tokyo owns 2.84 ACs while the average household in Osaka
owns 2.91 ACs. This data suggests that households living in large cities own more
ACs and use them more heavily.
3 Energy Conservation Measures
3.1 Energy Price and Carbon Pricing
Japan imports almost all energy from abroad and thus the energy prices have been set
at a high level for both household and industrial uses. Considering that further energy
price increases would lower the international competitiveness and impact economic
growth negatively, introducing the carbon tax in Japan has been long debated; after
two decades Japan finally introduced the carbon tax in October 2012 to mitigate
warming mitigation.4
Carbon pricing is now considered as one of the most cost-effective measures to
reduce CO2 emissions, especially under the long-term target of de-carbonization.
In this sub-section, we compare energy prices between Japan and other countries,
especially the relative size of carbon taxes among the household sector. We focus
on electricity, natural gas, and kerosene, which comprise almost 90% of Japanese
energy usage (see Sect. 2.1).
Energy price5 data in Table 4 were collected from Energy Prices and Taxes of
IEA (2018). The table indicates that energy prices in Japan are higher than other
countries: the prices of natural gas and electricity for Japan are 107.4 USD/MWh
and 226.6 USD/MWh, respectively, the average prices in OECD countries are
53.9 USD/MWh for natural gas and 166 USD/MWh for electricity.
Table 4 indicates the size of energy taxes to energy prices; and that the sizes of
taxes in Japan are lower than those in France or Germany. The tax size of natural
gas for Japan, France, and Germany are 7.4%, 24.5%, and 24.3%, respectively, and
electricity: 8.9%, 36.2%, and 54.5%, respectively. By removing tax payment, we
can calculate each country’s prior-tax base energy prices. The base price of natural
gas for Japan is 99.5 USD/MWh, while for France and Germany, 59.3 USD/MWh
and 56.6 USD/MWh. Similarly, the base price of electricity in Japan, France, and
4Presently, the tax rate is set at very low rate (0.76 yen/litter for Gasoline, 0.76 kWh yen/litter,
0.11 yen/kWh) (Ministry of Environment 2020).
5According to the IEA (2018), the energy price is defined as the ratio of the total amount of money
spent on purchasing an energy and the total sales volume of the same energy over one year.
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Table 4 Energy end-use prices in 2017 (converted using exchange rates)
Kerosene (USD/1000 L) Natural
gas (USD/MWh)
Electricity (USD/MWh)
Total taxes (%) Total taxes (%) Total taxes (%)
Japan 695.8 11 107.4 7.4 226.6 8.9
US 694.7 4.7 36.1 na 129 na
UK 649.8 26.8 55.3 4.8 205.7 4.8
France 832.6 32.7 78.5 24.5 187.3 36.2







Notes na means data is not available
Total taxes mean the percentage of the energy end-use prices
Source Energy Prices and Taxes of IEA (2018)
Germany are 206.4 USD/MWh, 119.5 USD/MWh, and 156.3 USD/MWh, respec-
tively. The price-differences between Japan and the other countries are substantial
on the base price level.
Pertaining to kerosene, its price in Japan is lower than the averageOECDcountries.
The prior-tax base price in Japan is about 619.3 USD/1000 L, which is the second
highest price among the five countries listed in Table 3.
Thus, the base energy prices are relatively high in Japan but carbon taxes are
relatively small. Indeed, the effective carbon price of residential and commercial use
in Japan was 5 EUR/ton, while that of UK, Germany, and France was 23 EUR/ton,
26 EUR/ton, and 19 EUR/ton, respectively (Ministry of the Environment 2018).
3.2 Policy Measures to Improve Appliance Energy Efficiency
Energy consumption per service is reduced via energy efficiency improvement.
Households might choose an energy-efficient product even without any policy inter-
vention since they can save money. Manufacturers will develop an energy-efficient
product to increase demand for their products. However, it is often difficult to achieve
the sufficient energy efficient improvement necessary for the society when simply
relying on household’s voluntary product selection and manufacturers’ voluntary
investment,6 and thus the government has introduced policies to forcibly improve the
energy efficiencyof durable consumer goods.While policies for improving electricity
6Arimura et al. (2019) compared environmental policies between Japan and other developed
countries and discussed the conditions for the voluntary approaches.
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usage of home appliances have been widely implemented, the Japanese government
has adopted similar strategies.
The government introduced the Top Runner Program to improve the efficiency of
energy-consuming durables in 1998. It set the energy efficiency of the products with
the highest efficiency as the energy efficiency standard and requested manufacturers
to achieve it before the specified target year. Although only 11 items were covered
at the beginning of the program, seven items were added in 2002, two items were
added in 2009, and five in 2013. Presently, a total of 31 items are subject to the
Top Runner Program, resulting in significant improvement in the energy efficiency
of energy-consuming durables. The energy saving of several electric appliances has
improved twice or more than the target. For example, the energy efficiency of REFs
has improved by 43% from 2005 to 2010, while its target was 21%. Similarly, the
energy efficiency of TVs has improved by 73.6% from 2008 to 2012, while its target
was 37%.
Households cannot examine the energy efficiency of products at the time of
purchase. In 1995, to effectively inform consumers of product energy efficiency,
the Japanese government introduced the Energy Star Program jointly with the US.
In 2000, the Japanese government introduced the Energy Saving Labeling program
based on the Japanese Industrial Standards. A green mark is placed if a product
achieves the top runner standard, while the orange mark indicates that it did not.
Manufacturers further provide consumers with detailed information including an
energy-savingmark of the target year, an achievement rate of energy-saving standard,
and an annual electricity consumption.
A strength of these programs is that they do not significant consumer effort.
The Top Runner Program improves energy efficiency of the products sold, and the
Energy Saving Labeling Program enables consumers to choose an energy-efficient
product at the time of product replacement by reporting its energy saving benefit. To
further promote the selection of energy-efficient products by consumers, the Japanese
government started the Unified Energy Saving Labeling Program in 2006, in which
the government requests retailers to indicate the energy efficiency of products with
the number of stars, as well as the annual estimated electricity bills from using the
products. Consumers require less cognitive skills to identify the energy efficiency of
products since they can identify product energy efficiency by simply counting the
number of the stars. Presently, six varieties of home electric appliances including
AC, REF, and TV are covered under this program.
CO2 emissions per household reached approximately 4520 kg CO2 in 2016, about
50.9% was due to electricity. Pertaining to electricity usage, the shares of usage
from REF, lighting, TV, AC were 14.2%, 13.4%, 8.9%, and 7.4%, respectively in
2009 (Ministry of the Environment 2019). This data suggests that improvements
in energy efficiency of electric appliances are closely related to the reduction of
the CO2 emissions from households. However, households tend to not choose an
energy-efficient durable even if they are informed of the detailed information about
product energy efficiency (Allocott 2011; Jaffe and Stavins 1994). Moreover, not all
households would equally react to such programs: for example, wealthy households
with many family members are more likely to purchase an inefficient REF (Wang
et al. 2019). Households living in rented houses are less likely to choose LED lamps
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(Onuma and Matsumoto 2019). Since the energy-efficiency of appliances has been
greatly improved through the implementation of the programs mentioned above,
the next challenge is how to encourage households to purchase an energy-efficient
appliance.
3.3 Policy Measures to Improve Housing Energy Efficiency
Households can reduce energy consumption by installing energy-efficient durables.
Similarly, households can reduce energy consumption by improving the energy effi-
ciency of their houses. Although both the purchase of energy-efficient durables and
the renovation of old houses are energy-saving investments, previous studies have
found that households respond differently to these two types of energy-saving invest-
ments. Ramos et al. (2016), and Trotta (2018) confirm that the environmental attitude
can explain the purchase of energy-efficient appliances, but not for home renovation.
This data suggests a different policy for improving the energy efficiency of houses
vis-à-vis that of other energy-consuming durables.
In order to improve the energy-efficiency of houses, the Japanese government
has introduced various measures including subsidies and a long-term tax reduction,
and the most ambitious measure: the subsidy for net zero energy houses (ZEHs).7
These are houses whose annual primary net energy consumption is set at around
zero (or less). Under the ZEH program, houses are constructed to save energy as
much as possible, while maintaining a comfortable living environment. In the fourth
Energy Basic Plan introduced in 2014, the Japanese government targeted make more
than half of newly-constructed detached houses ZEHs by 2020, and the average
newly-constructed house ZEH by 2030 (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
2014).
In recent years, a series of subsidy programs have been introduced to promote
ZEHs. The first, “ZEH support program”, started in 2015, which targets newly-
constructed detached houses with more than 20% reduction rate of primary energy
consumption as well as high thermal insulation performance. In the first program
period, 1.3 million JPY would be provided for households constructing a ZEH, with
1.5 million JPY for households in cold regions. In 2016, 6146 subsidies were issued,
the average reduction rate of the primary energy consumption including solar power
among these houses reached to 120.7%, and with excluding solar power reached to
43.9%. With the success of the first ZEH program, the government continued it but
reduced the amount of subsidies: 1.25million JPY in 2016, 0.75million JPY in 2017,
and 0.7 million JPY in 2018 and 2019, although the number of issued subsidies has
increased to 7100 in 2018 (Sustainable Open Innovation Initiative, SII 2019).
The Japanese government introduced “ZEH + program” in 2018 and “ZEH + R
program” in 2019. The ZEH + program requires ZEHs’ average reduction rate of
primary energy consumption to be 25%.TheZEH+Rprogramasks sufficient energy
7Zero Energy Buildings (ZEBs) is discussed in Chap. 2.
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provision during a power failure as well as the resilience strengthening option, in
addition to the requirement of the ZEH+ program. The subsidy amount of the ZEH+
program is 1.15 million JPY/house, and that of ZEH + R program is 1.25 million
JPY/house. The number of subsidies provided under three types of programs (ZEH,
ZEH + , and ZEH + R) were 9172 in 2018 and 7345 in 2019.
Subsidies for companies began 2018 with “Detached-sale ZEH program. Aiming
to support building companies to construct ZEHs, the program provides 0.7 million
JPY (or 1.15 million JPY) per house to the building company (SII 2018). In 2018, the
first subsidy program targeted at housing complexes (including apartments), “High
building ZEH-M program” started, whereby projects with six floors or higher ZEH
apartment can obtain a subsidy two-thirds of the total subsidized cost.
In addition, the ZEH builder mark and the ZEH planer mark have been imple-
mented to increase the recognition of ZEHs among households as well as building
companies.However, despite such efforts, only 15.3%of newly-constructed detached
houses were ZEHs in 2017 (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2019), far
below the 2020 target of 50%. Given the high housing construction, it seems difficult
to achieve the target solely thorough the ZEH subsidy programs: with the average
price of a new house in Japan of 34 million JPY (Japan Housing Finance Agency
2019), the subsidy amount to less than 4% of the construction cost.
3.4 Support for Solar Panel Installation
Solar panel, an important renewable energy, has been universally used in the house-
hold sector. In Japan, the first solar panel for residential use was installed in 1993.
Given the expensive price of solar panels, the Japanese government introduced a
subsidy program in 1994. The size amounted to 50% of the installation cost. Never-
theless, solar panels are unpopular,with only 3.14%of Japanese households installing
them in 2005 (NSFE 2014).
The promotion of solar panels in the household sector was proposed again when
formulating the Action Plan for Creating a Low-Carbon Society in 2008 (Ministry of
the Environment 2008) and the revival of the subsidy program since 2009. Owing to
this new program, the installation cost of the solar-panel systemwas lowered substan-
tially. When introduced in 2009, households purchasing a solar-panel system with a
unit price less than 700,000 JPY could receive a subsidy of 70,000 JPY/kW initially.
However, the amount of subsidy kept decreasing continually to 15,000 JPY/kWwhen
the program ended in 2013. This subsidy targeted households that purchased a rela-
tively low-price solar-panel system. For example, in 2012, the subsidy for a system
priced lower than 475,000 JPY was 35,000 JPY/kW, while that for a system priced
lower than 550,000 JPY was only 30,000 JPY/kW (Eco life 2019).
In addition to the subsidy program, the government started a 10-year Feed-in
Tariff (FIT)8 in 2009, promising that the surplus electricity produced by solar panels
8The detail of Feed-in Tariff is explained in Chap. 5.
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Fig. 2 Households’ annual energy consumptions on average. Source SCDEH (2016)
would be purchased by the power company in a fixed price in 10 years (Agency for
Natural Resources and Energy 2009). The FIT made solar-panel investment more
attractive, as households not only pay lower electricity bills but also make a profit by
selling surplus electricity. The average solar-panel households earn approximately
153,755 JPY annually by selling surplus electricity (SCDEH 2016).
The new subsidy and the FIT positively affected the promotion of solar panel.
According to the 2014 NSFE, approximately 60.12% of solar-panel households
installed a solar panel system during the new subsidy program period, whereas only
about 28.7% of the installed before 2009. Furthermore, the 2014 NSFE shows that
solar panels have been promoted especially among multi-person households, as well
as households living in detached houses. Among all solar-panel households, about
97.35% are multi-person households, while about 98.13% live in detached houses.
Figure 2 indicates the differences in annual energy consumption (the sum of elec-
tricity, natural gas, propane gas, and kerosene consumption) between solar-panel
households and non-solar-panel households (SCDEH 2016). (The energy produced
by solar panel is not included.) Figure 2 shows that solar-panel households use less
energy than households without solar panels, a propensity more palpable among
multi-person households and households living in detached houses. The annual
energy consumption of non-solar-panel households is 43.08 GJ while that of solar-
panel households is only 30.8 GJ. As for households living in detached houses,
the annual energy consumption of solar-panel households is 30.04 GJ, and that of
non-solar-panel households is about 45.17 GJ.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we reported the characteristics of the energy consumption of Japanese
households, and then reviewed the policymeasures implemented in Japan for residen-
tial energy conservation. Like other developed countries, the Japanese government
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has introduced various programs to improve energy efficiencies of energy-consuming
durables. Among them, the most effective policy is probably the top runner program:
the energy efficiency of appliances has greatly improved for the last several decades.
According to a survey by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (2007),
during the period 1997–2004, the energy efficiencies of televisions (TVs), air condi-
tioners (ACs), and refrigerators (REFs) improved by 25.7%, 67.8%, and 55.2%,
respectively. Nevertheless, much of energy saving effects has been lost due to stock
and size increase (Inoue and Matsumoto 2019). The fact tells that it is difficult to
reduce residential electricity consumption merely through technological innovation.
Even if it reliably reported that energy investment is beneficial, many households
will not invest in energy efficiency. In recent years,many studies have been conducted
worldwide in order to find effective programs to induce households to choose energy-
efficient durables. Although many interesting findings have been reported in recent
studies, it is expected that the effectiveness of incentive programs would vary across
countries. Thus, it is necessary to find effective programs for Japanese households.
However, at present, it is not well-known what types of households do not invest in
energy efficiency and what type of information households are likely to respond to.
Further research is clearly needed.
Although various subsidy programs have been introduced for the last several
decades, those programs primarily focus on the purchase of new products. Such
subsidy programs would be effective for durables with a short replacement cycle,
and less effective for the durables whose replacement cycle is slow. And given that
the amount of subsidy is small compared to the purchase price, the subsidy program
for energy-efficient houses seems less successful currently (Matsumoto 2016). Given
that household energy efficiency improvement will substantially impact carbon miti-
gation, it is important to findmore effective programs for penetrating energy-efficient
houses. Although a system to display the total energy performance of houses has
been introduced in Japan (Housing Performance Evaluation and Display Associa-
tion 2019), its usage is low, and will (as in other developed nations) be necessary to
popularize it in the future.
A palpable weakness of the subsidy programs is regressivity: Almost all subsidy
programs, including for solar power and new appliances, support the purchase of
durables, but households obviously must purchase them to receive subsidies. The
households using such a subsidy program lived in detached houses where solar
panels could be installed, or were those who had an additional deposit to replace
electric appliances during the specified subsidy period. Therefore, in past subsidy
programs the poor supported the rich to enable him or her to use energy services at
low cost. Perhaps, such regressive policies will not be able to retain public support. A
publicly acceptable policy, must not only account for energy consumption, but also
energy consumption purposes.
Japan introduced the carbon tax in October 2012 to mitigate global warming,
which was simply added to the old energy taxes (Chap. 1). As we mentioned before,
the tax rate is low presently but is expected to increase in near future. The distin-
guishing feature of this new carbon tax is that it is uniformly applied on a CO2 basis
regardless of the purpose of energy use. In contrast, the conventional energy taxes
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were adjusted by the energy use purpose. Although the new carbon tax effectively
mitigates carbon, it is regressive. In particular, the new carbon tax is more strin-
gent for low-income households living in cold regions. Thus, the government should
introduce redistribution policies when it increases the carbon tax.
The rapid spread of renewable energies is essential for significant energy savings
in the household sector. Households with a strong interest in environmental problems
installed a renewable energy system initially, and subsequently householdswith suffi-
cient financial asset installed it by using subsidies. However, the system penetration
is still low, and more households will need to use renewable energy equipment in the
future. Even if various policy options for renewable energies are introduced, it will
be difficult to achieve the energy conservation target. It is, therefore, necessary to
investigate energy use purpose in order to judge whether a household is using essen-
tial energy for life or is wasting energy. Without that knowledge, it is impossible to
speculate how much energy can be reduced.
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Chapter 4
Climate Policy in Transportation Sector:
Role of Carbon Pricing
Kazuyuki Iwata
Abstract This chapter focuses on climate countermeasures in the Japanese trans-
port sector. We introduce the Japanese complexed automobile tax system and then
calculate the Japanese effective carbon rate (ECR) on automobiles. In addition to the
discussion of the ECR, this chapter offers a simple examination of the efficiency of
electric vehicles (EVs) from the viewpoint of cost-benefit because it is expected that
EVs will become the most popular eco-friendly vehicle in the future. Two remarks
are found in our analysis. First, although the carbon tax rate on fuel consumption
is small in Japan, compared to the European countries, the ECR is rather high. For
further improvement of climate policy, the Japanese government should shift its
attention to vehicle usage from vehicle purchase and possession. Second, under the
basic assumption (i.e., representative owners do not recharge their EVs at home but
at outdoor fast chargers), the diffusion of EVs is not an efficient measure for reducing
GHG emissions. If owners recharge their EVs at home once of every two charges, the
net benefit becomes positive Therefore, the opportunity cost of waiting for recharges
is a key factor in whether EVs can play a role in mitigating climate change.
Keywords Automobiles · Carbon tax · Effective carbon rate · Life cycle
assessment · Electric vehicles · Fast chargers
1 Introduction
Automobiles are one of the most important sources of greenhouse gases (GHG)
emissions. In Japan, the amount of total GHG emissions was 1.19 billion t-CO2 in
2017 (Ministry of the Environment, 2019). Of that amount, 0.21 billion t-CO2 (i.e.,
17.9%) was attributable to the transport sector. Automobiles, including passenger
vehicles and trucks, accounted for 86.2% of the GHG emissions from the transport
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Fig. 1 Trends in GHG emissions and indicators related to vehicles in Japan (The data of the
GHG emissions (the top-left panel), number of vehicles (the top-right panel), annual mileage (the
bottom-left panel) and fuel efficiency (the bottom-right panel) are obtained from the websites of the
Greenhouse Gas Inventory Office of Japan (http://www-gio.nies.go.jp/aboutghg/nir/nir-e.html), the
Automobile Inspection and Registration Information Association (https://www.airia.or.jp/publish/
statistics/trend.html), the Survey on Motor Vehicle Transport (https://www.mlit.go.jp/k-toukei/jid
ousya.html) and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (https://www.mlit.go.
jp/common/001178377.pdf), respectively (accessed on December 10, 2019).)
sector.1 Therefore, 0.18 billion t-CO2 (15.4%) of the total GHG emissions were
generated by automobiles. Although automobiles emit not only the GHG but also air
pollutants, this chapter focuses on the GHG only.
Although automobiles are responsible for a large share ofGHGemissions, the total
amount of emissions has been continuously decreasing since approximately 2000.
The top-left panel in Fig. 1 shows the trends in GHG emissions from passenger
vehicles and trucks. The emissions peaked in 2002 and 1995 for passenger vehicles
and trucks, respectively, and then started decreasing.
What led to the decreased in emissions? There are three potential drivers of the
reductions: the total number of vehicles, annual mileage per vehicle and fuel effi-
ciency. The first, the total number of passenger vehicles and trucks (including buses),
is presented in the top-right panel in Fig. 1. The numbers of passenger vehicles and
trucks have been gradually increasing and decreasing, respectively. The reason why
1Refer to the following website of the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism (MLITT): https://www.mlit.go.jp/sogoseisaku/environment/sosei_environment_tk_
000007.html (accessed on December 10, 2019).
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the total number of passenger vehicles has increased is the popularity of hybrid vehi-
cles such as the Prius.2 In tandem with the increase in hybrid vehicles, the number
of traditional gasoline and diesel passenger vehicles has been decreasing, suggesting
that passenger vehicles have been shifting from gasoline and diesel vehicles to eco-
friendly hybrid vehicles. Meanwhile, the total number of trucks has continuously
decreased since 1990.
The kilometers travelled bypassenger vehicles and trucks are shown in the bottom-
left panel in Fig. 1. The annual mileage for gasoline passenger vehicles is likely
to decrease over time. The decrease may come from increase of aging population
because older drivers voluntary limit vehicle usage (Baldock et al. 2006). For diesel
trucks, the annual mileage increased until 2008 and then started decreasing. It is
thought that this trend may be correlated with Japanese economic conditions. The
economic boom lasted until approximately 2009, when the financial crisis happened
due to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. After that, the recession started.
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism shows that the
average fuel efficiency of gasoline passenger vehicles is improving over time,
suggesting that this improvement has helped to reduce GHG emissions (see the
bottom-right panel in Fig. 1). For example, average fuel efficiency in 2015 increased
to 21.6 km/liter compared with 11.1 km/liter, 12.2 km/liter, 13.6 km/liter and
16.5 km/liter in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010, respectively. Therefore, in the last
30 years, fuel efficiency has improved approximately twice over. This consistent
increase is mainly due to the diffusion of hybrid vehicles.
GHG emissions from vehicles reached a peak in 2001 (see Fig. 1). Although the
total amount of emissions has continuously decreased over time, 0.18 billion t-CO2
in 2017 was still caused by vehicles. To cost-efficiently reduce GHG emissions from
vehicles, economic instruments such as emission trading schemes or Pigouvian taxes
are the best countermeasures (Kolstad 2010).
For automobiles, it is cost-efficient to impose a Pigouvian carbon tax on gasoline
and diesel according to their CO2 coefficients. In 1990, the first carbon tax in the
worldwas implemented inFinland.Then, Sweden introduced a similar tax in 1991.Of
course, the two taxes cover gasoline consumption. TheWorld Bank reports that there
were 28 countries and regions3 where carbon taxes had already been implemented
as a carbon pricing initiative by 2019.4 In Japan, a carbon tax was introduced in
October 2012. The initial tax rates were 250 yen (US$2.3)5 per kiloliter, 260 yen
(US$ 2.4) per ton and 220 yen (US$2) per ton for petroleum, liquefied natural gas
(LNG) and coal, respectively. The government had originally planned to raise the tax
rates. Eventually, in 2016, these rates increased by approximately triple, that is, to
760 yen (US$6.9) per kiloliter, 780 yen (US$7.1) per ton and 670 yen (US$6.1) per
2The Prius was released in 1997 by Toyota as first hybrid vehicle in the world.
3Alberta in Canada will abolish its carbon tax in 2020.
4Refer to the following website of the World Bank: https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/
(accessed on December 10, 2019).
5US$1 roughly equals to 110 yen.
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ton. Automobiles are indirectly affected by this carbon tax because the tax covers
petroleum.
The current Japanese carbon tax rates are equivalent to 289 yen (US$2.6) per
t-CO2.6 Viewing the carbon tax rates among 28 countries and regions, the highest
rate is US$121.3 per t-CO2 in Sweden. The next highest rate is US$96.6 per t-CO2 in
Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Therefore, the carbon tax rate in Japan is relatively
low compared with such countries. Another efficient economic instrument is an
emission trading scheme (ETS); the carbon prices in the EU ETS and Korea ETS
are US$32.5 and US$24.2 per t-CO2 in 2019, respectively, whereas the price in the
Japanese Tokyo ETS7 is only US$6.0. In addition, firms located outside of Tokyo
are not affected by the Tokyo ETS. We observe that the carbon price of the ETS in
Japan is also low.
To efficiently reduce GHG emissions and achieve a balance between economic
development and implementation of countermeasures against climate change, it is
necessary to set appropriate carbon prices using economic instruments such as a
carbon tax or an ETS. The efficient carbon price should be set to be equal to the social
cost of carbon (SCC). Althoughmany studies have estimated the SCC, there are large
differences among them. In a recent study,Wang et al. (2019) reviewed 578 estimates
of the SCC from 58 studies (the range is between US$-13.38 and US$2386.91 per
t-CO2) and concluded that the SCC is US$54.7 per t-CO2, on average. As mentioned
above, the Japanese total carbon price is US$8.6, which sums the US$2.6 for the
carbon tax and US$6.0 for the Tokyo ETS. The value is obviously lower than the
SCC of Wang et al. (2019). Therefore, it may appear that the Japanese government
should raise its carbon price to mitigate climate change.
However, several types of taxes besides carbon taxes and ETS costs are already
imposed onmost goods. For example,many counties impose a value-added tax (VAT)
as a consumption tax, and a gasoline tax is often levied on the usage of vehicles.
Although the purpose of such taxes is not to prevent climate change but to secure
governmental financial resources, such taxes indirectly play the same role as a carbon
tax or ETS. The expanded carbon price, which is the sum of carbon taxes, ETS costs
and such indirect taxes, is called the effective carbon rate (ECR) (OECD 2016).
In Japan, the ECR for automobiles is complicated because the automobile tax
system is not simple. Therefore, this chapter will introduce the Japanese automobile
tax system and then calculate the Japanese ECR on automobiles. In addition to the
discussion of the ECR, this chapter offers a simple examination of the efficiency of
electric vehicles (EVs) because it is expected that EVs will become the most popular
eco-friendly vehicle in the future. The IEA (2019) reports that EVs are developing
at a rapid pace. For example, the number of EVs was more than 5.1 million in 2018,
compared to 3 million in 2017. The report concludes that the market share of EVs
6Refer to the following website of the Japanese Ministry of the Environment: https://www.env.go.
jp/policy/tax/about.html (accessed on December 10, 2019).
7The Tokyo ETS does not cover automobiles but covers facilities including office buildings and
industrial plants.
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Table 1 Automobile tax system in Japan







Possession Vehicle tax Every year For vehicle with
displacement over
661





Once every two years
Usage Gasoline tax Each time For gasoline vehicle








aThe vehicle acquisition tax was greatly revised on October 2019. Before the revision, the tax rate
was fixed at 3%
will be 30% by 2030. In addition, Japan Post Holdings stated in a press release that
it will introduce 1200 EVs for use in delivery service by 2020, implying that 30% of
delivery vehicles in Tokyo will be EVs.8
2 ECR on Automobiles in Japan
2.1 Automobile Tax System
Before calculating the ECR in Japan, this section provides an overview of the auto-
mobile tax system.A summary of the tax system is shown inTable 1. InOctober 2019,
the tax system for vehicles drastically changed. Briefly, the tax rate for eco-friendly
vehicles decreased.
The tax system for vehicles in Japan consists of taxes on three behaviors: purchase,
possession and usage. Suppose that people buy a new or an old vehicle and use it.
They must pay various taxes in addition to the vehicle and fuel costs. First, they
8Refer to the following newspaper website of Asahi Shimbun: https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASM
CF4RRPMCFULFA016.html (accessed on December 10, 2019).
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must pay two types of taxes on vehicle purchase: vehicle acquisition tax and VAT.
These taxes are imposed only once. The vehicle acquisition tax rate is set to 0%,
1%, 2% or 3%, according to vehicle environmental performance characteristics such
as fuel efficiency. The tax rate for EVs is set at the lowest rate of 0% because their
environmental performance is better than those of conventional vehicles. Vehicles
with low performance face higher tax rates. The VAT rate was fixed at 10% after
October 2019.9 When a person purchases a new vehicle at a price of 1 million yen
(US$9091) and the vehicle acquisition tax rate is 2%, (s)he needs to pay 20,000
yen (US$182) and 100,000 yen (US$909) for the vehicle acquisition tax and VAT,
respectively.
The second type of tax is on vehicle possession. Vehicle owners have an obligation
to have a legal inspection of their vehicles carried out once every two years to use
them on the road. If vehicles do not pass inspection, they cannot be used on the road.
Owners must pay vehicle taxes or light vehicle taxes every year for their vehicles
to be considered eligible for inspection. If they forget to make the payment, the
vehicles cannot be inspected, meaning that they cannot travel on the road. Which
tax is applied depends on the displacement of the vehicle. When the displacement
is more than 661 cc, the vehicle tax is applied. Otherwise, the light vehicle tax is
applied. Even when vehicle owners do not use their vehicle at all, they are required to
pay this tax because it is on vehicle possession. The greater the vehicle displacement
is, the higher the annual amount of the vehicle tax.10 The tax amount increases for
every 500 cc of displacement. For example, the tax amount for passenger vehicles
with a displacement of 1000 cc is 25,000 yen (US$227) a year, whereas the amount
for passenger vehicles with a displacement of 3000 cc is 50,000 yen (US$455) a
year. Different from the vehicle tax, the amount of the light vehicle tax is fixed at
7200 yen (US$65) a year.11
In addition to the vehicle tax or light vehicle tax, all vehicle owners must pay the
vehicle weight tax when a legal inspection is carried out. The first inspection occurs
3 years after a new vehicle is purchased, and then the following inspections occur
every 2 years. Therefore, vehicles will undergo inspections and owners will pay the
vehicle weight tax at 3, 5, 7 and so on years thereafter. As the name suggests, the tax
rate depends on the vehicle weight. The greater the vehicle weight, the higher the tax
rate is. For example, the standard tax amounts for passenger vehicles with weights of
1000 and 2000 kg are set to 16,400 yen (US$149) and 32,800 yen (US$298), respec-
tively. In addition to the weight, the tax rates change according to the environmental
performance and vehicle age. For the case of a passenger vehicle with a weight of
1000 kg and high environmental performance, the tax amount decreases from 16,400
yen (US$149) to 10,000 yen (US$91). In contrast, for a passenger vehicle with the
same weight and age of 18 (i.e., a very old vehicle), the tax amount increases from
9The VAT rate was 8% before September 2019.
10The vehicle tax amount varies across vehicle type and purpose of use. The tax amount shown
here is for passenger vehicles for personal use.
11The light vehicle tax amount also depends on vehicle type and purpose of use. The tax amount
shown here is for passenger vehicles for personal use.
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Fig. 2 Tax revenues from each tax related to automobiles in 2018
16,400 yen (US$149) to 25,200 yen (US$229). The vehicle tax and light vehicle tax
are local tax, whereas the vehicle weight tax is a national tax.
Gasoline or diesel is necessary to use vehicles. The third type of tax is on fuel
consumption. The retail price for gasoline includes the gasoline tax, petroleum coal
tax and carbon tax. In addition to these three taxes, vehicle users pay VAT when
purchasing gasoline, meaning that they pay 4 taxes when using gasoline vehicles.
For diesel vehicles, users pay diesel oil tax instead of gasoline tax. The gasoline
tax and diesel tax rates are 53.8 yen (US$0.49) and 32.1 yen (US$0.29) per liter,
respectively. The petroleum coal tax and carbon tax are imposed on all oil and
coal products, including gasoline and diesel oil. The petroleum coal tax is 2.04 yen
(US$0.02) per liter, and the carbon tax is 0.74 yen (US$0.01) per liter, implying that
these tax rates are relatively smaller than the gasoline tax and diesel oil tax rates. In
particular, the carbon tax rate is much smaller than the other conventional fuel taxes.
Figure 2 presents the revenue from each tax in 2018.12 The tax revenues of the
carbon tax and petroleum coal tax are calculated from the tax rates and consumption
data. The data are obtained from the Survey onMotorVehicle Fuel Consumption. The
other revenues are quoted from the website of the Japan Automobile Manufacturers
Association.13 The total amount of tax revenue was approximately 8829 billion yen
(US$80.3 billion). The revenue from the carbon taxwas only 58 billion yen (US$0.52
billion), which indicates that the carbon tax is of less importance from the viewpoint
12For the tax revenues from the petroleum coal tax and carbon tax, the 2017 values are used.
13http://www.jama.or.jp/tax/outline/image_01.html (accessed on December 10, 2019).
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of tax revenue. The most important revenue source is the gasoline tax, followed by
the VAT on vehicle purchase and the vehicle tax.
2.2 Actual ECR After Consideration of the Tax System
The described 10 types of taxes are levied on vehicle possession and usage in Japan.
In this subsection,we simulate and discuss howmuchGHGemissions vehicle owners
generate and pay taxes on from the perspective of a life cycle assessment. For the
simulation, we assume that Japanese drivers are average passenger vehicle owners.
Each car owner drove 6300 km in 2018 (Sony Assurance, 2018). The average fuel
economy of gasoline passenger vehicles is 21.9 km per liter (MLITT 2017). There-
fore, the average car consumes 287.7 L of gasoline per year. Using the CO2 emission
coefficient of 2.348 kg-CO2 per gasoline liter presented by the IEA (2011) yields
an equivalence of approximately 676 kg-CO2 per year. The Automobile Inspection
& Registration Information Association (AIRIA) reports that the average number of
years of passenger vehicle usage in 2018 was 13.24.14 Therefore, the lifetime total
amount of GHG emissions is approximately 8943 kg-CO2 (=676 kg-CO2 per year×
13.24 years). With a social discount rate of 4% (MLITT 2018) on the total amount
of the emission, the present discounted emission is 7112 kg-CO2. After 13.24 years,
we assume that the owners scrap their vehicles.
The average gasoline retail price in 2018, 149.9 yen per liter, was obtained
from the Survey on Petroleum Product Price by the Agency for National Resources
and Energy. The average owner annually spends approximately 43 thousand yen
on gasoline. Over the long term, the total amount of gasoline consumption costs
approximately 571 thousand yen.
The average vehicle price is assumed to be 2525 thousand yen (US$23.0 thou-
sand), which is the average value of the prices of the Note (2131 thousand yen;
US$19.4 thousand), Aqua (2314 thousand yen; US$21.0 thousand) and Prius (3132
thousand yen; US$28.5 thousand) car models. These were the top three best selling
cars in 2018.15 In the same manner, the weight and displacement of the average
vehicle are set to 1212 kg and 1497 cc, which are the averages of the weights and
displacements, respectively, of these three described vehicles. The characteristics of
the assumed average vehicle are shown in Table 2.
Hereafter,we calculate howmuchowners of the averagevehicle pay for the various
taxes over the 13.24-year life cycle. We ignore scrapping cost in the calculation. The
calculation results are presented in Table 3. The rows in the table denote the vehicle
age, so row 14 indicates the final year, when vehicles are scrapped. The owners,
14https://www.airia.or.jp/publish/file/r5c6pv000000m20m-att/r5c6pv000000m211.pdf (accessed
on December 10, 2019).
15In 2018, the best-selling vehicle was the Note, produced by Nissan; 136,324 vehicles were sold.
The next best sellers were the Aqua and Prius, manufactured by Toyota. The sales volumes of the
Aqua and Prius were 126,561 and 115,462, respectively.
4 Climate Policy in Transportation Sector: Role of Carbon Pricing 69
Table 2 Features of the assumed average vehicle
Terms Value Unit References
Annual mileage 6300 km/year Sony Assurance (2018)
Fuel efficiency 21.9 km/litter MLITT (2017)
CO2 coefficient 2.348 kg-CO2/litter IEA (2011)
Vehicle price 2525 thousand yen Average retail price among Note, Aqua and
Prius
Vehicle weight 1212 kg Average weight among Note, Aqua and Prius
Vehicle displacement 1497 cc Average displacement among Note, Aqua and
Prius
Years of vehicle usage 13.24 years AIRIA website
Gasoline price 149.9 yen/litter The survey on petroleum product price
Table 3 Amount of tax payments until vehicle scrapping (unit: thousand yen)





















1 25.3 252.5 34.5 11.2 15.5 4.3 0.2 0.6
2 0.0 0.0 33.2 0.0 14.9 4.1 0.2 0.6
3 0.0 0.0 31.9 0.0 14.3 4.0 0.2 0.5
4 0.0 0.0 30.7 13.3 13.8 3.8 0.2 0.5
5 0.0 0.0 29.5 0.0 13.2 3.7 0.2 0.5
6 0.0 0.0 28.4 12.3 12.7 3.5 0.2 0.5
7 0.0 0.0 27.3 0.0 12.2 3.4 0.2 0.5
8 0.0 0.0 26.2 11.4 11.8 3.3 0.2 0.4
9 0.0 0.0 25.2 0.0 11.3 3.2 0.2 0.4
10 0.0 0.0 24.2 10.5 10.9 3.0 0.2 0.4
11 0.0 0.0 23.3 0.0 10.5 2.9 0.1 0.4
12 0.0 0.0 22.4 9.7 10.1 2.8 0.1 0.4
13 0.0 0.0 21.5 0.0 9.7 2.7 0.1 0.4
14 0.0 0.0 6.9 3.0 2.2 0.6 0.0 0.1
Total 25.3 252.5 365.2 71.5 163.0 45.4 2.3 6.2
Note Tax rates of the vehicle acquisition tax, vehicle tax and vehicle weight tax are discounted
for designated eco-friendly vehicles such as plug-in hybrid vehicles and EVs. The tax rates for
eco-friendly vehicles are applied for the calculation
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therefore, pay only a quarter of each tax in the final year because they hold their
vehicles for only 0.24 years (approximately 3 months). With a social discount rate of
4%, the present discounted value of the tax payment is 931.4 thousand yen in total.
Considering the total discounted emission volume described above, the ECR from
the viewpoint of life cycle assessment is 131.0 thousand yen (US$1.19 thousand)
per t-CO2, implying that the ECR in Japan is considerably higher than the SCC
of US$54.7 per t-CO2 determined by Wang et al. (2019). It is concluded that the
Japanese government should reduce the tax rate on automobiles because the ECR is
too high.
Of the total payment, 365.2 thousand yen (US$3.32 thousand), the highest tax
payment, is attributable to the vehicle tax. The tax with next highest payment is
the VAT on vehicle purchase and then the gasoline tax. When aggregating tax
payments by behavior, the tax payments for purchase, possession and usage are 277.8,
436.7 and 216.8 thousand yen (US$2.07 thousand, US$3.97 thousand and US$1.97
thousand), respectively. Therefore, the tax payment for usage is lowest, implying
that the Japanese automobile tax system emphasizes taxes on vehicle purchase and
possession.
Assuming that the average vehicle features are as shown in Table 2, we calculate
the long-term ECR as the total tax payment divided by GHG emissions. If vehicles
are assumed to be fuel inefficient, ceteris paribus, the ECR decreases because the
denominator becomes larger. If vehicles are assumed to be more expensive, the
ECR increases because the numerator becomes larger. These changes are due to the
features of the Japanese automobile tax system, where the main tax target is not fuel
consumption but vehicle purchase and possession.
GHG emission is not generated from vehicle purchase and possession but usage
(i.e., fuel combustion). Therefore, a Pigouvian carbon tax should be imposed on
vehicle usage to attain cost efficiency. According to economic theory, the extent of
the Pigouvian carbon tax should equal the SCC. Therefore, the Japanese government
should shift its attention in the automobile tax system from purchase and possession
to usage. At the same time, it should reduce the tax rates on vehicle usage to cost-
effectively reduce GHG emissions.
Table 4 shows the ECR for an average vehicle. In general, the ECR is calculated by
summing taxes on fuel consumption only (OECD 2018), that is, the 4 types of taxes
on usage. In this case, the ECR is 30.5 thousand yen (US$ 277) per t-CO2. TheOECD
(2016) reports that the Japanese ECR on road vehicles in 2012 was approximately
22.6 thousand yen (US$205) per t-CO2. Considering that the estimated ECR depends
on vehicle characteristics (as in Table 2), our calculated ECR is not greatly different
from that of the OECD (2016). Additionally, the difference may come from the
Table 4 The ECR for an average vehicle
Purchase Possession Usage Total
Tax payment (thousand yen) 277.8 436.7 216.8 931.4
Tax payment/GHG emissions (thousand yen/ t-CO2) 39.1 61.4 30.5 131.0
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different benchmark years. The benchmark years of this chapter and the OECD
(2016) report are 2018 and 2012, respectively.
The OECD (2016) also shows the ECRs for 40 countries, including Japan. The
highest ECR, 33.7 thousand yen (US$307) per t-CO2, is implemented in the UK. Of
the 40 countries, Japan has the 14th highest ECR on road vehicles. That is, although
the carbon prices of the carbon tax and the Tokyo ETS in Japan are smaller than
those in other countries, it is confirmed that the ECR is sufficiently high compared
to the SCC.
3 Cost-Benefit of EVs in Japan
3.1 Construction Cost for Fast Chargers
After the consideration of the ECR on automobiles in Japan in the previous section,
this section conducts a cost-benefit analysis of the diffusion of EVs. Different from
previous studies examining the effects of EVs, this chapter explicitly considers the
recharging time of EVs, which is a social loss, similar to congestion. The basic
concept of the analysis follows the method of Ito and Managi (2015). In this cost-
benefit analysis, we assume that all vehicles in Japan are substituted by EVs, that
is, that there are no conventional gasoline or diesel vehicles. The AIRIA shows that
there are approximately 62.1 million vehicles in Japan.16 Therefore, our analysis
assumes that there are same number of EVs.
Similar to refuelling stations for conventional gasoline vehicles, EVs require fast
chargers outside of homes. Of course, frequently charging EVs at home may elimi-
nate the demand for fast charging them elsewhere. However, when EVs travel long
distances, fast chargers are always required. Therefore, considering the diffusion of
EVs, many new fast chargers must be constructed.
We calculate the required number of fast chargers and their construction costs. The
required number of fast chargers can be obtained from the total yearly electric power
consumption divided by the yearly electric power supply per charger [Eq. (1)]. In the
equation, the term in parentheses denotes the unit. The value of the yearly electric
power supply per charger is set to approximately 140,160 kWh/unit/year, obtained
fromMitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting (2014). The report shows that the fast
charger takes 30 min to charge 8 kWh. In other words, the charger takes one year to
charge 140,160 kWh.
The total yearly electric power consumption is calculated by multiplying the
total number of EVs (i.e., 62.1 million vehicles) and the required electric power
consumption per EV [Eq. (2)]. On the assumption that drivers’ behaviors are not
changed by the use of EVs, the required electric power consumption per EV is
obtained from the annual mileage (i.e., 6300 km in Table 2) divided by the EV
16https://www.airia.or.jp/publish/statistics/ub83el00000000wo-att/01.pdf (accessed on December
10, 2019).
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driving distance per kWh [Eq. (3)].We use approximately 9.3 km/kWh as the driving
distance of the EV, which is equal to the performance of the Leaf model produced
by Nissan.17 According to the three equations, the required number of fast chargers
is 299,069. In the calculation, we assume that all EV owners do not recharge their
EVs at home but at fast chargers outdoors. Therefore, the required number can be
regarded as the maximum.
Number of f ast chargers(units)
= Total yearly electric power consumption(kWh/year)





Total yearly electric power consumption(kWh/year)
= Total number of EV s(vehicles)

















driving distance of EV per kWh(km/kWh)
(3)
The construction cost of the fast charger is set to 2.25 million yen (US$20.5
thousand) (Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting, 2014). The statutory useful
life for a fast charger is 8 years.18 Therefore, ignoring a discount rate, the annual cost
per charger is approximately 281 thousand yen (US$2.26 thousand). The total annual
cost for constructing fast chargers is 84.1 billion yen per year (US$0.76 billion). The
values and data sources in the calculation are shown in Table 5.
3.2 GHG Emission Reduction
Asmentioned earlier, the amount of GHG emissions from automobiles is 0.18 billion
t-CO2. In the case that all conventional gasoline and diesel vehicles are replaced with
EVs, the amount ofGHGemissions from fuel consumption becomes zero. Therefore,
the direct emission reduction effect of EVs is 0.18 billion t-CO2.
On the other hand, EVs need electric power. The total yearly electric power
consumption of EVs is already calculated in Eq. (2): approximately 42.9 GWh per
17The Leaf with a 30 kWh battery can travel 280 km on a full charge; http://history.nissan.co.jp/
LEAF/ZE0/1211/charge.html (accessed on December 10, 219).
18Refer to the Next Generation Vehicle Promotion Center website: http://www.cev-pc.or.jp/hojo/
pdf/h31/H23-H24_kouhukitei_saisoku.pdf (accessed on December 10, 2019).
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Table 5 Data sources for calculating construction cost
Term Value Unit Source
Yearly electric power supply per
charger
140,160 kWh/unit/year Mitsubishi UFJ Research
and Consulting (2014)
Total number of EVs 62.1 million vehicles AIRIA website
Annual mileage 6200 km/year Sony Assurance (2018)
Driving distance of EV per kWh 9.3 km/kWh Nissan website
Construction cost of fast charger 2.25 million yen/unit Mitsubishi UFJ Research
and Consulting (2014)
Statutory useful life for fast
charger
8 years Next Generation Vehicle
Promotion Center website
year. Therefore, that amount of electric power must be newly generated for the use
of EVs. Here, the additional electric power is assumed to be generated by thermal
power generation (i.e., coal, oil and LNG). Viewing the breakdown of thermal power
generation, coal, oil and LNG account for 40.4%, 10.8% and 48.8%, respectively
(Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2018). Therefore, when the power gener-
ation amount is apportioned at these rates, 16.9, 4.5 and 20.5 GWh are generated by
coal, oil and LNG thermal generation. Since the CO2 coefficients for each type of
power generation are 943, 738 and 599 gram-CO2 per kWh, respectively (Imamura
et al. 2016), the additional annual total amount of GHG emissions is 31.5 million
t-CO2.
Therefore, the amount of net GHG emission reduction is approximately
0.15 billion t-CO2 because the reduction in emissions from replacement of other
vehicles with EVs exceeds the increase in emissions from the related power genera-
tion. When the reduction is converted into monetary value with the SCC at 6017 yen
(US$54.7) per t-CO2 in line with Wang et al. (2019), the annual benefit of reducing
GHG emissions from diffusion of EVs is approximately 916.4 billion yen (US$
8.33 billion).
3.3 Opportunity Cost of Recharging Time
The EV owner must wait for the vehicle to recharge at the charging station. Theymay
do something to work during the recharging time (e.g., input work using a laptop).
However, for simplicity, we ignore this possibility. That is, we consider the recharge
wait time to be an opportunity cost. Although the charging time has become shorter,
Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting (2014) reports that it takes 30 min to fully
recharge an EV.
EV owners annually drive 6300 km, and an EV can travel 280 km on a single
charge (see the previous Sect. 3.2). Owners thus recharge their EVs at charging
stations 22.5 times a year. The time value of driving is presented in MLITT (2018)
74 K. Iwata
at 39.6 yen per minute. Following Eq. (4), the annual opportunity cost per EV is
26,730 yen (US$243).









× number of recharges(time)





When using conventional gasoline vehicles, owners must refill fuel at refuelling
stations. The Fire and Disaster Management Agency reports that the refuelling
amount is on average 30.6 L.19 The refuelling speed of the refuelling machine is
legally set to between 30 and 35 L per minute by the Fire Service Act. Using the
average speed of 32.5 L per minute and the average refuelling amount, we can
calculate the refuelling time for each refuel as approximately 0.94 min.
Since gasoline vehicle owners consume 287.7 L of gasoline per year, calculated
by the annual mileage (i.e., 6300 km) divided by the fuel efficiency (i.e., 21.9 km
per liter), they refuel their vehicles approximately 9.4 times for a year (=287.7 L per
year/ 30.6 L). Therefore, the opportunity cost for conventional gasoline vehicles is
approximately 350 yen (US$3.2), calculated as in Eq. (5). The opportunity cost of
refuelling conventional vehicles is quite small compared to that of recharging EVs.









× number of re f uels(time)





Thenet opportunity cost of replacing conventional vehicleswithEVs is 26,379yen
(US$239.8). Considering that the number of vehicles is 62.1 million, the total oppor-
tunity cost is 1638.2 billion yen (US$14.9 billion). The data sources for calculating
the costs are described in Table 6.
3.4 Total Net Benefit of EVs
Three components of EV net benefit have been calculated: the construction cost,
the benefit from the GHG reduction and the net opportunity cost. The amounts of
those components are annually 84.1 billion yen, 916.4 billion yen and 1638.2 billion
19Refer to the Fire and Disaster Management Agency website: https://www8.cao.go.jp/kisei-kai
kaku/kaigi/meeting/2013/wg/ene/130508/item2-2.pdf (accessed on December 10, 2019).
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Table 6 Data sources for calculating opportunity costs
Term Value Unit Source
Recharging time 30 minute Mitsubishi UFJ Research and
Consulting (2014)
Annual mileage 6200 km/year Sony Assurance (2018)
Travel distance on a single charge 280 km Leaf with 30kWh battery
Time value of driving 39.6 yen/minute MLITT (2018)
Refuelling amount 30.6 litter Fire and Disaster Management
Agency website
Refuelling speed 32.5 litter/minute Fire Service Act
Fuel efficiency 21.9 km/liter MLITT (2017)
yen, respectively. Therefore, the total net benefit is negative, −805.9 billion yen
(−US$73.3 billion), implying that the Japanese government should not promote the
diffusion and usage of EVs. This conclusion mainly comes from the fact that the
opportunity cost of waiting for EVs to recharge is remarkably large.
The upper bound value of the opportunity cost is calculated in the simulation
as mentioned before because all EV owners are assumed not to recharge their EVs
at home but at outdoor fast chargers 22.5 times per year. Therefore, we reduce the
number of recharges at outdoor fast chargers (i.e., increase the number of recharges
at home) and recalculate the cost and benefit. When owners recharge their EVs at
home, the opportunity cost of waiting for EVs to recharge is assumed to be zero. For
example, this could be because the recharge is performed overnight.
Fig. 3 Cost and benefit of EVs by number of outdoor recharges
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The recalculated costs and benefits are depicted in Fig. 3. The x- and y-axes repre-
sent the number of recharges and monetary value of the cost or benefit, respectively.
In the basic simulation, the number of outdoor recharges is set to 22.5. As shown in
Fig. 3, we observe that the cost (i.e., sum of the construction cost and opportunity
cost of recharge wait time) decreases as the number of outdoor recharges decreases.
When the number of recharges decreases to 12, the benefit is greater than the cost,
implying that the promotion of EVs improves social welfare. Twelve is approxi-
mately half of 22.5, so if less than one of every two recharges is done outdoors,
the spread of EVs will be an efficient countermeasure against climate change. Since
charging EVs takes longer than refuelling gasoline or diesel vehicles, it is necessary
to examine in particular how many times EV owners will use outdoor fast chargers.
In addition, to improve social welfare further, it is important for policymakers and
manufacturers to develop high-performance fast chargers.
4 Concluding Remarks
Since automobiles greatly contribute to GHG emissions in Japan (i.e., 15.4% of the
total), it is important to examine how to efficiently reduce emissions fromautomobile.
A carbon tax on fuel consumption was implemented in Japan in 2012 to reduce GHG
emissions from vehicles. However, the tax rate, 289 yen (US$2.6) per t-CO2, has
been criticized as being too low compared to the rates of other countries and the SCC
determined by Wang et al. (2019). However, multiple taxes are already imposed on
vehicles in Japan. Considering taxes such as the vehicle acquisition tax and VAT, the
entire tax rate on carbon, that is, the ECR,may not be small. Focusing on automobiles
in Japan, this chapter first gave an overview of the complicated vehicle tax system
and examined the entire ECR on vehicles.
Different from the OECD (2016) and OECD (2018), when calculating the ECR
on vehicles in Japan, we consider the entire vehicle tax system, including taxes on
vehicle purchase and possession, from the perspective of life cycle assessment. The
final ECR on vehicles in Japan is estimated to be 128.9 thousand yen (US$1.17
thousand) per t-CO2, suggesting that the ECR is quite large. This is because the tax
rates for vehicle purchase and possession are high compared to the rate for vehicle
usageunder the vehicle tax system in Japan.Therefore, although the carbon tax rate on
fuel consumption is small in Japan, the ECR is rather high. For further improvement
of countermeasures against climate change, the Japanese government should shift
its attention to vehicle usage from vehicle purchase and possession.
Second, we completed a cost-benefit analysis of EVs, which are projected to
become a main type of vehicle in the future (IEA 2019). The benefit of EVs is
calculated as the monetary value of GHG emissions reduction when all vehicles are
replaced with EVs. The cost is the sum of the construction cost of fast chargers
and the opportunity cost of the EV recharge wait time. For the basic calculation,
we assume that EV owners do not recharge their EVs at home but at outdoor fast
chargers. In that case, the cost and benefit are estimated to be 1722 and 916 billion
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yen (US$15.7 and 8.3 billion), respectively. That is, the diffusion of EVs is not an
efficient measure for reducing GHG emissions. However, if owners recharge their
EVs at home once of every two charges, the net benefit becomes positive, suggesting
that the opportunity cost of waiting for recharges is a key factor in whether EVs can
play a role inmitigating climate change. Therefore, it is important for policymakers to
examine how often EV owners use outdoor fast chargers as well as to develop higher
performance fast chargers. Additionally, to make effective use of the waiting time for
recharging, it is desirable to construct fast chargers. This chapter introduces strong
assumptions for estimating the ECR and the cost-benefit analysis. Future research
needs to relax the assumptions to examine them precisely.
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Chapter 5
Climate Policy in Power Sector:
Feed-in Tariff and Carbon Pricing
Yukihide Kurakawa
Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effects of somemainstream
policy schemes in the power sector on the reduction of CO2 emissions. The first
part of this chapter is the analysis on the effects of promoting generation (fuel)
efficiency of fossil-fuel power generation, specifically assuming more efficient coal-
fired power plants that recently indicates increased presence in the Japanese power
sector. Improvement in generation efficiency of fossil-fuel power plants is expected
to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide mainly from a technological aspect. However,
overall effects on carbon reduction in the whole industry would be ambiguous since
it also depends onmarket structure. The increased efficiency in generation leads to an
improvement in cost conditions of fossil-fuel power producers relative to their rivals.
It enables them to expand their generation and market share. Analyzing the Cournot
oligopoly model, it is shown that an improvement in fossil-fuel power generations
produces two effects: the ‘saving effect’ and the ‘rebound effect’. The total CO2
emission in thewhole industry decrease if the former effect exceeds the other, andvice
versa. In addition, it is indicated that a rise in the generation efficiencywould increase
a difficulty of implementing carbon tax. In the second part of this chapter, I study
the combination of feed-in tariff and carbon tax; that would be worthy to investigate
since they could possibly complement each other. FIT policy could be financed by the
revenue of carbon tax, and a reduction in electricity supply by the carbon tax would
be lessen by supporting renewable power generations under FIT. It is demonstrated
that FIT had the combined effects: it fosters a competitive environment in addition to
indirectly reduces CO2 emissions. The result indicates that the combination of these
policies would produce potential welfare gains.
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There are several turning points in the history of energy use. The invention of theWatt
steam engine in the late eighteenth century driven the industrial revolution and led to
a rapid growth in coal consumption. In the 1950s, successive discovery of oilfields
in the Middle East and Africa brought about a shift from coal to oil as a major source
of energy. Since then, economies in various countries had become more dependent
on political and diplomatic situations of oil-producing nations. That poses potential
risks associated with social and economic stability in various countries. The oil crises
in the 1970s revealed the risk from energy use highly dependent on petroleum. That
triggered a promotion of usage of alternative energy sources like natural gas and
nuclear power as well as energy conservation policies in order to improve energy
security. After the adoption of theUnitedNations Framework Convention onClimate
Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, there has been a growing recognition of the global
warming as a problem of global issue.
Nuclear power has occupied an important position not only as a major energy
source but also as a low-carbon power source which plays a substantial role in
reducing CO2 emissions as well as increasing energy security; uranium is distributed
in countries with relatively stable political conditions and is able to release greater
thermal energy with smaller amount than fossil fuels. On the other hand, the issue of
securing a final disposal site for radioactive waste still remains unsettled. In addition,
the costs for safety measures at nuclear power generation facilities has increased
after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident in 2011, that has been
increasing the difficulty of constructing new nuclear power plants nowadays.
In that context, promoting renewable energies has become an increasingly more
important policy issue to tackle the problems of global warming and energy security
in recent years. Accordingly, many countries have implemented support schemes to
promote renewable power generations.
Feed-in tariff (FIT) is the mainstream policy scheme that is particularly effective
in promoting renewable energies. Despite its effectiveness, it usually causes an oper-
ational difficulty of making delicate adjustment in quantities of renewable energies,
since it is a kind of price regulation under which the government sets a price for
renewable electricity leaving the quantities to the market; practically it is difficult for
the government to grasp precise cost conditions of the renewable power producers.
The main purpose of the FIT policy is to reduce renewable power generation costs to
the competitive level by encouraging technological developments and producing effi-
ciency gains frommass production (e.g., the learning effect). Indeed, many countries
adopting FIT policy are aiming at transition to a support schemes that are more rele-
vant to the market mechanism such as feed-in premiums (FIP) and bidding systems
when the FIT policy successfully creates competitive cost conditions of renewable
power generations.
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Additionally, there exist the financing problem with FIT which tend to receive
public attentions since it would be partly passed on to consumers. On the other hand,
it is noteworthy to say that supporting renewable energy generations would partially
overlaps with fostering the competitive environment in the industry that is formerly
characterized by high market concentrations and entry barriers, because the new
entrants would be heavily subsidized by the FIT; eventually it would has the effect of
decreasing the consumer price. The analysis of the later part of this chapter primarily
focuses on this aspect of FIT in addition to its effects as a climate policy in the power
sector.
1.2 Outline
Themajor instruments for carbon reduction in the power sector typically involves the
environmental and regulatory policy schemeswhich can be classified as the following
categories,
1. Improving energy efficiencies
2. Carbon pricing
3. Promoting non-fossil fuel energy sources.
The first category covers approaches to both the supply-side and demand-side
efficiencies: efficiencies of producing and using energies, respectively. The second
category contains carbon tax and cap and trade schemes. The third category mainly
represented by support schemes for promoting renewable energy sources, e.g., feed-
in tariff (FIT), feed-in premium (FIP), and renewable portfolio standard (RPS). As for
Japanese power sector, FIT has been implemented since 2012, and partly combined
with the bidding system for large-scale photovoltaics from 2017.
In the first part of this chapter, I will be examining a linear model to investigate
the effects of generation efficiency and carbon tax. I will also be focusing on the
interrelationship between these factors. In the next part, I will analyze a model with
quadratic cost functions to examine the effects of feed-in tariff, aswell as combination
with feed-in tariff and carbon tax.
2 Generation Efficiency and Carbon Tax
I will begin the analysis by considering a linear model in which the cost functions
and the demand function of the market are all linear to examine the overall effect of
generation efficiency of the fossil-fuel power plants (specifically suppose coal fired
power plants here) on carbon reduction. Following previous works such as Tamás
et al. (2010) and Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010), I consider a liberalized1 Cournot
1Armstrong et al. (1994) states a distinction between “deregulation” and “liberalization”; the former
would represent the removal of regulations such as price control aswell as the removal of restrictions
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oligopoly market which is consisted of n identical fossil-fuel power producers and
m identical renewable power producers.2 The inverse demand function is assumed
to be as follows,
P(Q) := A − BQ,
where P = P(Q) is the consumer price and Q is the total electricity supplied by
both fossil-fuel and renewable power producers.
The profit of each fossil-fuel power producer is given by,
π iF := (P − cF − a)yi − kF , i = 1, · · · , n (1)
where yi is the amount of electricity supply, cF is the constant marginal cost, and
kF is the fixed cost. Let a denote the access charge for each unit of electricity which
is paid to the network operator in order to access the transmission network. The
marginal cost of fossil-fuel power generation cF is composed of fuel cost and carbon
tax:
cF := pFθ + t(ηθ), (2)
where θ(kg/kWh) represents the amount of fuel needed to produce 1 kWh of elec-
tricity, it is equivalent to the generation efficiency of power plants,3 pF is the fuel
price (yen/kg), and t is the carbon price (equivalent to a tax for each unit of emis-
sions of carbondioxide). Letη(kg− CO2/kg)denote the carbon intensity of fuel; that
represents the amount of CO2 emissions generated from burning 1kg of fossil-fuel.4
Substituting Eq. (2), Eq. (1) can be rewritten as follows,
π iF := (P − pFθ − a)yi − t(ηθyi ) − kF , i = 1, · · · , n. (3)
whereηθyi is the emission of the i-th fossil-fuel power producer,which is represented





Similarly, the profit of the renewable producer j is written as,
π
j
R := (P − cR − a)x j − kR, j = 1, · · · ,m, (4)
on competition. For clarity, they use “liberalization” to mean the removal of restrictions on compe-
tition. Following them, I use “liberalized market” here to represent the competitive environment
under environmental regulations such as FIT.
2As Tamás et al. (2010) pointed out, market concentration in the electricity markets often high
despite liberalization.
3Note that lower (higher) θ corresponds to higher (lower) generation efficiency.
4The amount of emission by producer i is given by ηθyi (kg− CO2).
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where x j is the amount of electricity supply, cR is the constant marginal cost, and kR
is the fixed cost.
By solving the profit maximization problems, the first order conditions for fossil-
fuel and renewable power producers are obtained as follows,
∂π iF
∂yi





= {A − BQ − cR − a} − Bx j = 0 (6)
Assuming the symmetry (yi = yfor all i , and x j = x for all j) in the equilibrium,
the equilibrium outcomes can be obtained as follows,
y = A − (m + 1)(pFθ + tθη) + mcN − a
(n + m + 1)B , (7)
x = A − (n + 1)cN + n(pFθ + tθη) − a
(n + m + 1)B , (8)
Q = (n + m)(A − a) − n(pFθ + tθη) − mcN
(n + m + 1)B . (9)
In order to secure positive outputs of the fossil-fuel and renewable power
producers, it is assumed in the following analysis that A − (n + 1)cN − a > 0
and θ < θ̄ , where
θ̄ := A + mcN − a
(m + 1)(pF + tη) .
2.1 Generation Efficiency
Contrary to the worldwide trend toward restrictions or ‘divestment’ on coal-related
projects in recent years, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI), as well as former monopolists in the electric power industry are positive
about promoting coal-fired power generations. They rather place emphasis on tech-
nological measures for carbon reductions, i.e., developing low emission technologies
that would reduce emissions of carbon dioxide such as higher-efficient power plants,
CCS (Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage) and CCU (Carbon dioxide Capture and
Utilization).
Japanese electric power companies shut down nuclear power plants in May 2011
after Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident. METI and the former
84 Y. Kurakawa
monopolists in the power sector regard coal fired power generation as a good alter-
native to nuclear power. They have become more enthusiastic to promote coal fired
power generation after the accident. In addition, the Japanese government aims to
export high efficiency coal fired power plants to the developing countries.
Improvement in generation efficiency of fossil-fuel power plants is expected to
reduce emissions of carbon dioxide mainly from a technological aspect; more effi-
cient power plants are able to produce the same amount of electricity with less
fuel input. Consequently, it enables cutting fuel consumption and carbon emissions
maintaining the electricity output. However, overall effects on carbon reduction in
the whole industry would be ambiguous since it also depends on market structure.
The increased efficiency in generation leads to an improvement in cost conditions
of fossil-fuel power producers relative to their rivals. It enables them to expand their
generation and market share. It may cause a net increase in total CO2 emission in the
industry.We need to take this factor related to the market structure into account when
we consider to what extent does promoting more efficient power plants contribute to
carbon reduction in the whole industry.
To examine the impact of changes in generation efficiency of fossil-fuel power




= − (m + 1)(pF + tη)
(n + m + 1)B < 0, (10)
dx
dθ
= n(pF + tη)
(n + m + 1)B > 0, (11)
dQ
dθ
= −n(pF + tη)
(n + m + 1)B < 0. (12)
Note that dy/dθ < 0. This means that an improvement (reduction) in generation
efficiency, which is equivalent to a decrease (increase) in θ , leads to a lager (smaller)
output of fossil-fuel power producers. A higher generation efficiency improves cost
conditions of fossil-fuel generators. This gives them a competitive advantage relative
to their rivals: renewable electricity producers. To sumup, improvement in generation
efficiency leads to an increase in output of fossil-fuel power producers and reduces
output of renewable power producers, and vise-versa. The total output rises with
higher generation efficiency.









The first term in the bracket indicates the direct effect of fuel conservation. A
higher generation efficiency (lower θ ) can cut carbon emissions due to fuel conser-
vation. The second term indicates the indirect effect through the market in which the
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fossil-fuel power producers expand their production with improved cost conditions
relative to their rivals. It causes the adverse effect through changing in the market
equilibrium.5 Improvement in generation efficiency reduces total emission of the
power sector if the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect, and vice versa. Note
that a reduction in θ increases the former effect but decreases the latter. Substituting





A − 2θ(m + 1)(pF + tη) + mcN − a
(n + m + 1)B
)
. (14)
The sign of Eq. (14) depends only on the sign of numerator of fraction in the
bracket. We can obtain a threshold,6
θ̂ := A + mcN − a







> 0 i f 0 < θ < θ̂
= 0 i f θ = θ̂
< 0 i f θ̂ < θ < θ̄
(15)
Note that a lower θ corresponds to more efficient power plant. The above equation
indicates that an improvement in generation efficiency increases total emission of
the industry if the fuel efficiency is lower than a threshold,7 and vice versa.
Concerning a combination with carbon tax, a higher tax level increases the
threshold of generation efficiency. In other words, a higher tax level reduces θ̂ ;
d θ̂/dt < 0. This is because in a market where carbon tax is implemented, the direct
effect of higher efficiency gets smaller with a reduction in the output of fossil-fuel
power producers by the tax, which is represented by the first term in the bracket of
Eq. (13), while the impact of the indirect effect, which is represented by the second
term in the bracket of Eq. (13), increases with the rise in the carbon tax. Conse-
quently, the required level of generation efficiency which enables total emission
reduction goes up with an increase in the tax level. This means that the situation in
which generation efficiency leads total emission expansion is more likely to occur as
5It can be interpreted as a form of the ‘rebound effect’. In Sorrel (2009), the ‘rebound effect’ is
described as “an umbrella term for a variety of mechanisms that reduce the potential energy savings
from improved energy efficiency.”
6Note that θ̂ = θ̄/2.
7It can be seen as a kind of ‘Jevons’ Paradox’ suggested by William Stanly Jevons in 1865, that
claims an improvement in energy efficiency will increase the overall energy consumption (Alcott
2005; Sorrel 2009). That is not the case under the cap and trade policy scheme in which the total
emission is controlled by the cap that is set by the government. Under the cap and trade scheme,
the gains in fuel efficiency does not affect the total emission. Instead, it would increase the price
for the allowances by raising the marginal abatement costs of the fossil-fuel power producers.
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environmental tax increases. Similarly, a higher fuel price raises the threshold effi-
ciency level. The fossil-fuel power producers reduce their outputs with an increase
in fuel price. This diminishes the relative impact of the direct effect relative to the
indirect effect. As a result, the required level of generation efficiency gets higher.
2.2 Effect of Carbon Tax
Next, I will be examining the effect of carbon tax. Differentiate Eqs. (7)–(9) with
respect to t yeilds,
dy
dt
= − (m + 1)θη








(n + m + 1)B < 0. (18)
The above equations suggest that a reduction in carbon emission by the carbon
tax leads a reduction in the total output Q, with a production shift from fossil-fuel
power producers y to the renewable power producers x .
The effect on the total emission is given by,
dE
dt
= − (m + 1)n(θη)
2
(n + m + 1)B < 0. (19)
In order to reduce a certain amount of emission E ,8 the level of tax must be,
t(E; θ) = t0 + (n + m + 1)B
(m + 1)n(θη)2 E,
where t0 denotes the initial tax level.9 We can see from the above equation that a
gain in fuel efficiency (a reduction in θ ) raises the required tax level to reduce the
equivalent amount of total emission;
8Suppose that E corresponds to a reduction target set by the government. The analysis of this
section focuses on the cost efficiency in achieving a certain level of reduction target. The major
factor relevant to the cost efficiency would be the effect on consumer price and the external cost of
CO2 emissions are offset each other when compared with the other level of the reduction target.






where t1 = t(E; θ).




Additionally, if θ > θ̂ , a gain in fuel efficiency increases the overall emission. It
leads to a counterintuitive implication. The tax level must be raised with an improve-
ment in fuel efficiency to achieve the equivalent target of carbon reduction, especially
when the fuel efficiency is lower than the threshold (θ > θ̂).







(m + 1)θη .
The above equation indicates that a 1kg reduction in CO2 emission involves
1/(m + 1)θη(kWh) decrease in the total output. The reduction rate rises with an
improvement in generation efficiency (correspondswith an increase in θ ). A decrease
of E in total emission brings about the corresponding decline in the total output:
Q(E; θ) = E
(m + 1)θη .
It results in a rise in the consumer price and a welfare loss derived from the
decreased total consumption. The corresponding reduction in the benefit of the











where Q0 is the initial level of total output which is represented as Eq. (9).
In the same way, we can derive the effect of carbon reduction on the output of








We can easily see that with a fuel-efficient power plant, a unit reduction of CO2
involves a greater reduction in the electricity output. A decrease of E in CO2
emission involves a reduction ofE/θη in the output of fossil-fuel power producers,
which increases with an improvement in the fuel efficiency (a lower θ ).





where Q1 = Q0 − E/(m + 1)θη.
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Finally, it is useful to investigate the impact of carbon tax on the profit of fossil
fuel power producers, since it would be relevant to political feasibility of the tax.11






















= (n + m + 1)B
(m + 1)ηθ y. (23)
Since dy/dθ > 0 from Eq. (10), and the denominator of Eq. (21) decreases with a
reduction in θ , we can easily see that the marginal profit loss derived from the carbon








2.3 Summary: Generation Efficiency and Carbon Tax
Table 1 summarizes the main results of this section. Case 1 describes a notable situ-
ation where an improvement in generation efficiency leads the overall CO2 emission
expansion (Statement (1)) and the increase in the potential profit loss of fossil-fuel
power producers by the carbon tax (Statements 3 and 4). It would be the case inwhich
the tax increase provokes a fierce opposition from the fossil-fuel power producers.
In Case 2 at Table 1, the efficiency gain would contribute to the overall CO2
reduction. A comparative advantage of promoting fuel-efficient power plants relative
to the carbon tax is that an improvement in fuel efficiency possibly increases a total
electricity output [Eq. (12)] while it reduces the overall CO2 emission; in other
words, it could decouple a carbon reduction from a decrease in the total electricity
output. On the other hand, a carbon reduction by the carbon tax involves a decrease
11Resistance from the producers or the consumers could become a significant obstacle to introducing
environmental taxes. In the policy proposal on long-term growth strategy of Japan under the Paris
agreement (issued at March 19, 2019), Japan Business Federation expressed their opposition to
promoting carbon pricing such that carbon tax and emissions trading scheme.
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θ > θ̂(lower efficiency)
Case 2:
θ < θ̂(higher efficiency)
(1) The overall emission
increases.
Equation (15)
(2) The overall emission
decreases.
Equation (15)
(3) The marginal profit loss of the fossil-fuel power producers
by the tax increases.
Equation (24)
(4) The required tax level to reduce a certain amount of CO2
emission increases.
Equation (20)
in the total electricity output. The notable point is that an efficiency standard (which
corresponds to θ̂ in the model of this section) is necessary in order to achieve an
effective CO2 reduction by the efficiency improvement. An incorrect estimation of
the critical threshold or irrelevant setting of the standard could cause the adverse
effect. In addition, statements (3) and (4) in Table 1 still valid in Case 2, which
would make it difficult to complement the effect of carbon reduction with the carbon
tax.
Taking these factors into consideration, the results of this section indicate that
promoting generation efficiency of fossil-fuel power plants is not a reliable way to
reduce overall CO2 emission relative to the carbon tax. In other words, it is not a
substitute of the tax; rather it would increase the political difficulty of implementation
of the carbon tax, which is more reliable measure to reduce the overall emissions.
3 Feed-in Tariff and Carbon Tax
In this section, I consider a policy that simultaneously use feed-in tariff and carbon
tax. The combination of these policies is worthy to investigate since they could
possibly complement each other; FIT policy may be financed by the revenue of
carbon tax, and a reduction in electricity supply by the carbon tax may be lessen by
supporting renewable power generations under FIT.
Under feed-in tariff, the price of electricity generated from renewable power
producers is fixed at PR which is set by the government. A third party network
operator is obliged to purchase the electricity from renewable power producers at
this fixed price. Assuming a quadratic cost function, the profit of the renewable
electricity producers is given by,
π
j





j − ax j − kR, j = 1, · · · ,m. (25)
Differentiating the profit function of the renewable power producers with respect
to yi yields the first order condition for profit maximization as follows,
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PR − a = cRx j , j = 1, · · · ,m.
Solving the first order condition, we obtain the output;
x j = x = PR − a
cR
, j = 1, · · · ,m, (26)
where PR > a is assumed to secure positive outputs of renewable power producers.








The profit of the fossil-fuel power producers is given by,





i − tce yi − kF , i = 1, · · · , n. (28)
where ce(kg− CO2/kWh) represents the carbon intensity of the electricity output.
They go into Cournot competition taking the outputs of the renewable power
producers (and corresponding residual demand) as given; that is determined by the
price for renewable electricity set by the government as Eq. (27). The first order
condition of profit maximization is,
(A − BQ − a) − Byi − cF yi − cet = 0, i = 1, · · · , n. (29)
Assuming the symmetry in the equilibrium (yi = yfor all i), the equilibrium
output is obtained as follows,
y(PR, t) = cR{A − (a + cet)} − Bm(PR − a){(n + 1)B + cF }cR . (30)
The total output of the whole industry is,
Q(PR, t) = ncR(A − a − cet) + Bm(PR − a) + cRcF{(n + 1)B + cF }cR . (31)
3.1 Feed-in Tariff
To examine the effect of feed-in tariff, partially differentiating Eqs. (26), (30) and
(31) with respect to PR yields,
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∂y
∂PR








= Bm{(n + 1)B + cF }cR > 0. (34)
An increase in the feed-in tariff raises themarginal revenue of the renewable power
producers. As a result, it increases their outputs. It also creates a production shift
from the fossil-fuel power producers to the renewable power producers in themarket.
Consequently, it indirectly reduces the carbon emissions in the whole industry. In
contrast with the carbon tax, a rise in the policy variable, i.e., feed-in tariff, leads to an
increase in the total output of the industry and involves a reduction in consumer price.
Consequently, a rise in the feed-in tariff would reduce thewelfare loss generated from
the market power in the oligopoly.12
The effect on total emission is written as follows,
∂E
∂PR
= −nceBm{(n + 1)B + cF }cR < 0. (35)
where E := nce y denotes the total amount of CO2 emission. An increase in the
fixed price creates a production shift from the fossil-fuel power producers to the
renewable power producers. As a result, it creates an indirect effect of reducing the
industry-wide carbon emissions.
A sharp difference between the feed-in tariff and the carbon tax is that the feed-
in tariff involves an increase in the total electricity output (which corresponds to
a lower consumer price) when it indirectly reduces the output of the fossil-fuel
power producers. The relationship between the effects of feed-in tariff on the carbon








We can see from the above equation that a 1kg reduction in the carbon emission by
the feed-in tariff involves a 1/nce(kWh) increase in the total output. In contrast with
the case of carbon tax, feed-in tariff is able to reduce the carbon emissions without
decreasing the total output; rather it increases with a rise in the feed-in tariff.
12In an imperfectly competitivemarket, policy effects of correcting distortions caused by themarket
power play an influential role (Hibiki and Kurakawa 2013).
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3.2 Carbon Tax
The effect of carbon tax is straightforward. The partial derivatives ofmarket outcomes
with respect to t is obtained as follows,
∂y
∂t






= −nce{(n + 1)B + cF }cR < 0. (39)
When the carbon tax is implemented together with feed-in tariff, the outputs of
renewable power producers are solely determined by the feed-in tariff and are not
affected by the carbon tax. In other words, a change in the tax level does not create
production shift caused by the strategic interrelationship in the market, because the
marginal revenues of the renewable power producers are fixed by the feed-in tariff. It
merely reduces the output of fossil-fuel power producers and consequently decreases
the total output of the power sector. A reduction in CO2 emission by the carbon tax
involves a decrease in the total output and a rise in the consumer price.





{(n + 1)B + cF }cR < 0.









This equation indicates that a 1kg reduction in the carbon emission by the tax
involves a 1/ce(kWh) reduction in the total output.
3.3 Combination of Feed-in Tariff and Carbon Tax
Combination of the feed-in tariff and the carbon tax enables a policymaker to choose
a pair of the emission level and the total output from the feasible region which is
illustrated in Fig. 1. The lines L0 and L1 correspond to the lower limit and the upper
limit of the feed-in tariff respectively, which would be determined bymultiple factors
(e.g., the break-even point of the renewable power producers). The slope of these
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Fig. 1 The combined effect of the feed-in tariff and the carbon tax
lines is 1/ce as represented in Eq. (40). Similarly, the lines L2 and L3 respectively
correspond to the lower limit and the upper limit of the carbon tax. The slope of L2
and L3 is −1/nce as Eq. (36) indicates.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the carbon tax has a negative impact on the total output.
When the carbon tax is implemented separately from the feed-in tariff,13 there is
a trade-off between the carbon reduction and a fall in the total electricity output,
that results in a rise in the consumer price. The feed-in tariff introduces a positive
element of the total output, that greatly extend the range of possible choice for the
policy maker.14 In other words, these policy instruments complement each other; the
combination of these policies produce a potential welfare gain in the industry.
4 Summary and Conclusion
The analysis of Sect. 2 investigated the effects of generation efficiency gains in fossil
fuel power plants (mainly supposing coal-fired power generation). It was shown that
an improvement in generation efficiency of fossil-fuel power plants produced the
following two effects:
13The possible range is segment BC in Fig. 1 in this case.
14When the feed-in tariff is introduced separately from the carbon tax, the possible range is segment
CD in Fig. 1.
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1. The effect of reducing the fuel required to obtain the same amount of electricity
2. The effect of increasing the cost efficiency of the fossil-fuel power generation
(reducing the marginal costs of fossil-fuel power producers), that gives them an
advantage in competition relative to their rivals, the renewable power producers,
and enables them to increase the market shares.
The latter effect (2) can be interpreted as a kind of the ‘rebound effect’, and the
former can be referred as a ‘saving effect’. The overall emission decreases if
the ‘saving effect’ exceeds the ‘rebound effect’, and vice versa. The analysis in
Sect. 2 demonstrated that
3. There exists a threshold level of fuel efficiency such that the ‘conservation effect’
exceeds the ‘rebound effect’ if the fuel efficiency is higher than the threshold.
That is, the efficiency gains lead to a reduction in the total emission.
4. Conversely, if it is lower than the threshold, the “rebound effect” exceeds the
“saving effect”. That is, the efficiency gains lead to an increase in the total
emission.
In order for an improvement in fuel efficiency to reduce total CO2 emission of the
whole industry, it is necessary to achieve a certain level of technical standard. Effi-
ciency gains in the lower levels will result in an increase in the total emission. In order
to avoid such adverse effects, it is required that (1) accurately estimate the threshold
level, (2) set the regulation level on the technical standard to an appropriate level
that exceeds the threshold, and (3) clear the technical standard. If these conditions
are not achieved, on the contrary, the total emission will increase. In addition, it was
shown that the gains in the generation efficiency would increase political difficulty of
introducing the carbon tax. Overall, these results indicate that improving generation
efficiency of fossil-fuel power plants is not necessarily a reliable measure to reduce
CO2 emissions.
In Sect. 3, I investigated the combination of FIT and carbon tax. It was
demonstrated that FIT had the combined effect:
5. Supporting renewable power generations by FIT indirectly reduces CO2 emis-
sions by causing production shifts from fossil-fuels power producers to the
renewable power producers.
6. FIT has the effect of fostering competitive environment in which the consumer
price falls with decreasing market power.
The effects (5) and (6), together with the possibility that FIT could be financed by
revenue of carbon tax, indicate that combination of these policies produce potential
welfare gain.
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Chapter 6
An Empirical Study of the Tokyo
Emissions Trading Scheme: An Ex Post
Analysis of Emissions from University
Buildings
Tatsuya Abe and Toshi H. Arimura
Abstract The Tokyo Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the first cap -and-trade
program of CO2 emissions in Asia, and it is unique in regulating commercial and
service sectors. We examine the impacts of the Tokyo ETS on CO2 emissions and
energy consumption by universities in the first phase. Focusing on universities allows
us to estimate the effects of the Tokyo ETS separately from the economic stagnation
Japan experienced after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 because universi-
ties are less likely to be affected by economic fluctuations compared to other sectors.
In addition to the ETS, other factors may have achieved CO2 emissions reductions
in Tokyo in this phase due to the influence of the earthquake. To deal with the
shortage of electricity supply after the Fukushima disaster, several measures were
undertaken, such as rolling blackouts and power-saving orders, particularly in the
Tokyo Electricity Power Company’s jurisdiction. To capture the characteristics for
each university at the campus level and their experience with being regulation targets
of the policies mentioned above, we conducted amail survey for universities in Japan
and obtained panel data that contain information about both regulated and unregu-
lated universities over 5 years (2009–2013). The difference-in-differences approach
reveals that the Tokyo ETS caused regulated universities to reduce their CO2 emis-
sions and energy consumption by approximately 3–5% relative to unregulated univer-
sities in the first phase. In addition, we find that the quantitative regulations, such as
rolling blackouts and power-saving orders, also had an impact on the universities’
behavior.
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1 Introduction
Previous chapters explained the carbonmitigation policy by sections in Japan. Inmost
countries, however, carbon pricing, such as carbon tax or emissions trading schemes
(ETSs), has been the major policy instrument. This chapter and the following two
chapters introduce and quantitatively examine the two regional ETSs in Japan, i.e.,
the Tokyo ETS and the Saitama ETS. As of 2020, Japan has introduced a small
carbon tax, 289 JPY per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2), a carbon tax of less than US$3,
which is not large enough to achieve the long-term target of an 80% reduction by
2050 (Chap. 1). Japan has not introduced a national ETS, although it has discussed
introducing such a scheme intensively in the past (Arimura 2015).
The Tokyo metropolitan government introduced a regional ETS in 2010. This
ETS was the first cap -and-trade scheme of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in
Asia. Compared to ETSs in other countries, the Tokyo ETS has several notable
features. In particular, it is characterized by the inclusion of the commercial sector
and universities as well as the manufacturing sector in the regulation target. This
feature is a distinctive characteristic of the Tokyo ETS, which is different from
earlier ETSs, such as the EU Emissions Trading Schemes (EU ETS) or the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiatives (RGGI) in US.
Tokyo has been known as a leader of environmental regulations in Japan because
of a number of factors. For example, to tackle PM 10 emissions from diesel trucks,
the Tokyo metropolitan government took a leadership role in implementing regula-
tions together with the surrounding three prefectures, including Saitama (Arimura
and Iwata 2015). Moreover, the Japanese national government respects a voluntary
approach by the industry association (Arimura et al. 2020) and has been reluctant to
introduce ETSs at the national level. Consequently, the Tokyo metropolitan govern-
ment took a lead and decided to introduce an ETS. Saitama joined this movement
by adopting an ETS in their prefecture one year after Tokyo (Chap. 7). Tokyo and
Saitama are collaborating on the design and the implementation of their ETSs. In
fact, Saitama primarily uses the design of the Tokyo ETS and their markets are linked
as explained later. The other two prefectures, Kanagawa and Chiba, have not adopted
ETSs, which is possibly because the two prefectures host large energy-insensitive
facilities, such as steel plants or fossil fuel power plants; hence, achieving a consensus
with their industry stakeholders was difficult.
At the end of the first compliance period (phase I), 2010–2014, the Tokyo
metropolitan government announced the actual reduction of CO2 emissions.
According to the report, the regulated facilities reduced their CO2 emissions by
approximately 25% comparedwith the reference year level. During phase I, however,
the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011, and caused economic
stagnation in many sectors. In addition, the earthquake affected power plant facilities
throughout Japan and led to an electricity supply shortage. To deal with this power
shortage, the government implemented a quantity regulation of electricity in 2011,
especially in the Kanto and Tohoku regions. Two quantity regulations were imple-
mented, i.e., rolling blackouts and power-saving orders, and these two regulations
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may have partially contributed to the emission reductions. Thus, some people are
skeptical about attributing an observed reduction in CO2 emissions in Tokyo to the
achievement of the Tokyo ETS. It is important to evaluate whether the ETSs have
worked effectively by conducting a quantitative analysis. In this chapter, we esti-
mate the causal effect of the Tokyo ETS in phase I on the energy consumption of the
regulation targets, especially focusing on universities.
Why do we focus on universities? The regulation targets of the Tokyo ETS are
facilities with over a certain level of annual energy consumption, and universities
are included among such facilities. GHG emissions are likely to be influenced by
economic fluctuations. However, compared to other sectors, the GHG emissions
from universities are less likely to be impacted by the economic situation. Therefore,
universities are a suitable target for quantitative analysis. To estimate the policy effect
of the Tokyo ETS, it is necessary to remove factors other than the Tokyo ETS. For
this reason, we focus on universities in this study.
The empirical studies presented in this chapter use a questionnaire survey
conducted by the authors in 2015. This data set includes data for five years from
2009, before the start of the Tokyo ETS, to 2013, one year before the end of phase
I. By using this data set, it is possible to analyze the extent of the energy reduction
by the regulated universities.
The results of the quantitative analysis using our survey of universities in Japan
confirmed that the regulated universities reduced their energy consumption compared
to the unregulated universities during phase I. In addition, we found that the effects
of the power-saving orders and rolling blackouts implemented after the earthquake
were very large.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
the literature on this research field, especially focusing on the EU ETS. Section 3
describes in detail the system of the Tokyo ETS. Section 4 presents explanations for
the power-saving orders and rolling blackouts. Section 5 outlines the data sources
used in our analysis. Section 6 presents our approach to estimating the causal effect of
the Tokyo ETS and interprets the estimation results. Section 7 discusses the national
development of the regional ETS in Japan.
2 ETS Literature Review
2.1 Impact on Emission Reductions
This subsection introduces the existing literature that has conducted empirical anal-
ysis to verify the effects of ETSs on GHG emission reductions. We review studies
on the EU ETS, followed by those on the Tokyo ETS. Since the EU ETS is now in
phase III, some findings up to phase II have thus far been obtained. The description
of the EU ETS is largely based on Martin et al. (2015).
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For phase I, 2005–2007, some papers have confirmed a GHG emission reduction
due to the EU ETS. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) used a data set including all
countries complying with the EU ETS for the first two years of phase I. To assess the
effects of the EU ETS on CO2 emission reduction, they compared the actual amount
of emissions with the hypothetical amount had the EU ETS not been introduced.
They concluded that EU ETS countries as a whole reduced their CO2 emissions
by 50–100 Mt annually from 2005 to 2006. In addition, Ellerman et al. (2010) and
Anderson and Di Maria (2011) supported this finding, reporting annual reductions
of 70 Mt and 58 Mt during phase I, respectively.
Other papers have focused on the GHG emission reduction effect in a single
country. For example, Ellerman and Feilhauer (2008) estimated this effect, focusing
on Germany. They found that in phase I, the EU ETS reduced CO2 emissions by
28.5 Mt in all ETS industries and by 11.7 Mt in the manufacturing sector.
For phase II, 2008–2012, Egenhofer et al. (2011) showed an average improvement
of 3.4% in CO2 emissions intensity over the first two years of phase II. On the other
hand, Cooper (2010) and Kettner et al. (2015) were skeptical about the effect of the
EU ETS during this period, particularly the economic downturn from 2007 to 2008.
The number of papers that use firm-level panel data has recently increased. Petrick
and Wagner (2014) and Colmer et al. (2018) analyzed the causal effects of the EU
ETS using firm-level panel data in Germany and France, respectively. These studies
used a matching method to estimate the causal effect of the EU ETS. Petrick and
Wagner (2014) showed that the EU ETS caused the regulated manufacturing firms in
Germany to reduce their CO2 emissions by 25–28% over the first three years of phase
II, from 2008 to 2010. Colmer et al. (2018) confirmed that French manufacturing
firms under the EU ETS reduced their CO2 emissions by 13.5% in phase II compared
with the 2000 level.
To our knowledge, few empirical papers have investigated the policy effect of
the Tokyo ETS on the emissions from regulation targets. Wakabayashi and Kimura
(2018) and Arimura and Abe (2020) estimated the impact on the commercial sector
using a facility-level data set. Wakabayashi and Kimura (2018) concluded that the
Tokyo ETS did not cause regulated facilities to reduce their CO2 emissions during
phase I (2010–2014) and that the energy saving behaviors after the Great East Japan
Earthquake in 2011 were the main drivers for the observed emissions reduction.
However, they did not control for the electricity power prices or consider drastic
increases in the power prices after the earthquake.Arimura andAbe (2020) controlled
for the electricity power price to estimate the causal effect of the Tokyo ETS and
then derived different conclusions from those of Wakabayashi and Kimura (2018).
Arimura and Abe (2020) showed that the Tokyo ETS had an impact on the CO2
emissions from regulated facilities to the same extent as more than a 10% increase
in the electricity power price.
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2.2 Economic Impacts
There are concerns that the introduction of carbon pricing may reduce the interna-
tional competitiveness of regulated firms. In this subsection, we focus on empirical
papers that consider the issue of competitiveness in the case of the EU ETS.
In phase I, we found no evidence that the EU ETS has negative impacts on the
economic performance of regulated firms. For example, Abrell et al. (2011) analyzed
the impact of the introduction of the EUETSon value added, employment, and profits
in phase I. Using firm-level panel data from 2005 to 2008, they concluded that the
EU ETS had no negative impact on any of these outcomes. Additionally, Commins
et al. (2011) found no impact on employment using firm-level data for 1996–2007.
The size of impacts on economic activities such as production and employment
are different by country, industry and compliance period. Focusing onmanufacturing
firms inGermany, Petrick andWagner (2014) found that therewas no negative impact
on employment in phase I or phase II and that only phase II had some positive impacts
of 4–7% and 7–18% on the amount of production and exports, respectively. Simi-
larly, using data on German manufacturers, Löschel et al. (2019) examined whether
regulated firms run efficient production processes by estimating a stochastic produc-
tion frontier model. They found no statistically significant effect on the efficiency of
production processes.
Moreover, Colmer et al. (2018) examined the effect of the EU ETS using manu-
facturing firm data in France. They confirmed that the value added, employment, and
tangible assets of regulated firms did not decline from the announcement period to
phase II compared with the 2000 level.
3 Tokyo ETS
3.1 Targets, Caps, and Compliance Periods
In this section, we first explain the history of the introduction of the ETS by the
Tokyo metropolitan government. Then, the outline of the system is described.
The Tokyo metropolitan government established a mid-term emission target of a
25% reduction by 2020 compared to the 2000 level. Earlier, they tried a voluntary
scheme (Roppongi et al. 2017), but such a scheme did not generate a substantial
emission reduction. Consequently, the Tokyo government needed to adopt a manda-
tory emission reduction scheme1 with flexibility, which is why the Tokyo ETS was
introduced.
1Any facility that cannot attain the goal set by the Tokyo ETS faces a fine. This penalty
contrasts with the Saitama ETS, which was modeled after the Tokyo ETS and was introduced
in 2011. The Saitama ETS is a voluntary scheme and thus has no fines. For details on the Saitama
ETS, see Chap. 7 by Hamamoto.
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As of 2020, the Tokyo ETS is in the third compliance period of the system. The
first phase (phase I) was from 2010 to 2014, and the second phase (phase II) ran from
2015 to 2019. The Tokyo metropolitan government has announced details on phase
III, which will continue from 2020 to 2024.
The targets of the Tokyo ETS are large-scale CO2 emitters in the commercial and
manufacturing sectors.2 The emissions from these sectors amount to approximately
40% of the CO2 emissions from the commercial andmanufacturing sectors in Tokyo.
Facilities consuming crude oil equivalent energy of 1‚500 kl or more per year are
subject to the Tokyo ETS. Because there are small and medium-sized facilities that
do not meet this threshold, the Tokyo ETS covers approximately 20% of total CO2
emissions in Tokyo.
A unique feature of the Tokyo ETS is that it regulates buildings in the service
sector as well as industrial plants. Just like other metropolitan cities in developed
economies all over the world, the service sector accounts for the majority of facilities
in Tokyo. The manufacturing sector accounts for a small portion of GHG emissions
in Tokyo. Moreover, large-scale power plants are not located in Tokyo. Thus, to have
a meaningful regulation of GHG emissions, the Tokyo metropolitan government
decided to include commercial and service sectors in the ETS. Indeed, commercial
and office facilities account for approximately 80% of regulated facilities.
This characteristic is unique and quite different from that of existing ETSs imple-
mented in other countries at the time of the adoption of the Tokyo ETS in 2010. For
example, when it started in 2005, the EU ETS regulated emissions from manufac-
turing facilities and power plants. Additionally, the RGGI is a scheme that targets
power plants. The main target of the Korean ETS is manufacturing facilities (Jun
et al. 2019). Therefore, in 2010, the Tokyo ETS differed from other schemes in that
it regulated emissions from the service sector.
Although the Tokyo ETS is a regional ETS, there is a large number of regulated
facilities. For example, in the Tokyo area, in 2013, 1‚392 facilities had to comply
with the Tokyo ETS. The number of facilities under the Korean ETS, which has the
largest market value for a single country (World Bank 2019), is approximately 600
(Jun et al. 2019); therefore, in comparison, the Tokyo ETS has a large number of
regulated facilities.
The reduction targets under the Tokyo ETS have been different across the two
phases. The reduction target for phase I was relatively low, as this phase was thought
to be an introductory phase. In fact, the mandatory CO2 reduction targets were 8%
for commercial buildings and 6% for manufacturing facilities compared to a base
year level.3 However, in phase II, the emission targets were tightened to 17% for
office buildings and 15% for manufacturing facilities.
2Specifically, facilities that consume 1‚500 kl or more of crude oil equivalent energy per year are
defined as large-scale facilities in this system. This typical threshold is used in energy regulation in
Japan. For details, see Arimura and Iwata (2015).
3Facilities had the flexibility to choose their baseline emissions from the average of three consecutive
years selected from 2002 to 2007.
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3.2 Transition of GHG Emissions and the Calculation
of Indirect Emissions
To what extent have emission reductions been achieved by facilities complying
with the Tokyo ETS through phase I in total? At the end of phase I, the Tokyo
metropolitan government announced the actual values of CO2 emission reductions.
The graph in Fig. 1 shows the transition of CO2 emissions from the regulated facili-
ties. Emissions in the base year were 13,630,000 tons of CO2, and annual emissions
decreased during this period. In 2014, the final year of phase I, emissions decreased
by 10,270,000 tons of CO2, indicating that the decrease in the amount of emissions
in 2014 from Tokyo ETS facilities was approximately 25% relative to the base year
level. This fact suggests that the target for phase I established under the Tokyo ETS
was achieved beyond expectations. Notably, however, the influence of the 2011 earth-
quake also contributed to these reductions. We will reveal the effects of the Tokyo
ETS purely from the total emissions reduction in later sections.
The Tokyo ETS is also unique in how it measures GHG emissions. Emissions
from electricity usage, as indirect emissions, are regulated because the majority of
emissions from commercial and office buildings are from their electricity usage. The
regulation of these emissions is different from other ETSs, such as the EU ETS,
which focuses on emissions from fossil fuel combustion.
The CO2 emissions from the electricity usage of a facility are measured by multi-
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Fig. 1 Transition of Total CO2 Emissions from Tokyo ETS Facilities. Source Tokyo Metropolitan
Government Bureau of Environment (2016), https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/climate/large_
scale/data/index.files/candtpuresusiryouhonnbun.pdf (last access date: 08/04/2020)
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of electricity was 0.382 kg CO2 per kWh4 and was fixed for the compliance period of
the Tokyo ETS. According to this method, in 2010, total emissions under the Tokyo
ETS were approximately 11.8 million CO2 tons.
3.3 Credits and Compliance Methods
To ease the burden of compliance and to provide several options for achieving targets,
the Tokyo metropolitan government permits the regulated facilities to use several
types of credits. All facilities receiving permit allocations can participate in trading,
and the transactions are conducted by emission reduction credits. Such credits can
be issued to facilities only after they have already reduced their emissions.
Additionally, the Tokyo ETS has three offset credits: small and medium-sized
installation credits within the Tokyo area, renewable energy certificates, and outside
Tokyo credits. These offset credits offer options to the regulated facilities to count
emission reductions by small and medium-sized facilities that do not comply with
the Tokyo ETS or facilities outside Tokyo as their own reductions. Facilities can also
earn credits by investing in renewable energy.5
In addition, the Tokyo ETS has Saitama credits, as the Tokyo ETS is linked with
the Saitama ETS, which was introduced in 2011. The Saitama ETS was modeled
after the Tokyo ETS; thus, the features of the two systems are similar, and the credits
from the two systems are exchangeable.
Table 1 presents the aggregate amounts of credit issues between 2011 and 2016.6
A total of 9.51 million tons of CO2 was issued during this period. Regarding the
















9,062,832 (1‚272) 56,421 (1‚051) 289,615 (119) 92,030 (8) 5‚557 (6) 9,506,455 (2‚456)
Source Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Environment (2017)
https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/climate/large_scale/trade/past_information.files/jukyuryos
uikei20170602.pdf (last access date: 07/02/2020)
Note These values represent aggregate amounts of credit issued from 2011 to 2016 in terms of tons
of CO2 (left) and the number of facilities (right, in parentheses)
4This amount is the average CO2 intensity from 2005 to 2007. Under the Tokyo ETS, the coefficient
is fixed through all periods even when the emission intensity changes as power companies change
the fuel mix. This fuel mix is hardly impacted by the Tokyo ETS because most power plants are
located outside Tokyo or Saitama and do not have to deal with an ETS.
5For details, see the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Environment (2015).
6Tokyo ETS set an adjustment period for regulated facilities; for phase I, it was between 2015 and
September 2016.
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Table 2 Compliance
methods








192.7 (1.9%) 10,080 (98.1%)





Note The numbers in parentheses show the ratios for each row
emission reduction credits, which were the most frequently issued among all credits,
9.06 million tons of CO2 were issued. The emission reduction credits are bankable
up to the next phase. Therefore, credits from phase I were carried over into phase II,
although they cannot be used in phase III.
Facilities under the Tokyo ETS can achieve their targets through several methods.
Table 2 shows the compliance methods by entity. First, they can reduce emissions:
according to the Tokyo metropolitan government, 91% of facilities reduced their
emissions beyond the target. Alternatively, they can achieve their target by obtaining
additional credits: approximately 9% of facilities achieved their target through the
acquisition of credits.
The Tokyo ETS is also unique in the way regulated facilities engage in trading.
In designing the Tokyo ETS, the Tokyo government faced the criticism that permit
trading under an ETS could create a “casino” (Roppongi et al. 2017). Stakeholders
close to the manufacturing sector were afraid that the ETS might invite specula-
tion by the financial sector and that the ETS would thus be ineffective as a means of
environmental regulation. In dealing with this criticism, the Tokyo government intro-
duced “reduction credits” and not “emission credits”. The introduction of this type
of credit means that regulated facilities can earn credits only after they reduce their
emissions. In addition, the Tokyo government has not introduced permit auctions.
Only emitting entities can participate in trading, and the financial sector is excluded
from permit trading. As a result, most trades have been bilateral, and compared
to other markets, permit trading has not been very active. The Tokyo government
examines the price through private interviews and publicizes the permit price; Fig. 2
depicts the trajectory of permit prices. In 2011, the price was initially approximately
10,000 JPY ($125) per CO2 ton, but in 2015, it fell to approximately 4‚500 JPY
($37) per CO2 ton for reduction credits. These numbers are close to the findings
by Arimura and Abe (2020), who estimated the implicit price of permits from their
empirical analysis. Figure 2 shows that renewable credits are more expensive than
reduction credits. The reason is that one can use renewable credit permits for other
compliance purposes.
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Renewable Energy Credit Excess Emission Reduction Credit
Fig. 2 Permit Price (JPY/CO2 ton). Source Mizuho Information & Research Insti-
tute, Inc. (2019), https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/climate/large_scale/trade/index.files/sateik
akaku.pdf (last access date: 08/04/2020)
4 Rolling Blackouts and Power-Saving Orders
In addition to the regulation of the Tokyo ETS, one can consider other factors as
having influenced GHG emissions in Tokyo. On March 11, 2011, the Great East
Japan Earthquake occurred, with its epicenter off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture
in the Tohoku region. This disaster caused tremendous damage to the Kanto7 and
Tohoku regions near the epicenter. One example of such damage was the accident
at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. After the accident, electric power supply
shortages became a serious problem because all nuclear power plants in Japan were
shut down for safety inspections, and other electric power facilities had also been
damaged. To address this problem the Japanese government decided to implement
quantity regulations of electric power as a countermeasure, and these regulations
consisted of rolling blackouts and power-saving orders.
Rolling blackouts were the first regulation introduced. In a rolling blackout, the
electric power supply in a certain area is stopped and restarted in a structured manner
to avoid large-scale blackouts caused by excess demand. Rolling blackouts were
implemented only within the service area of the Tokyo Electric Power Company
(TEPCO) fromMarch 14 to 28, 2011, right after the earthquake. To choose the target
area, the damage from the earthquake disaster had to be comparatively small, and
negative spillover effects from the blackouts to other regions had to be limited. The
location and time of an actual blackout were announced the day before.
7In general, the Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki, and Tochigi Prefectures are included
in the Kanto region.
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In the service area of the TEPCO and the Tohoku Electric Power Company, where
the damage was especially severe, power-saving orders were issued to address the
electricity shortages anticipated for the summer. These orders required a consumption
reduction of 15% or more compared with the previous year during peak weekday
hours for large-lot users whose contracted electric power was over 500 kW. In the
case of a violation, large-lot users had to pay a fine of less than one million JPY. This
regulation was enforced in the service area of the TEPCO and the Tohoku Electric
Power Company from July 1 to September 9, 2011.
These regulations may have had some impacts on the conservation of electricity
consumption, and theymay have promoted energy saving investments among univer-
sities. Moreover, the activities at universities may have changed due to these regu-
lations. In Sect. 6, we control for these factors when estimating the causal effect of
the Tokyo ETS.
5 Data
5.1 Mail Survey of Universities in Japan
We conducted a mail survey of universities in 2015 to capture their yearly energy
consumption and their GHG emissions. As of 2015, there were 779 universities
in Japan. Among them, 137 universities were in Tokyo, accounting for 17.6% of
the population. The targets of this survey were chosen from the GHG Emissions
Accounting, Reporting, and Disclosure System under the Act on the Promotion
of Global Warming Countermeasures, which requires facilities in Japan to report
their GHG emissions if they consume 1‚500 kl crude oil equivalent energy or more.
Consequently, we sent questionnaires to the 340 universities across Japan that met
these criteria. We received responses from 271 universities, for a response rate of
79.7%. In our sample, the number of universities located in Tokyo is 52, which is
consistent with the population rate.
The universities were requested to provide their CO2 emissions, electricity
consumption and energy consumption over the five years between 2009 and 2013.8
To capture their characteristics, the universities were also asked to provide informa-
tion regarding the number of students, the percentage of science and engineering
students, and the floor space of their buildings. In addition, we included items in the
questionnaire regarding the universities’ experiences with the rolling blackouts and
the power-saving orders from the power companies.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for 2009, a period before the implemen-
tation of the Tokyo ETS. For all variables in the sample, both the top and bottom
one percentile of each distribution were regarded as outliers, and they were removed
8In our survey, we asked the universities to report their energy usage and characteristics based on
campuses that they own because in the case of universities, the unit of the regulation target under
the Tokyo ETS is campus.
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Table 3 Summary statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
A. Full sample (mid-98%)
Energy consumption [kl] 239 4‚803.2 4‚045.1 1‚456.0 21,394.0
CO2 emissions [t-CO2] 239 8‚805.1 7‚724.7 2‚353.0 39,400.0
Electricity consumption [GJ] 239 140,418.0 113,481.2 34,117.0 721,991.0
Floor space [m2] 235 111,582.2 64,476.1 14,429.0 417,561.0
# of students 223 5‚479.7 4‚416.7 197.0 21,674.0
Percentage of Science & Eng. Students [%] 207 56.5 41.3 0.0 100.0
B. Tokyo
Energy consumption [kl] 52 3‚928.8 3‚404.3 1‚639.0 19,729.0
CO2 emissions [t-CO2] 52 6‚748.0 6‚001.6 2‚840.0 35,029.0
Electricity consumption [GJ] 52 123,907.9 107,446.1 35,413.0 605,435.0
Floor space [m2] 51 99,571.7 50,575.8 14,429.0 265,414.0
# of students 50 7‚124.0 4‚731.7 621.0 19,663.0
Percentage of Science & Eng. Students [%] 47 42.8 45.6 0.0 100.0
C. Other regions (excluded Saitama)
Energy consumption [kl] 175 5‚150.0 4‚269.4 1‚456.0 21,394.0
CO2 emissions [t-CO2] 175 9‚598.2 8‚232.5 2‚353.0 39,400.0
Electricity consumption [GJ] 175 147,836.8 117,417.0 34,117.0 721,991.0
Floor space [m2] 172 116,970.3 68,858.2 19,193.0 417,561.0
# of students 163 4‚998.6 4‚297.2 197.0 21,674.0
Percentage of Science & Eng. Students [%] 150 62.1 38.3 0.0 100.0
from the data set used for analysis. The table has three panels: the first panel shows
the summary statistics for all universities in our sample, the second panel shows the
statistics for the universities in Tokyo, and the third panel shows the statistics for the
universities in the other prefectures.
There are clear differences in the characteristics of the universities in Tokyo and
those in the other prefectures. In 2009, the annualCO2 emissions from the universities
in Tokyo were relatively low compared to those from the universities in the other
prefectures, e.g., an average of 6‚748 tons ofCO2 and 9‚583 tons ofCO2, respectively.
Regarding the scale of universities, while the universities in Tokyo have a smaller
floor space than those in other regions, the number of students in Tokyo is larger.
The transitions in average CO2 emissions over time are illustrated in Fig. 3. In this
figure, the values on the vertical axis represent the differences between the 2009 level
and each year, and the dashed and solid lines show the changes in CO2 emissions
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Fig. 3 Changes in CO2 emissions. Note For each region, the lines show changes between CO2
emissions in each year (2010–2013) and those in 2009, which is a reference year for our analysis
for Tokyo and the other prefectures, respectively.9 The CO2 emission reductions in
2011 were large in Tokyo and the other prefectures. Although the CO2 emissions in
all areas have increased since 2011, the degree of increase in Tokyo was smaller than
that in the other prefectures.
5.2 Electricity Price Data
Electricity prices are likely to play an important role in GHG emission reductions
because most GHG emissions come from electricity consumption. Specifically, there
was a rise in electricity prices during phase I in theTokyo region.Weobtain electricity
prices from the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) of Japan. The data
set contains the volumes of electric power demand for nine regions in Japan and
the associated charge revenues. Before the recent deregulation of the retail market
in 2016, the Japanese power market was divided into nine regions.10 The electricity
price for each region was calculated by dividing the charge revenue by the volume
of power demand.
Figure 4 depicts the transitions of electricity prices by region. The power price
in Japan rose over the 10 years from 2006 to 2015. Before the Great East Japan
Earthquake in 2011, the power prices were somewhat similar across the nine regions.
After the earthquake, however, the price in the jurisdiction of the TEPCO increased
greatly. In particular, the industrial and commercial sectors in the TEPCO market
9Since Saitama Prefecture has its own ETS, it is excluded from this figure.
10The nine regions are as follows: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokyo, Chubu, Hokuriku, Kansai, Shikoku,
Chugoku and Kyusyu.
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Fig. 4 Trends of electric power prices. Source Database from the Federation of Electric Power
Companies of Japan. Note Each line shows trends of electric power prices for the nine electric
power companies in Japan
faced an electricity price growth rate of 12.4% during the 2010–2013 period, which
was the largest among the growth rates recorded in the nine regions. The TEPCO
covers nine prefectures: Tokyo, Saitama,Chiba, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma,Kanagawa,
Yamanashi and Shizuoka. Among them, only the Tokyo and Saitama regions have
an ETS in place. Therefore, we can detangle the impact of the ETS from the increase
in the power price.
6 Econometric Model and Estimation Results
6.1 Econometric Model
In this subsection, we describe a method for estimating the causal effect of the
Tokyo ETS on the energy usage of universities. The causal effect that we would like
to estimate here is defined as the difference between the actual energy usage of a
Tokyo ETS university and a counterfactual energy usage when the university was
not subject to the Tokyo ETS. Therefore, we have a problem in estimating the causal
effect. We are unable to observe the latter energy usage in the real world.
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To solve this problem,we take the difference-in-differences (DD) approach,which
is widely used in the policy evaluation context when panel data are available. Using
the DD strategy, we estimate the following equation to quantify the impact of the
Tokyo ETS:
yitg = τg · Tokyoi · I (t ≥ 2010) + α1gT okyoi
+ α2g I (t ≥ 2010) + x ′i tgβg + ηt + μi + εi tg
In this equation, yitg on the left-hand side denotes the CO2 emissions (g = 1), the
electricity consumption (g = 2), and the energy consumption (g = 3) of university
i in year t .11 The variable Tokyoi on the right-hand side is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one if university i is located in Tokyo and zero otherwise. The
function I (·) is the indicator function, which takes the value of one if a condition in
the argument is true and zero otherwise. The interaction term between Tokyoi and
I (t ≥ 2010) represents the causal effect of the Tokyo ETS; thus, the parameter τg is
the parameter of interest. The vector xitg is composed of some explanatory variables,
including the electricity price, and policy variables, including rolling blackouts and
power-saving orders. In addition, the characteristics of universities, such as the floor
space, the number of students, and the percentageof science and engineering students,
are included in this vector. The year fixed effects and individual fixed effects are
captured by ηt and μi , respectively. The idiosyncratic error term is represented by
εi tg .
6.2 Empirical Results
This subsection provides the implications of the estimation results obtained in the
previous subsection. Table 4 reports the estimation results. We have estimated three
models. Each column in the table shows these estimation results for the equation with
the dependent variable being the logarithm of CO2 emissions, electricity consump-
tion, and energy consumption. The sample sizes for each model are different because
the dependent variables have missing values for each.
As mentioned above, our value of interest is the estimate of the coefficient for
the interaction term, the parameter τg . For each equation, the estimates are shown
in the first row of Table 4: −0.036, −0.049, and −0.042. These results imply that
the Tokyo ETS had an impact on the CO2 emissions, electricity consumption, and
energy consumption of regulated universities during phase I and that the size of the
impact was between 3.7% and 5.0%.
In addition to the Tokyo ETS, the effect of the rolling blackouts or
power-saving orders is noteworthy. The third row in Table 4 presents these estimates:
−0.073, −0.049, and −0.052. From these results, we conclude that the impact of
11We estimated these three equations (g = 1, 2, 3) equation by equation. The fixed effect model
was used for each estimation.
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Tokyo ·I(t2010) −0.036** −0.049*** −0.042***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.012)






Observations 982 999 1‚000
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are in parentheses. Other
explanatory variables, such as floor space, the number of students, and the percentage of science
and engineering students, are used in the estimation, but their results are removed from the table
these electricity restrictions implemented in 2011 persisted during phase I and that
the size of the impact that they hadwas larger than that of the TokyoETS.Universities
may have reacted strongly to the regulatory policies issued by the government.
On the other hand, the coefficients of the electricity price for each equation do
not have a negative sign. This result may suggest that universities are less likely
to be sensitive to changes in the electricity price. We discuss this point in the next
subsection.
6.3 Discussion
In the previous subsection, we obtained the estimate of the impact of the Tokyo ETS
onCO2 emissions at universities and found that it was approximately 3–5%.Thus, the
following question arises: how did the Tokyo ETS work well not only in universities
but also in other sectors? In fact, Arimura and Abe (2020) conducted an analysis for
the commercial sector that was the same as that in this chapter, confirming that the
Tokyo ETS made regulated commercial facilities reduce their CO2 emissions and
energy consumption by approximately 5–7%.
There may be several reasons why the effect of the Tokyo ETS for commercial
facilities was larger than that for universities. One reason is that universities suffer
from the principal-agent problem, as often pointed out in the literature on the energy
efficiency gap (Gillingham and Palmer 2014). The managers of universities facing
the Tokyo ETS want to reduce GHG emissions. However, the majority of agents
consuming energy in universities are students, who have no incentive to reduce their
energy consumption. Furthermore, faculty members may not listen to the requests
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of university managers to save energy because they, too, do not have any incentives
to do so. Therefore, the impact of the ETS was weaker in universities than in office
buildings.
Additionally, Arimura and Abe (2020) concluded that commercial facilities
responded sensitively to changes in electric power prices. This point is largely
different from the result of our empirical analysis, as we did not find that elec-
tricity consumption at universities negatively responded to the electricity price we
measured. There are two possible reasons for these counterintuitive results. The first
is related to the contracts with power companies. In Tokyo, universities are large
consumers of electricity, and different from other commercial facilities, they might
have a unique contract with the power companies. We would ideally employ the real
electricity price that each university faces in our estimation. However, since these
data are not available, we used the values at the regional level, which were calculated
from data on charge revenues and the volumes of electricity demand as an alternative
to the actual electricity price. Thus, the difference between the actual and calculated
electricity prices might lead to some biases in the estimates.
Second, the principal-agent problem argued above would also apply to this issue.
Students and faculty members in universities have no incentive to reduce their elec-
tricity consumption and respond to changes in electricity prices. Thus, the estimate
of the coefficient for the electricity price might not become statistically significant.
Moreover, we can think another possibility for this issue. When students or faculty
members face a rise in electricity prices, they may tend to go to and spend time at
the university to avoid consuming electricity in their homes. If this is the case, a rise
in electricity prices will lead to an increase in demand for electricity in universities,
making the sign of the coefficient for the electricity price positive. Of course, at this
stage, this possibility is only a conjecture. Verifying it will constitute future work.
7 Conclusions
In this chapter we carried out an ex post evaluation of the Tokyo ETS in phase I,
focusing on university buildings. The estimation strategy we took was to compare
the CO2 emissions and energy consumption of regulated universities with those of
unregulated universities.We found that the Tokyo ETS reduced the CO2 emissions or
energy consumption of regulated universities by approximately 3–5% on average in
phase I compared with the level of 2009, a year in the pretreatment period. Despite
some skepticism regarding ETSs, the Tokyo ETS was effective in reducing CO2
emissions.
Moreover, the rolling blackouts andpower-savingorders in 2011 continued to have
effects on subsequent energy consumption. We confirmed that these regulations had
an impact of approximately 5–7% on average in phase I. On the other hand, we could
not find an impact of the increase in electricity power prices in the Tokyo area; this
result stands in contrast to the findings of Arimura and Abe (2020) with regard to
commercial buildings.
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To understand the size of these impacts from the ETS as well as the rolling
blackouts and power-saving orders, we must be careful. By summing these two
effects, the emissions reduction ranges from 8 to 12%, which is much smaller than
the appraisal of the emissions reduction by the Tokyo government, which obtained a
25% reduction. This difference comes from the difference in the reference year. The
Tokyo government uses baseline emissions, which were chosen between 2002 and
2007, a period before the announcement of the implementation of the Tokyo ETS; in
contrast, our econometric analysis uses the emissions in 2009 as the reference year
due to data limitations. We suspect that facilities facing the Tokyo ETS reduced their
CO2 emissions and energy consumption between the base year and 2009. Thus, our
finding is not entirely inconsistent with the appraisal by the Tokyo government.
There is one limitation in our analysis. The data that we used were panel data
from 2009, one year before the start of the Tokyo ETS. The analysis method used in
this chapter is strongly dependent on the assumption that the energy usages of the
regulation targets and nontargets have parallel trends in the period before the start
of the system. However, since we have data for only one year in the pretreatment
period, we cannot verify the validity of this assumption. Verifying this assumption
will be the subject of future research.
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Program in Saitama Prefecture: Impact
on CO2 Emissions in the First
Compliance Period
Mitsutsugu Hamamoto
Abstract This chapter investigates whether the Target-Setting Emissions Trading
(TSET) Program launched in 2011 by Saitama Prefecture in Japan had an impact on
CO2 emissions during the first compliance period. Facility-level data are used to esti-
mate the causal relationship between implementation of the program and changes in
CO2 emissions. The results indicate that the TSET Program spurred emission reduc-
tion efforts. In addition, this chapter shows that the TSET Program also functioned
as an incentive for facilities that are not covered by the program to lower their energy
consumption. These findings indicate that the TSET Program succeeded in encour-
aging emission reduction efforts by the facilities, even though the program includes
no penalty for facilities that do not meet emission goals.
Keywords Emissions trading · Climate policy · Treatment effect estimation
1 Introduction
In 2005, the European Union (EU) launched the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS), which was the world’s first international mandatory cap-and-trade program.
Since then, emission trading has drawn attention as a policy instrument for the effi-
cient reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In the US, the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative was established in 2005 in order to reduce CO2 emissions from
power plants in northeastern states by utilizing emissions trading. Outside Europe
and North America, many emissions trading systems have recently emerged in Asia
and the Pacific region at the regional, national, and local levels.1
1A number of studies have attempted to estimate the impact of emissions trading programs on
emissions, economic performance, and innovation. Martin et al. (2016) summarize and evaluate the
existing literature on the impact of the EU ETS.
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Although Japan has not yet implemented a nationwide mandatory emissions
trading program, the Tokyo metropolitan government started a mandatory CO2 cap-
and-trade program (hereinafter, theTokyoETS) in 2010 in order to cutCO2 emissions
from large emitters. The Tokyo ETS differs from the EU ETS in that it covers office
buildings as well as factories.
One year after the TokyoETSwas launched, SaitamaPrefecture started theTarget-
Setting Emissions Trading (TSET) Program.2 This program is very similar to the
Tokyo ETS in many aspects. However, unlike the Tokyo ETS, the TSET Program
has no penalty evenwhen covered facilities are in non-compliancewith the emissions
reduction targets. It is an important research question to explore whether cap-and-
trade schemes without enforcement measures like the TSET Program can provide
incentives for emission reductions, and the aim of this chapter is to address this issue.
Specifically, we investigate the causal relationship between the implementation of the
TSET Program and CO2 emission reductions. Through treatment effect analysis, we
examinewhether the program, which is a cap-and-trade schemewithout enforcement
measures, incentivized covered facilities to reduce their emissions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground on the TSET Program. Section 3 describes the research design for evaluating
the causal effect of theTSETProgramonCO2 emission reductions. Section4 explains
the data for this analysis. Section 5 reports the empirical results and discusses the
findings of this study. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
2 Background to the TSET Program
In 2009, Saitama Prefecture formulated the “Saitama Prefecture Global Warming
Strategy Action Plan,” which set a target of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions by 25% below the 2005 level by 2020 (the target was revised to 21% in 2015,
primarily due to the fact that the role of nuclear power was greatly diminished by the
Fukushima accident in 2011). In order to achieve the reduction target, two schemes
were introduced. One is the Saitama GHG Emissions Reduction Program, which
requires business operators to formulate their own annual GHG reduction plans,
including voluntary emission reduction targets and to report them to the Saitama
Prefectural Government. This program, which started in FY 2010, covers business
operators having facilities that are located in the prefecture and have total energy
consumption of 1500 kiloliters or more per year in crude oil equivalent, as well as
large-scale retailers whose store floor areas within the prefecture are 10,000 m3 or
more.
The other scheme is the TSET Program, which covers facilities that have total
energy consumption of 1500 kiloliters or more per year in crude oil equivalent
for three consecutive years. These facilities are given emission caps (i.e., emission
targets) and allowed to trade allowances. The first compliance period of the TSET
2For the design of the Tokyo ETS, see Chap. 6.
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Program is the four years from FY 2011 to FY 2014, and the second compliance
period covers the five years from FY 2015 to FY 2019. The method of allowance
allocation is a grandfathering approach based on historical emissions.3 Specifically,
the volume of allowances initially allocated is determined in accordance with the
following formula:
Initial Allowance Allocation = BYE× (1− CF) × YEARS, (1)
where BYE denotes base year emissions, CF indicates a compliance factor, and
YEARS means the number of years of a compliance period. The base year emis-
sions are defined as the average emissions of three consecutive fiscal years between
FY 2002 and FY 2007. The compliance factor in the first compliance period is set
as follows: 8% (CF = 0.08) for office buildings, commercial facilities, educational
facilities, and hospitals, and 6% (CF = 0.06) for factories, waste disposal and treat-
ment facilities, and water supply and sewage facilities. In the second compliance
period, the compliance factor for the former increases to 15% (CF = 0.15) and that
for the latter to 13% (CF = 0.13).
Under the TSET Program, covered facilities can utilize credits from several types
of offsets in order to meet their emission targets. Emission reductions from small and
midsize facilities located in Saitama Prefecture and those from large facilities outside
the prefecture can be used for compliance. Forest sink credits and credits originating
from renewable energy such as solar, wind, geothermal, hydro, and biomass are also
available. In addition, excess credits from the Tokyo ETS are formally eligible as
offset credits under the TSET Program because these two cap-and-trade schemes are
officially connected.
If the volume of allowances that a covered facility holds exceeds its emission cap,
the surplus allowances may be banked for the next compliance period.When covered
facilities fail to achieve their emission caps, the TSET Program has no enforcement
measure such as the imposition of penalties. This is a major difference between the
TSET Program and the Tokyo ETS; the Tokyo ETS requires non-compliant facilities
to reduce emissions by the amount of the reduction shortfall multiplied by 1.3, and if
non-compliant facilities fail to meet this requirement, they are subject to penalties.4
Under the Tokyo ETS, both the setting and the achievement of targets are mandatory,
whereas the setting targets is mandatory but achieving them is voluntary under the
TSET Program.
The Saitama Prefectural Government published a report on the achievement status
for the emission targets under the TSET Program in the first compliance period.
During the period, 608 facilities were subject to the program. Of these, 599 achieved
their emission targets by reducing their own emissions and/or utilizing emissions
trading. Therefore, 9 facilities remained non-compliant without penalty. The number
3Auctioning was not adopted as the method of initial allocation in the TSET Program.
4The names of non-compliant facilities are made public under the TSET Program. The Tokyo ETS
also publicly announces the names of non-compliant facilities if they fail to meet requirement that
they must reduce emissions by the amount of the reduction shortfall multiplied by 1.3.
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of facilities that utilized allowance trading for compliance is 66: approximately 11%
of the covered facilities.5 This is slightly larger than the proportion of facilities that
utilized emissions trading under the Tokyo ETS (see Chap. 6). Total annual emissions
from the 608 facilities were 6.94 million tons of CO2 on average during the first
compliance period, which were 1.95 million tons less than the total volume of the
facilities’ base year emissions. This means that the facilities as a whole reduced their
emissions by 22% compared to their base year emissions.6
3 Research Design
Because the business facilities regulated by theTSETProgramare also affected by the
Saitama GHGEmissions Reduction Program, their decisions on reducing CO2 emis-
sions may be influenced by both programs. In order to disentangle such combined
policy effects, we assume two states of prefecture-level climate policy, namely, one in
which both the TSET Program and the Saitama GHG Emissions Reduction Program
are implemented, and one in which only the Saitama GHG Emissions Reduction
Program is implemented. Let Di denote an indicator of the two states. If the ith
facility is regulated by both the TSET Program and the Saitama GHG Emissions
Reduction Program (that is, if the facility is treated), then Di = 1. If the ith facility
is only subject to the Saitama GHG Emissions Reduction Program, then Di = 0.
Let Yi(1) and Yi(0) denote the outcomes at facility i when the facility is treated and
when the facility is not regulated by the TSET Program, respectively. The outcome
variable of interest here is the change in CO2 emissions. We estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) as follows:
ATET = E[Yi(1)−Yi(0)|D = 1], (2)
where E is the expectation operator.
While data are available to calculate E[Yi(1) | D= 1] (changes in CO2 emissions
under the situation where the TSET Program is implemented), [Yi(0) |D= 1] cannot
be observed. To deal with this missing data problem, data for the counterfactual
outcomes are constructed using information about facilities that are subject to only
a program similar to the Saitama GHG Emissions Reduction Program.
In recent years, an increasing number of Japanese local governments have estab-
lished their own mandatory programs for reducing GHG emissions. These programs
include requirements such as preparing GHG reduction plans and submitting them
to the local government offices. Gunma Prefecture, which is adjacent to northern
Saitama, implemented a program that requires business operators to formulate their
5Trading prices for allowances are not disclosed under the TSET Program.
6For more details on compliance status under the TSET Program, see the Saitama Prefectural
GovernmentOfficialWebsite. https://www.pref.saitama.lg.jp/a0001/news/page/2017/0516-01.html
[Accessed January 22, 2019].
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own annual GHG reduction plans, including voluntary absolute emission targets, and
to report them to the Gunma Prefectural Government (hereinafter, the Gunma GHG
Emissions Reduction Program) in FY 2010, the same year that the Saitama GHG
Emissions Reduction Program also started. The Gunma GHG Emissions Reduction
Program covers business operators whose facilities within the prefecture consume
in total more than 1500 kiloliters of energy in crude oil equivalent annually. Market-
based instruments such as emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes have not been
used for addressing global warming in Gunma Prefecture. Therefore, climate poli-
cies in Saitama are notably different from those in Gunma in that a program such as
the TSET Program has been established only in the former. The existence of such
a difference permits a quasi-experimental research design that can fulfill the aim of
this study.
We estimate the ATET using a propensity score matching (PSM) method
(Wooldridge2010; Imbens andWooldridge 2009).The facilities subject to theGunma
GHG Emissions Reduction Program are used as the control group, and the treatment
group consists of the facilities regulated by both the TSET Program and the Saitama
GHG Emissions Reduction Program. The probability of being treated is estimated
by a logistic regression model. Each facility in the treatment group is matched with
a single facility in the control group whose propensity score is closest.
To identify the ATET, PSM estimators are used in a difference-in-differences
setting. Specifically, we construct the data for the difference between CO2 emissions
in each fiscal year during the first compliance period and those in FY 2010, which are
used for comparing the outcomes between treated and control units. Because we use
log-transformed data, the ATET estimated in this analysis represents the difference
in the rate of change in CO2 emissions.
4 Data
The data for annual CO2 emissions from each facility subject to the TSET Program
during the first compliance period were reported by the Saitama Prefectural Govern-
ment.7 Since the data for base year emissions were also published by the govern-
ment, emissions targets for the facilities can be calculated using the data. The Gunma
Prefectural Government reports voluntary absolute emission targets and annual CO2
emissions under the Gunma GHG Emissions Reduction Program, which are aggre-
gated data for the facilities in Gunma Prefecture that are owned by the business
7The emissions data for facilities subject to the TSET Program during the first compliance period
are available at the Saitama Prefectural Government Official Website. https://www.pref.saitama.lg.
jp/a0502/sakugen.html [Accessed October 31, 2019].
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operators subject to the program.8 For our analysis, we therefore constructed aggre-
gated data for the facilities regulated by the TSET Program; the data for the facilities
subject to the TSET Program were summed for each of the business operators.
As covariates for estimating the propensity scores, emissions targets for each fiscal
year and dummy variables denoting the types of business operators are used. The
types of business operators are categorized as follows: waste disposal and treatment,
water supply and sewage collection, education, medical services, business operators
related to both education and medical services, business operators owing factories,
and others.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the samples. Some of the facilities regu-
lated by the TSET Programwere exempted from the program during the first compli-
ance period because their emissions decreased enough to be excluded from being
subject to the program. Therefore, the number of TSET facilities decreased during the
first compliance period. This can be found even when TSET facilities are aggregated
for each of the business operators, as shown in Table 1.
5 Results and Discussion
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the causal effect of the TSET Program on
CO2 emission reductions. The PSM estimate for the change in emissions between FY
2010 and FY 2011 is not statistically significant, suggesting that the TSET Program
had little effect on emissions in the first fiscal year of the first compliance period. In
contrast, the ATETs for the changes in emissions in fiscal years 2012, 2013 and 2014
compared with those in FY 2010 are statistically significant at the 1% level. This
indicates that during the three fiscal years, the TSET Program induced the covered
facilities to reduce their CO2 emissions. Each estimated coefficient represents the
difference in the rate of change in CO2 emissions between the facilities regulated
by the TSET Program and those subject to the Gunma GHG Emissions Reduction
Program. In FY 2012, TSET facilities reduced CO2 emissions on average by 11.7%
points more than matched control facilities. The estimated coefficients for changes
in emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2013 and between FY 2010 and FY 2014
are larger (15.9% points in FY 2013 and 18.9% points in FY 2014), indicating that
TSET facilities made deeper emission reductions as the first compliance period went
on.
Hamamoto (2020) investigates the impacts of the TSET Program on the adop-
tion of low-carbon technology using facility-level data on the manufacturing sector,
finding that the program promoted the adoption of high-efficiency machines and
devices for the first three years of the second compliance period, whereas the program
did not spur investments in high-efficiency equipment during the first compliance
8For emissions data for business operators subject to the Gunma GHG Emissions Reduction
Program, see the Gunma Prefectural Government Official Website. https://www.pref.gunma.jp/
04/e0100369.html [Accessed October 31, 2019].
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
A: TSET facilities
Emissions in FY 2010 480 15,156.730 41,561.760 2252 737,334
Emissions in FY 2011 480 15,043.040 49,740.740 1884 946,355
Emissions in FY 2012 480 14,657.850 47,105.970 1093 886,457
Emissions in FY 2013 473 14,890.250 48,427.580 1113 903,533
Emissions in FY 2014 457 14,874.720 47,512.030 866 876,884
Targets in FY 2011 481 17,567.730 52,700.660 2188.3 962,305.3
Targets in FY 2012 481 17,607.790 52,736.500 2188.3 962,305.3
Targets in FY 2013 479 17,735.480 52,828.610 2188.3 962,305.3
Targets in FY 2014 479 17,806.910 52,888.850 2403.0 962,305.3
Factory 481 0.721 0.449 0 1
Water treatment 481 0.006 0.079 0 1
Waste treatment 481 0.017 0.128 0 1
Education 481 0.021 0.143 0 1
Hospital 481 0.033 0.180 0 1
Education and hospital 481 0.004 0.064 0 1
B: Facilities in Gunma
Emissions in FY 2010 309 16,444.950 29,174.270 44 240,324
Emissions in FY 2011 309 15,477.480 28,005.210 41 238,345
Emissions in FY 2012 304 17,002.420 29,835.490 46 237,052
Emissions in FY 2013 300 18,504.140 33,254.110 46 311,101
Emissions in FY 2014 295 18,520.020 33,297.390 47 296,627
Targets in FY 2011 307 16,468.760 29,281.150 43 237,920
Targets in FY 2012 319 15,233.920 26,939.030 41 235,962
Targets in FY 2013 317 16,137.380 27,369.290 40 246,360
Targets in FY 2014 320 17,890.690 32,996.330 44 307,990
Factory 344 0.631 0.483 0 1
Water treatment 344 0.006 0.076 0 1
Waste treatment 344 0.026 0.160 0 1
Education 344 0.023 0.151 0 1
Hospital 344 0.032 0.176 0 1
Education and hospital 344 0.003 0.054 0 1
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Table 2 Average treatment
effect: TSET facilities versus
facilities in Gunma
ATET Number of treated Number of controls
A: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2011
0.0274 480 307
(0.0141)
B: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2012
−0.1167*** 480 303
(0.0271)
C: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2013
−0.1586*** 472 299
(0.0264)
D: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2014
−0.1894*** 457 293
(0.0288)
Robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors in parentheses
***Significant at the 1% level
period. These findings imply emission reduction measures that TSET facilities took
to achieve their emission targets; the manufacturing facilities may have adopted
relatively cheaper emissions reduction plans in the first compliance period such as
improvements to equipment they already owned, whereas in the second compli-
ance period, when the emissions targets became stricter, they allocated money and
resources to introduce high-efficiency equipment (Hamamoto 2020).
Arimura and Abe (2020) examine the impact of the Tokyo ETS on emissions
using a facility-level dataset for office buildings. They show that the Tokyo ETS
caused a decrease of 6.9% in CO2 emissions. Jun et al. (2020) investigate the effect
of the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (KETS) on CO2 emissions, finding that
the stringency of emission caps provided incentives for participating firms in the
manufacturing and building sectors to improve carbon intensity. The results shown
in Table 2 indicate that the TSET Program, as well as the Tokyo ETS and the KETS,
can encourage emission reduction efforts.
To check the robustness of the above-mentioned results, we estimate the ATETs
for changes in CO2 emissions using an alternative dataset that includes facilities that
were regulated by the Saitama GHG Emissions Reduction Program but were not
subject to the TSET Program in the first compliance period (hereinafter, non-TSET
facilities) as part of the control group; data for non-TSET facilities are added to the
data for the facilities subject to the Gunma GHG Emissions Reduction Program.
The data for non-TSET facilities are aggregated for each business operator that does
not own any TSET facilities. In addition, the method for constructing the data for
the treatment group is slightly changed: If a business operator owns both TSET
and non-TSET facilities, the data for both types of facilities are summed for the
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Table 3 Average treatment
effect: TSET facilities versus
non-TSET facilities and
facilities in Gunma
ATET Number of treated Number of controls
A: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2011
0.0078 479 476
(0.0134)
B: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2012
−0.1001*** 479 471
(0.0208)
C: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2013
−0.1742*** 474 467
(0.0317)
D: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2014
−0.1626*** 460 462
(0.0283)
Robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors in parentheses
***Significant at the 1% level
business operator.9 In estimating propensity scores, actual emissions in FY 2010 and
dummy variables denoting the types of business operators are used as covariates. The
reason for using FY 2010 emissions is that many of non-TSET facilities set emission
intensity targets and thus do not have absolute emission targets.
Table 3 summarizes the results of estimating the ATETs using the alternative
dataset. The PSM estimates indicate that TSET facilities reduced CO2 emissions
more than the controls during the period from FY 2012 to FY 2014. Compared to the
ATET in FY 2014 shown in Table 2 (18.9% points), however, the ATET in FY 2014
estimated using the alternative dataset is somewhat smaller. This might suggest the
possibility that CO2 emissions from non-TSET facilities declined more than those
from the facilities subject to the Gunma GHG Emissions Reduction Program.
To examine this point, we estimate the ATETs for changes in CO2 emissions
using non-TSET facilities belonging to the business operators that do not own any
TSET facilities as the treated units and the facilities subject to the Gunma GHG
Emissions Reduction Program as the control units (the data for these facilities are
aggregated for each business operator). Table 4 shows the results. The ATETs for
the changes in emissions during the period from FY 2012 to FY 2014 indicate that
non-TSET facilities belonging to the business operators that do not own any TSET
facilities also reduced CO2 emissions more than the facilities subject to the Gunma
GHG Emissions Reduction Program. A possible reason for this is that non-TSET
facilities made efforts to reduce their energy consumption in order to avoid being
regulated under the TSET Program. If a facility has total energy consumption of
1500 kiloliters or more per year in crude oil equivalent for three consecutive years, it
9For data on facilities subject to the Saitama GHG Emissions Reduction Program, see the Saitama
Prefectural Government Official Website. https://www.pref.saitama.lg.jp/a0502/keikakukouhyou.
html [Accessed November 1, 2019].
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Table 4 Average treatment
effect: non-TSET facilities
versus facilities in Gunma
ATET Number of treated Number of controls
A: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2011
0.0224 167 309
(0.0298)
B: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2012
−0.0925*** 167 304
(0.0313)
C: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2013
−0.1468*** 167 300
(0.0370)
D: Change in CO2 emissions between FY 2010 and FY 2014
−0.1999*** 167 295
(0.0459)
Robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors in parentheses
***Significant at the 1% level
becomes subject to the program. This provision in the TSET Program can incentivize
non-TSET facilities to suppress their energy consumption so as not to be covered by
the program. Thus, the TSET Program may have spurred the facilities that are not
subject to the program to reduce CO2 emissions.
6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the causal relationship between the implementation of
the TSET Program and CO2 emissions. Using facility-level data, the impact of the
program on emission reductions is estimated by using a PSM approach. The results
show that the TSET Program spurred the facilities subject to the program to reduce
emissions during the period from FY 2012 to FY 2014. In addition, the results of
estimating the ATETs for changes in emissions using the data for non-TSET facil-
ities and the facilities subject to the Gunma GHG Emissions Reduction Program
show that the former reduced CO2 emissions more than the latter. This implies that
non-TSET facilities likely reduced their energy consumption to avoid being subject
to the TSET Program.
An attempt to introduce cap-and-trade schemes will, in most cases, provoke a
political backlash, mainly from the industry sector. A cap-and-trade scheme that
includes no penalties for failure to meet targets may be faced with weaker polit-
ical opposition compared to programs with some form of enforcement measures.
Unlike the EU ETS and the Tokyo ETS, where both target-setting and the achieve-
ment of targets are mandatory, the TSET Program is a different type of emissions
trading system: amandatory target-setting and voluntary achievement approach. This
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paper reveals that cap-and-trade schemes based on such an approach can successfully
provide incentives for covered entities to achieve their emission targets. A cap-and-
trade scheme design like the TSET Program can be seen as one of the strategies in
the political process of policymaking for combating climate change.
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Chapter 8
Energy Consumption in Transition:
Evidence from Facility-Level Data
Naonari Yajima, Toshi H. Arimura, and Taisuke Sadayuki
Abstract This chapter estimated the impact of the Tokyo emissions trading scheme
(ETS) and Saitama ETS on energy consumption in the manufacturing sector using a
facility-level panel data set compiled from the Current Survey of Energy Consump-
tion, a nationwide survey on energy consumption conducted by the Agency for
Natural Resources and Energy in Japan. To our knowledge, no study has used this
rich data set to perform sophisticated econometric analyses.We found that the Tokyo
ETS reduced electricity consumption by 16%. On the other hand, we did not find
evidences of switching from dirty fossil fuel to cleaner fuel associated with the intro-
duction of the Tokyo ETS. The impact of the Saitama ETS on energy consumption
was not statistically confirmed based on our samples. Additional studies are needed
to identify the different impacts of the ETSs between Tokyo and Saitama. We also
found that Japan has been experiencing long-term decreasing trends in the number
of manufacturing facilities and the volume of fossil fuel consumption, which may
reduce Japanese CO2 emissions in the long run.
Keywords Emission trading schemes · Tokyo ETS · Saitama ETS ·
Manufacturing sector
1 Introduction
The previous two chapters investigated the impacts of the Tokyo emissions trading
scheme (ETS) and the Saitama ETS based on facility-level data. Chapter 6 (Abe
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and Arimura) focused on university buildings and examined the impact of the Tokyo
ETS by employing the difference-in-differences approach using the two-way fixed
effects model. Chapter 7 (Hamamoto) targeted the facilities of all industries under
the Saitama ETS and examined the impact of this ETS by comparing the facilities in
Saitama Prefecture and one of its adjunct prefectures with a similar background in
terms of environmental policies and industrial structures, namely, Gunma Prefecture.
Despite the similarity between the Tokyo ETS and Saitama ETS, two important
distinctions should be noted. The first is the type of major industry targeted under
each ETS. Because of the high land price and stringent environmental regulations in
Tokyo, commercial and office buildings constitute the majority of regulated facili-
ties under the Tokyo ETS. However, the regulated facilities under the Saitama ETS
mostly belong to the manufacturing sector. Commercial and office buildings mainly
use electricity, while manufacturing facilities consume various types of fossil fuels,
ranging from petroleum-based fuels to non-petroleum-based fuels. Therefore, each
regulated facility adopts a different reduction strategy because the cost of compliance
with ETSs can differ depending on the type of industry and the type of energy used.
Some facilities may reduce emissions by decreasing the usage of electricity, while
others may reduce the usage of fossil fuel.
The second difference between the two ETSs is associated with the severity of
compliance obligation. Compliance with the emission reduction targets under the
Tokyo ETS is mandatory, and facilities that violate the regulation face fines. In
contrast, compliance with the Saitama ETS is voluntary in the sense that regulated
facilities that do not comply with the ETS face no monetary penalties.
This chapter focuses on the manufacturing sector and examines the impacts of
both the Tokyo ETS and Saitama ETS on the consumption of energy by regulated
facilities. We utilize the Current Survey of Energy Consumption (CSEC), which
includes rich facility-level data from a nationwide survey on energy consumption
conducted by the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy in Japan. This survey
was started in 1981 with the aim of monitoring the consumption of various energy
types by energy-intensive facilities and making use of the data for policy making,
especially for policies concerning petroleum consumption. As of 2016, the survey
covers approximately 1300 facilities (hereinafter, reporting facilities) in the manu-
facturing sector. Reporting facilities are required to submit monthly reports on the
consumption of various energy types, such as electricity or petroleum.
The contribution of this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, although
the previous two chapters investigated the impacts of ETSs on facilities in different
prefectures and industries, this chapter examines two local ETSs by focusing on
manufacturing facilities. To comply with the ETSs, regulated facilities can reduce
their GHG emissions by decreasing their energy use. The Current Survey of Energy
Consumption (CSES) allows us to examine this question in the manufacturing sector
at the facility level in both Tokyo and Saitama and compare the effectiveness of
the two local ETSs. As noted above, the Saitama ETS differs from the Tokyo ETSs
because there is no financial penalty for noncompliance. We examine whether the
ETS without the financial penalty in Saitama can generate the same level of GHG
emission reductions as the Tokyo ETS, which has the binding obligation.
8 Energy Consumption in Transition: Evidence … 131
Second, we examine whether the regulated facilities reduced their emissions by
changing the fuel mixture. The CSEC allows us to investigate whether the implemen-
tation of ETSs has motivated regulated facilities to shift energy consumption from
dirty to cleaner energies. Previous studies on the impact of ETSs in Japan (Arimura
and Abe 2020; Wakabayashi and Kimura 2018) only had access to aggregate levels
of emissions and/or only the amount of electricity use. In contrast, Wagner et al.
(2014) investigated the impacts of the EU ETS on the energy composition of coal,
oil, gas, and steam and found that the regulated plants reduced their share of coal by
approximately 2%. We follow this line of the study and provide the first empirical
evidence regarding the shift in energy composition under the two local ETSs in Japan.
Similar to the case of EU ETS, the regulated facilities may try to reduce fossil fuel
consumptions such as coal. Another possibility is that they may comply with their
target by reduction of fuels with cheaper abatement costs, for instance, electricity.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the impacts of
Japanese local ETSs using the facility-level data of the CSEC. Because scarce studies
use these data, descriptive statistics and simple graphical illustrations can provide
valuable information on the current trends of consumption of different energy types
by large facilities.
We focus on the reduction of GHG emissions in this chapter. In general, under
ETSs, regulated facilities can complywith the regulation either by reducing emissions
or by purchasing additional allowances. However, few trades have been performed
in the Tokyo and Saitama ETSs as illustrated in Chaps. 6 and 7. Compliance has
primarily been achieved by reducing emissions, and many allowances have carried
over to the next phase. Therefore, we can safely focus on emission reductions in our
analysis.
The next section describes the CSEC data in detail and graphically demonstrates
the trends in the number of reporting facilities and consumption by energy type.
This data description is followed by an empirical analysis section that focuses on the
impact of the Tokyo ETS and Saitama ETS on the consumption of various energy
types. The final section concludes with some discussion on the direction of future
work.
2 Data Description1
This section introduces a facility-level survey, theCSECconducted by theAgency for
Natural Resources and Energy in Japan. The survey was started in 1981 with the aim
of collecting information on fuel consumption in the energy-intensive manufacturing
sector, and it covers the following nine manufacturing industries: the “pulp and
paper industry”, “chemical industry”, “chemical fiber industry”, “petroleumproducts
industry”, “ceramic, clay and stone products industry”, “glass product industry”,
1This section is based on the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of theMinistry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) (2015) “Yearly Report of the Current Survey of Energy Consumption”.
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“iron and steel industry”, “nonferrous metals industry”, and “machinery industry”
(Table 1). Notably, the electric power and gas industries are not covered by the survey.
Table 1 Reported fuel types Fuels
Petroleum-based fuels
Crude petroleum
Natural gas liquids (NGLs)・condensate
Gasoline
Naphtha
Oil produced by conversion
Kerosene
Gas oil
Heavy fuel oil A, B, and C
Hydrocarbon (by-product)




Recycled oil (oil origin)
Non-petroleum-based fuels
Coal-based fuels








Liquified natural gas (LNG)





Refuse plastic and paper fuel (RPF)
Electricity
Steam
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Every facility with more than a designated number of employees (hereinafter,
reporting facilities) is required to report its monthly consumption of various energy
types. The threshold of the number of employees varies across industries. In some
industries, such as the pulp and paper industry, chemical industry or petroleum prod-
ucts industry, all facilities are required to make reports regardless of the number of
employees. All facilities in the nonferrous metals industry are also subject to the
survey unless the facility produces secondary aluminum ingot. In other industries,
facilities with a certain number of employees or more are targeted under the survey.
For instance, a facility in the machinery industry, glass product industry or chemical
fiber industry is not subject to the survey if it has less than 500 employees, 100
employees or 50 employees, respectively. Facilities with 500 employees or less fall
beyond the scope of the survey.
The survey requires reporting facilities to report their consumption of petroleum-
based fuels, non-petroleum-based fuels, electricity, and steam on a monthly basis
(Table 1). Table 2 lists the number of reporting facilities that appear at least once
between FY2004 and FY2015 and the average energy consumption by sector. The
number of reporting facilities varied across sectors; for instance, there were 600
reporting facilities from the machinery industry and 50 reporting facilities from
the glass product industry. The average energy consumption per facility also varied
by sector. For example, the average consumption of electricity was approximately
6000 thousand kWh in the machinery industry and approximately 13,000 thou-
sand kWh in the pulp and paper industry. On the other hand, the machinery industry
consumed approximately 30 tons of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), while the pulp
and paper industry consumed approximately 9 tons of LPG.
In the following sections, we take a closer look at the consumption of several
selected fuels and electricity generation by renewable energies and cogeneration.
3 Overall Trend in Energy-Intensive Sectors
The overall trends of the number of reporting facilities and the energy consumption
by major prefectures are introduced in this section.
Figure 1 shows the number of reporting facilities from 2004 to 2016.2 The total
number of reporting facilities in Japan diminished from approximately 1600 in 2004
2For each year, we count the number of facilities that mademonthly report(s) at least once during the
year. Because some facilities made multiple reports for different sectors, we remove such duplicate
observations to compute the number of facilities, and we handle such duplications as follows. If
a facility reported the same amount of fuel consumption in two reports, then we take the average
over the duplications for each month. The reason is that we do not know the fuel consumption ratio
between sectors; therefore, we assume that the value is the total consumption of fuel, with each
sector consuming half of the fuel. If a facility reported zero consumption or a missing value in
one file and positive consumption in another, then we also take the average over the duplications,
assuming that such reports of a positive number are the total consumption of fuels. Finally, if a
facility reported different values for each sector, then we keep these values, assuming that they
report the actual values for each sector.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 1 Number of reporting facilities in the CSEC
to1300 in2016. Such adecreasing trendwas alsoobservedwithinTokyoandSaitama.
The closure of facilities and the integration of firms and/or facilities partially caused
this trend. Such a trend implies that in Japan, the economic size of energy-intensive
sectors has been diminishing over time. This finding may reflect the transition of the
Japanese economy from being driven by the manufacturing sector to being driven
by the service sector, as typical in many developed economies.
Figure 2 shows the trend of monthly average electricity consumption per facility,
measured by thousand kWh, in fivemajor prefectures: Saitama, Tokyo, Chiba, Kana-



























Fig. 2 Average monthly electricity consumption per facility by prefecture (the right axis is for
Saitama and Tokyo and the left axis is for the other prefectures)
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Fig. 3 Monthly average consumption of fossil fuel and steam, measured by crude oil equivalent,
in transition
in bars (right axis), while that in the other prefectures is shown in line plots (left axis).
The average electricity consumption peaked in 2007, the year before the financial
crisis. The decline in electricity consumption between 2007 and 2009 was rela-
tively small in Tokyo. After 2009, consumption gradually recovered in Chiba, Aichi,
Shizuoka, and Saitama, where manufacturing industries are relatively active, while
consumption declined or remained constant in Tokyo and Osaka. This contradic-
tory consumption pattern between Saitama and Osaka can be explained as follows.
Saitama prefecture is closer to the capital of Japan, Tokyo. Therefore, compared to
other regions, it may have faced a smaller impact on its economic activities. Addi-
tionally, the difference in the industrial structures of areas may affect the impact of
the Tokyo ETS and/or technological innovations on electricity consumption.
Figure 3 displays the trends of fuel consumption (i.e., the sum of fossil fuels and
steam) per facility-month by prefecture, measured in crude oil equivalent.3 Although
the fuel consumption per facility in Chiba, Aichi, and Saitama moderately increased
over time, the aggregate fuel consumption of all reporting facilities in each prefecture
decreased (Fig. 4) due to the reduced number of facilities (Fig. 1). These observed
trends may reflect the fact that small- and medium-sized facilities were more likely
to close and drop out from the survey over time while large facilities remained, even
with the recent stagnation in the manufacturing sector.
In addition to the drop in the number of reporting facilities, several other factors
thatmay have driven these decreasing trends of fuel consumption. One is the effective
environmental policies implemented by national and/or municipal governments. To
improve energy efficiency, the manufacturing sector has been under environmental
regulations since the 1970s, such as theEnergy Saving Act (Arimura and Iwata 2015).
Such regulations could reduce fuel consumption by improving energy intensity in
advance of the implementation of the ETSs. Another possible factor is the increase
in electricity prices. After the East Japan Great Earthquake in 2011, electricity prices
3For the calculation of crude oil equivalent, we use the conversion factors for each fuel and the
criterion of 0.0258 kl/GJ of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of the METI (2015).
















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015







Fig. 4 Sum of the consumption of fossil fuel and steam, measured by crude oil equivalent, in
transition
drastically increased in Japan due to the temporary shutdown of nuclear power plants
(see Chap. 6). This sharp increase might have induced facilities in Japan to reduce
their electricity consumption or substitute other fuels for electricity to manufacture.
Additionally, the increase in the prices of other fuels, such as heavy fuel oil typeA and
natural gas, may have incentivized facilities to reduce their overall energy consump-
tion.4 Under such scenarios, however, the electricity consumption per facility should
decrease.
These trends also indicate that it is necessary to use nationwide and facility-level
data to examine the effectiveness of the Tokyo ETS and Saitama ETS. There are
three main reasons. First, the difficulty in introducing new production processes and
technologies to comply with the regulations may be different across sectors. If a
sector can adopt such changes at a lower cost than other sectors, then the sector may
have reduced more emissions due to the ETSs. Moreover, this change is a facility-
level decision; therefore, the facility is a relevant unit of analysis. Second, to control
for the effects of other environmental policies, it is necessary to use information on
facilities located in other regions. Finally, as shown in Fig. 3, Tokyo and Saitama
have relatively low fuel consumption compared with other regions, which means that
the ETSs may have potentially low impacts on the facilities in their locations. Our
data set can provide a relevant control group and units to examine the impacts of the
ETSs.
4The Energy Data and Modelling Center, (2019), “Handbook of Japan’s & World Energy &
Economic Statistics”, The Energy Conservation Center, Japan.
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4 Estimation Model and Results
This section examines the causal effects of the Tokyo ETS and Saitama ETS on the
energy consumption of facilities by fuel type and total energy consumption.Although
Wakabayashi and Kimura (2018) and Chap. 6 find positive effects of the Tokyo ETS
on the mitigation of aggregate CO2 emissions, the effects on the consumption of
each fuel are still not clear. The ETSs may have incentivized regulated facilities to
change their fuel mix to reduce emissions. However, do regulated facilities actually
shift their energy consumption from dirty fuels to cleaner fuels? Regarding elec-
tricity, Chap. 6 and Arimura and Abe (2020) show that the Tokyo ETS has reduced
electricity consumption in university and office buildings. Because such buildings
in the service sector use electricity as their main energy source, the impacts of the
ETS might have been greater than those in manufacturing sectors. What is the effect
on electricity consumption in manufacturing sectors where facilities use more fossil
fuels?To investigate these questions,we apply the difference-in-differences approach
and estimate the following equation:
ln(Fuelist ) = γ TokyoET Sist + ρSaitamaET Sist + βXit + λs + ηt + μi + εist
(1)
where i denotes the facility, s denotes the month and t denotes the year. Our sample
period is from FY2004 to FY2014, which covers the period of Phase 1 of the ETSs.
The dependent variable, ln(Fuelist ), is the logarithmic value of a type of fuel
consumed by facility i during month s in year t. For this analysis, we select elec-
tricity, heavy fuel oil, LPG, town gas and steam because of the relatively large
amount of data on the consumption of these fuels. We also examine the aggregate
consumption of energy produced from fossil fuels and steam as well as the power
generation by cogeneration, waterpower, and other renewable energies. Under the
ETSs, power generation from renewable energies can be excluded by calculating total
CO2 emissions. Therefore, facilities may have an incentive to generate electricity
themselves.5
TokyoET Sist and SaitamaET Sist are the dummy variables of interest; they
indicate facility i regulated under the Tokyo ETS and the Saitama ETS, respectively,
during month s in year t. Because the Tokyo ETS was introduced in April 2010,
TokyoET Sist takes the value of one if and only if the time of the data is later than
March 2010 and the facility is under the Tokyo ETS. Similarly, SaitamaET Sist
takes the value of one if and only if the time of the data is later than March 2011 and
the facility is under the Saitama ETS. The parameters γ and ρ capture the impacts
of the Tokyo ETS and the Saitama ETS, respectively, on the consumption of each
fuel. We identify the regulated facilities under the ETSs by using official data sets
5For detailed information, see: A policy guideline issued by Tokyo Metropolitan Government
(2015), https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/en/climate/cap_and_trade/index.files/TokyoCaT_
detailed_documents.pdf (accessed 2020-07-08).
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provided by the Tokyo metropolitan government and the Saitama government.6 In
our samples, there are 42 reporting facilities in Tokyo and 60 reporting facilities
in Saitama, of which 24 and 34 facilities are regulated under the Tokyo ETS and
the Saitama ETS, respectively, for at least one year.7 The records of all 24 regulated
facilities in Tokyo exist since the implementation of the TokyoETS,while the records
of some of the 34 regulated facilities in Saitama appear at different periods during
Phase 1. Additionally, a few regulated facilities in Saitama were exempted from the
ETS during Phase 1, in which case, SaitamaET Sist takes the value of zero once the
facility is exempted from the regulation.
Because the choice and quantity of energy consumption are not solely determined
by the ETSs,we need to control for the effects of other factors thatmight affect energy
consumption (such as the size of the facility, sector-specific production processes,
temperature and the economic situation) to extract the pure effects of the ETSs. The
control variables, Xit , include the natural log of cooling-degree days and heating-
degree days to capture the effect of temperature8 and the natural log of electricity
prices by ten regions.9 We also control for monthly fixed effects, λs , and yearly
fixed effects, ηt , to capture the dynamic nationwide economic impact and the effect
of sector-specific production processes, respectively; additionally, we control for
facility fixed effects, μi , to capture unobservable facility-specific effects such as
facility size and architectural performance. Finally, εist is the idiosyncratic error
term.
One of the disadvantages of this survey is that it does not include information
on economic activities such as outputs and the number of employees. This lack of
information is one of the limitations of the data set used in this chapter.
Table 3 displays the summary statistics of fuel consumption and the control vari-
ables as real values from FY2004 to FY2015. We find that there are many zero or
missing values. These values imply no reporting and/or no consumption of these
fuels. In our analysis, missing values are excluded, and zero values are excluded by
log transformation in the estimation. Fuel consumption shows right-skewed distri-
butions. For instance, the annual electricity consumption ranges from 0 kWh to
6Although the information has been continually revised, the lists of regulated facilitieswere obtained
from the homepages of the local governments: https://www9.kankyo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/koukai/
koukai.html (for Tokyo) and https://translation2.j-server.com/LUCSAIPREF/ns/tl.cgi/https://www.
pref.saitama.lg.jp/a0502/keikakukouhyou.html (for Saitama).
7We used the name of the facilities and/or their address as identifiers.
8Cooling degree-days (Heating degree-days) are a proxy variable of the annual energy consumption
required for cooling (heading) in each prefecture, which is defined as annual sum of the difference
between daily average temperature and 24° (14°) for each day in which daily average temperature
is hotter than 22° (cooler than 14°) in each prefecture capital.
9Electricity was mostly provided to each facility by one of ten regional monopolistic power compa-
nies before the deregulation of the electric power industry in Japan in 2000. After the deregulation,
it is difficult to identify the electricity supplier of each facility. We use the electricity prices of these
power companies, calculated by dividing the annual profits from electricity sales by the quantities
of electricity produced, as proxies for electricity prices, despite the possibility that facilities may
contract with a different supplier.
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Table 3 Summary statistics
Total energy consumption Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Crude oil equivalent (kl) 217,734 14,001.26 64,100.16 0 1072,132
Crude oil equivalent (kl, w/o electricity) 217,734 12,984.27 61,870.95 0 1030,758
Electricity
Electricity (consumption) 214,810 11,098.5 3,0341.5 0.0 471,615.0
Electricity (generation) 217,734 1701.6 9624.2 −251.0 335,021.0
Other Fuels
Heavy fuel oil (A, B, and C) 217,734 428.2 1918.0 0 166,384
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 217,682 355.1 3243.1 0 118,556
Town gas 217,494 267.2 1153.9 0 80,793
Steam 152,551 43,668.8 125,122.3 0 2023,363
Control variables
Cooling-degree days 217,734 404.5 139.8 10 1042.1
Heating-degree days 217,734 1038.0 383.1 0.6 2653.9
Electricity price 217,734 17.2 2.0 14.2 23.4
Note This table shows facility-month-level summary statistics from April 2004 to March 2016. The
Tokyo ETS dummy and the Saitama ETS dummy are excluded from the table. Zero values imply
no reporting and/or no consumption of these fuels. We exclude missing values
471,615 thousand kWh, with a mean of 11,101 thousand kWh. Log transformation
can partially overcome such skewness.
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results. Each column shows the results using a
different dependent variable, i.e., ln(Fuelist ). We start from the impacts of the Tokyo
ETS.Column [1] shows the results for electricity consumption, forwhich the estimate
is −0.16 and statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding indicates that the
Tokyo ETS reduced the electricity consumption of a facility by approximately 16%.
This estimate is much greater than the impacts on electricity consumption in the
service sector shown by Arimura and Abe’s (2020) and Chap. 6, i.e., a 6% reduction
for office buildings and a 5% reduction for university buildings.
Columns [2] to [5] show the results regarding other types of fuel, namely, steam,
heavy fuel oil, LPG and town gas. We found that only steam (column 2) and LPG
(column 4) were reduced by the Tokyo ETS, although the size of the impact seems
rather large. On the contrary, the impacts on heavy fuel oil and town gas were not
statistically significant. These results may have been caused by the small number of
facilities under the ETS.
What was the aggregate impact of the Tokyo ETS? Column [6] shows the estima-
tion results of the aggregated fuel consumption, while column [7] shows the results
for all fuels except electricity. Column [6] shows that the total energy consumption
was reduced by 12.3% due to the Tokyo ETS, and this result is statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% level. Column [8] shows the impact of the Tokyo ETS on electricity
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generation by renewable energies. However, we could not find evidence of the effects
of promoting renewable energy usage/supply.
Our results may reveal the compliance behaviors of the regulated facilities under
the Tokyo ETS. As we mentioned in the introduction, the regulated facilities have
two options to comply with reduction requirements: reducing their emissions or
purchasing emission allowances. Our findings imply that the regulated facilities
choose the first option, with ninety percent of the regulated facilities performing
emission reductions and only 10% obtaining additional permits to comply with the
regulation. Thus, our estimation results are consistent with this behavior reported to
the Tokyo government (Chap. 6). Notably, the facilities complied with their target
by reducing electricity consumption.
Another finding from the estimation results is that reducing electricity consump-
tion may be easier than reducing fossil fuel consumption. Reducing fossil fuel
consumption may require some changes in production process technology, which
requires an additional investment. For example, to reduce the consumption of fossil
fuels, facilities may have to replace their overall equipment. In contrast, there are
simple ways to reduce electricity consumption. For example, effective methods
include the adoption of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) or the adoption of energy
efficient appliances.
Our findings imply that facilities in the manufacturing sector in Tokyo achieved
their target through reducing electricity consumption, such as in the case of university
buildings (Chap. 6) or office buildings (Arimura and Abe 2020).
Unlike the results of the Tokyo ETS, we found no statistical evidence of impacts of
the Saitama ETS on the consumption of any types of energy. However, such a result
contradicts the results in Chap. 7, which identified the significant effects on CO2
emissions in Saitama. One possible reason is that we use different samples in both
the target industry and the control group. In its estimation, Chap. 7 uses information
on all regulated facilities from all industries; moreover, it compares the facilities
located in Saitama prefecture andGunma prefecture. In contrast, we use only energy-
intensive sectors; that is, the number of regulated facilities we cover is relatively
small. Additionally, there may be some heterogeneous impacts of the Saitama ETS
that depend on the characteristics of the facilities in Saitama. For instance, large
facilities may face more difficulties in reducing their fuel consumption.
One hypothesis that we wanted to test with this data set was whether facilities
switch fuel from dirty fuel, such as heavy fuel oil, to cleaner fuel, such as town gas
or electricity. Column [4] shows the estimation results for heavy oil. Neither the
Tokyo or Saitama ETS reduced the consumption of heavy oil. Therefore, we could
not identify a fuel switch from dirty fuel to cleaner fuel in this analysis.
All other control variables have no impact or little impact on the selected fuels.
Regarding the electricity price, although a coefficient on electricity consumption is
negative, it is not statistically significant.10 We note that the electricity price has a
10There are several possible reasons for this insignificant result. The first is the small number
of treatments. The second is the fact that electricity is not the principal source of energy in the
manufacturing sector. The third is the deregulation of the electric power industry, which leads
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positive and significant effect on the consumption of steam. This finding suggests
that steam and electricity are substituted in the manufacturing process.
Finally, we compare our results with those found in the literature. We select
the impacts of other ETSs, such as EUETS, Korean ETS (KETS), or Chinese pilot
ETSs. Several empirical studies identified statistically significant effects of the ETSs.
However, the sizes of the estimated impacts are mixed. In the case of the first phase
(2015–2017) of the KETS, Jun et al. (2020) concluded that the burden of emission
reductions has the impact of approximately -30% on changes in carbon emissions in
the manufacturing sector, however, it was not significant in the building sector, under
the KETS. Moreover, Haijun et al. (2019) found that the regulated sectors reduced
their carbon emissions by approximately 30% under the Chinese pilot ETSs from
2013 to 2015. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018) also revealed that the EU ETS reduced
carbon emissions by 10% from 2005 to 2012. Similarly, Wagner et al. (2014) inves-
tigated the impacts of the EU-ETS on the energy composition of coal, oil, gas, and
steam and found that the regulated plants reduced their share of coal by approxi-
mately 2% In the case of the EU-ETS, Chinese pilot ETSs, KETS, and Tokyo ETS,
relatively larger impacts on CO2 reduction have been observed in the manufacturing
sectors. Saitama ETS may have no effects in the manufacturing sectors. In office-
buildings, the Tokyo ETS also has relatively larger impacts on carbon emissions
while the KETS may have no effects. The impact of the ETSs on fuel or energy
consumption varies among countries and sectors.
Moreover, in our analysis, there may be several limitations. First, we assume that
the effects of the ETSs are constant over the sample period and all regulated facilities.
However, such an assumption may not be realistic. Under the ETSs, regulated facili-
ties can flexibly comply with their target. For example, if regulated facilities reduced
emissions during the latter part of the compliance period, then the effects of the
ETSs increased over time. Compliance behavior can also vary by industry-specific
features. For instance, if replacing capital with more energy efficient capital is more
difficult in one sector than in others, regulated facilities may postpone compliance
with their target.
5 Conclusions
This chapter uses rich facility-level data from the CSES to analyze trends in the
number of large facilities in the manufacturing sector and their energy consumption,
and it also examines the impacts of the TokyoETS and the SaitamaETSon electricity,
steam, and fossil fuel consumption.
to uncertainty with regard to the choice of electricity provider by each facility. The last is an
equilibrium effect, where the reduction in the number of facilities in Tokyo and Saitama due to the
implementation of the ETSs results in an increase in the unit cost of electricity production for power
supply companies and, therefore, an increase in the electricity price.
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Our findings are summarized as follows. First, the number of targeted facilities
was reduced from approximately 1600 in 2004 to 1300 by 2016. This finding may
reflect a shift in the industrial structure from the manufacturing sector to the service
sector, which leads to closures, temporary shutdowns, and manufacturing facility
integration. In addition, the total consumption of fuel, such as electricity and other
fuel types, declined in Tokyo and Saitama after 2006. The reduction in the number
of manufacturing sector facilities is one of the reasons for this trend. These trends
will contribute to the reduction of Japanese GHG emissions in the long run.
Second, our analysis demonstrated that the Tokyo ETS led to an approximately
16% reduction in electricity consumption in the manufacturing facilities, which is
larger than the reduction in office buildings found by Arimura and Abe (2020).
However, we could only find weak impacts on fossil fuel consumption. The Saitama
ETS had no statistically significant impacts on the consumption of any type of fuel,
which may be partly due to the insufficient number of facilities in Saitama for our
analysis. We could not find any statistical evidence on shifting from dirty fuels to
cleaner fuels under theETSs. In addition,wecouldnot identify statistically significant
effects of the ETSs on electricity generation by renewable energies.
We compared our results with the findings in the literature on other ETSs. The
impacts of the Tokyo ETS in the manufacturing sector were larger than that of the
EU-ETS but smaller than that of the Chinese pilot ETS. Moreover, the impact of the
Tokyo ETS was greater than that of the Korean ETS in office buildings. The impact
of the ETSs varied among countries and sectors. What can explain these variations in
the impact on emissions? Is it differences in the reduction targets, external economic
conditions or other regulations? Such topics represent an important area of future
work.
Our analysis has policy implications. The results provided in the previous chapters
indicate that both the Tokyo ETS (Chap. 6) and Saitama ETS (Chap. 7) have hetero-
geneous effects across sectors and fuels. Our estimation results revealed a significant
impact of the ETSs only on electricity in Tokyo but not on the consumption of other
types of fuels in manufacturing sector. The weak impact of the ETS in Saitama may
result from the voluntary nature of the Saitama ETS and the lack of penalty for viola-
tion. On the other hand, only a limited number of observations were available for
the Saitama ETS, which may have influenced our empirical results for the Saitama
ETS. Further research is needed on this point.
This study has other limitations in the empirical analysis as well. First, while
our data set contains detailed information on facility-level fuel consumption on a
monthly basis, it has no information on economic activities. Therefore, we could
not investigate the impacts of the ETSs on the adjustment of the capital stocks of
facilities. In the long run, facilities can adjust their capital stock through investment,
which may alter their fuel mixes or the fuel types that they can use. Second, some
facilities in electricity-intensive sectors, such as the chemical and steel industries,
are exempted from paying the higher electricity prices that resulted from the feed-in
tariff system. Such exempted facilities pay electricity prices that are lower than those
observed in our data set. However, we could not identify those facilities and thus
assume that they pay the same prices as other facilities. This difference in electricity
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prices may have caused some bias in our estimates. In future research, we would like
to consider these points to more rigorously explore the impacts of the Tokyo ETS
and Saitama ETS.
In the Paris Agreement, the Japanese government set a goal of reducing green-
house gas emissions by 80% by 2050. It looks like difficult to realize the target by
ETS only. Even if the 16% reduction in Tokyo is significantly high, however, it is
still not enough to achieve the goal. Moreover, the abatement cost has been increased
generally, then the impacts of the ETS would decrease in the future. In a while, the
Japan Center for Economic Research published a report claiming that this long-term
target is feasible with a reasonable cost.11 The declining trends in the manufacturing
sector and energy consumption discussed above help reduce emissions to a great
extent. Considering such trends, the long-term goal of an 80% reduction may not be
an unrealistic target in the future.
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Chapter 9
An Assessment of Carbon Taxation
by Input–Output Analysis: Upstream
or Downstream?
Ayu Washizu and Satoshi Nakano
Abstract To analyze the ripple effects of CO2 emissions from the introduction of
renewable energy power plants, this study developed input–output tables for anal-
ysis of next-generation energy systems (IONGES). The results revealed that the
environmental benefits obtained from investing in power plants of the same capacity
vary significantly depending on the type of renewable energy. Using the IONGES,
under assumptions of three carbon taxation methods (upstream, midstream, and
downstream), we calculated the taxable CO2 emissions induced when producing
each good or service and estimated the carbon tax burden associated with the final
demand. We found that, in the upstream method, the taxation effects of one unit
of carbon tax is concentrated in energy goods such as coal products and petroleum
basic, while the effects are relatively dispersed in the downstream taxation method.
If renewable energy is added to the government target level in 2030, taxable CO2
emissionswill decrease by 12–13.3%. Comparedwith the upstream taxationmethod,
in the midstream and downstreammethods, the CO2 emissions induced by each final
demand are distributed more evenly across various goods and services. Compared to
the downstream taxation method, upstream taxation leads to higher CO2 emissions
from exports, but lower CO2 emissions from household consumption. This is because
energy-intensive industries such as machinery have high export ratios. We analyzed
which expenditure categories contribute to the carbon tax burden associated with
household consumption. In the case of upstream taxation, households mainly focus
on reducing electricity consumption; in the case of downstream taxation, households
reduce consumption of various energy-intensive goods and services.
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1 Introduction
The Council of Japan’s Ministry of the Environment is currently discussing a carbon
tax scheme for 2050. The method of carbon taxation (upstream or downstream) is
an important consideration in these discussions. Policymakers need to quantitatively
understand how the tax burden on producers and consumers changes depending
on the taxation method. In addition, the spread of renewable energy is expected
to change the size of the carbon tax burden in various industries. To quantita-
tively measure how the introduction of a carbon tax affects industries under the
introduction of renewable energy and how different carbon taxation methods affect
producers and consumers, we developed an input–output table for analysis of next-
generation energy systems (IONGES) for 2011.1 This table follows a 2005 study of
IONGES (Nakano et al. 2017) and our previously published inter-regional IONGES
study (Nakano et al. 2018). IONGES is a table that incorporates renewable energy
sectors into the input–output table published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications (MIC), Japan. The sectors incorporated in the IONGES are power
facility construction and power generation for fifteen types of renewable energy. The
purpose of this study is to describe the 2011 IONGES table and use it to analyze
the ripple effects of CO2 emissions and savings from the construction and operation
of renewable-energy power plants. These results measure the potential tax reduction
from each power generation technology when a carbon tax is introduced. We also
examined the differences in burdens on producers or consumers caused by the three
carbon taxation methods: upstream, midstream, and downstream. Detailed quanti-
tative results obtained from the input–output analysis can provide specific ways to
implement carbon pricing.
2 History of Environmental Input–Output Analysis
in Japan
Input–output analysis was developed by Leontief in the 1930s as a method for
assessing the consequences of technological progress on economic development
through interdependences between economic agents (Leontief 1951). It can quanti-
tatively capture the interdependences amongdifferent sectors at high levels of sectoral
resolution. Interdependences emerge because sectors require each other’s outputs as
inputs (Nakamura and Nansai 2016). In the 1970s, Leontief argued that pollutants
1Waseda University Institute for Economic Analysis of Next-generation Science and Technology
web page http://www.f.waseda.jp/washizu/table.html.
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were inevitably emitted as a by-product of input–output relationships between sectors
and applied input–output tables to the analysis of environmental (pollution) issues
(Leontief 1986a, b). Based onLeontief’s idea, theMinistry of International Trade and
Industry (currently the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) created an input–
output table for pollution analysis in Japan (MITI 1971). In the 1980s, Hayami et al.
(1993) developed an input–output table for environmental analysis in Japan with
emission tables for air pollutants (NOx, SOx, CO2) by sector. Using the table for
1985, they conducted pioneering analysis of the environmental effects that new tech-
nology development, such as energy-saving housing, exerts on the society through
interdependence between economic sectors and on the environmental household
account, showing direct and indirect environmental impacts of household consump-
tion behavior (Hayami et al. 1996a, b). Researchers have provided input–output tables
for environmental analysis for 1990 (Ikeda et al. 1996), 1995 (Asakura et al. 2001),
2000 (Nakano et al. 2008), and 2005 (Nakano 2009). In Europe, Statistics Nether-
lands developed the National AccountingMatrix including Environmental Accounts
(NAMEA) at the end of the 1980s. It consists of a conventional national accounting
matrix extended with environmental accounts in physical units.2 The database was
linked to input–output tables in European countries and was widely used for regional
environmental studies (Marin et al. 2012).
Since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth
Summit) in 1992, input–output tables have been heavily used for environmental anal-
ysis. This increase in its use was driven by the fact that input–output analysis is useful
for life cycle assessment (LCA) analysis, which evaluates the lifetime environmental
impacts of products and services. LCAanalysiswas originally used in the engineering
field, in which the physical environmental burden associated with the production of a
certain product was accumulated sequentially in a bottom-up manner. Since the prin-
ciple of LCA was highly compatible with that of input–output analysis (analysis of
interdependency between sectors) in the social sciences field, the input–output tables
of each country have been expanded for LCA analysis as environmentally extended
input–output tables (EEIO) since the 1990s (Nakamura and Nansai 2016). In Japan,
Hondo et al. (1996, 1998, 2002) created an input–output table for LCA analysis
and considered the environmental impact of imported products abroad in their table.
The National Institute for Environmental Studies published the Embodied Energy
and Emission Intensity Data using input–output Tables (3EIDs) summarizing green-
house gas (GHG) emissions by sector in the national input–output tables for 1990,
1995, 2000, 2005, 2011, and 2015.3 Similar toHayami’s table for 1985 (Hayami et al.
1993), 3EID provides the environmental burden of each sector in the supplementary
table. Meanwhile, in the waste input–output table (WIO) developed by Nakamura
and Kondo (2002), waste treatment and recycling sectors (venous industries) that
are not specified in the national input–output table were added. Using WIO, they
2European Environment Agency web page https://www.eea.europa.eu/help/glossary/eea-glossary/
namea.
3National Institute for Environmental Studies web page https://www.cger.nies.go.jp/publications/
report/d031/eng/index_e.htm.
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analyzed the interdependence between sectors that produce conventional products
(arterial industries) and venous industries. WIO is unique in that it describes input–
output relationships of venous sectors in physical units. In 2011, the Ministry of
the Environment published an input–output table for environmental analysis, which
includes a supplementary table describing water resource inputs and waste emissions
in addition to energy inputs and GHG emissions in physical units4.
An input–output table based on supply anduse tables is a format used in theSystem
of National Accounts (SNA). It shows the flow of products produced by a certain
industry that become inputs for another industry. This input–output table differs
from Leontief’s original (product based) input–output table in terms of the analytical
method. An attempt is underway to develop physical supply and use tables within
the framework of the SNA satellite account, the System of Environmental-Economic
Accounting (SEEA) (Kovanda 2019).
The development of multiregional input–output tables (MRIO) has intensified in
recent years (Sun et al. 2019). Inmost cases, the developed database has a supplemen-
tary table showing the environmental burden (Nakamura and Nansai 2016). Interest
in how the economic activity of one country or region (e.g., consumer activity in
developed countries) exerts an environmental impact on another country or region
(e.g., China) is increasing. Although it is difficult to create anMRIO due to the signif-
icant amount of information required, an attempt is ongoing to create an international
platform for the tabulation (Wakiyama et al. 2020).
Considering this background, environmental research using input–output tables
has been promoted through collaboration between engineering and social science
researchers. However, with the advancement of research, the differences between
their aims have become apparent: The purpose of engineering LCA research is to
“accurately” measure the environmental impact of a certain product on (possibly)
multiple regions; on the other hand, the purpose of input–output analysis in the
social sciences is to analyze the effects of technological changes in a part of the
economy on society and the environment as a whole. The results of such anal-
ysis can provide significant policy implications for solving economic, social, or
environmental issues. Vercalsteren et al. (2020) discuss environmentally extended
multi-region input–output (EE-MRIO) studies in line with policy needs.
In Japan, the introduction and use of renewable energy has attracted attention as
an economic and environmental policy issue since the Great East Japan earthquake
of 2011. Therefore, input–output analysis needs to be developed in the context of
this new policy issue. Our IONGES fills this gap. At IONGES, renewable energy
sectors have been added to the national input–output table, and the interdependences
between renewable energy sectors and related sectors have been carefully described.
Research using IONGES is expected to have major implications for policy to effec-
tively build next-generation energy systems using renewable energy while simulta-
neously addressing other social issues (e.g., environmental damage and population
aging).
4Ministry of the Environment web page https://www.env.go.jp/doc/toukei/renkanhyo.html.
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Fig. 1 Conceptual diagram
of an input–output table
Intermediate
transaction
X = (x ij )
Final
demand
f = ( f i )
Total
output
x = (x i )
Value added
v' = (v j )
Total output
x' = (x j )
Moriizumi et al. (2015) have also developed the Renewable Energy-Focused
Input–Output table (REFIO)5 as a Japanese input–output database incorporating
renewable energy. REFIO aims at LCA analysis of individual renewable energy
installations, while IONGES aims at comprehensive policy research, including the
link between renewable energy introduction and carbon tax schemes. In these two
databases, renewable energy sectors that are not specified in the national input–output
table have been added. REFIO publishes the input structure (only) for each renewable
energy sector based on individual information on renewable energy power genera-
tion plants, while IONGES has created renewable energy sectors based on published
statistical information. The latter is an input–output table describing the supply–
demand balance including renewable energy sectors and is suitable for analyzing
policy issues such as carbon pricing.
3 Input–Output Model
Figure 1 provides a conceptual diagram of the input–output table. The columns in
this figure shows the composition of inputs to the sector, and the rows show the
composition of outputs from the sector. In Fig. 1, xi j is an element of the transaction
matrix X of the intermediate goods, and indicates the quantity of i-th goods input
to the j-th sector.
∑
i xi j + v j = x j shows that the sum of intermediate inputs and
the value added in the j-th sector is equal to the production value of the sector, and
5Yokohama National University Hondo Laboratory web page http://www.hondo.ynu.ac.jp/renewa
bles/result/refio.html.
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∑
j xi j + fi = xi shows that the sum of intermediate demand and final demand of
the i-th good is equal to the production value of the i-th sector, respectively.




ai j + v j/x j = 1 (1)
A, with all input coefficients as elements, is called the input coefficient matrix.
Using A, the supply and demand balance of all sectors can be shown as follows:
Ax + f = x (2)
Here, x is the total production vector and f is the final demand vector (million
JPY). The Leontief inverse matrix B = (I − A)−1 is obtained by solving Eq. (2)
for x. The elements in the j-th column of B show the intermediate inputs required
directly and indirectly throughout the supply chain to produce one unit of the j-th
good. When the j-th column of the Leontief inverse matrix B is represented by Bj,
replacing x in Eq. (2) with Bj gives Eq. (3) below:
A · B j + I j = B j (3)
Here, Ij is a unit vector with the j-th element as 1 and the others as zero. Here,
U j = A · B j (4)
Ozaki (1980) defined U j . as the unit structure of the j-th good. The unit structure
shows all intermediate goods transactions that occur directly and indirectly through
the supply chain of the j-th good. Ozaki (1980) considered the unit structure to
























Equation (5) is obtained by expanding Eq. (4). Each element of U j indicates the
total amount of each intermediate good required in the entire supply chain of the j-th
good. Equation (4) is also expanded as follows:
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Here, if e is a unit vector, the following holds:
Ū j · e = U j (7)
Equation (6) visualizes the trade structure of intermediate goods between sectors,









as aLeontief inversematrix, taking into account the leakage
effect due to imports.
4 Summary of IONGES
The IONGES has two kinds of tables, one that incorporates renewable energy sectors
that existed in 2011 (2011 IONGES) and one that renewable energy sectors up to the
composition ratio assumed in 2030 (2030 IONGES).
Table 1 Composition ratio in the 2030 IONGES
Facility (%) Operation (%)
Nuclear power 14.73 21.00
Thermal power 30.07 56.00
Water power 16.51 8.23
Solar power for homes 3.01 0.90
Solar power for businesses 12.13 6.16
Onshore wind power 2.55 1.51
Offshore wind power 0.55 0.21
Small hydropower 2.54 0.82
Flash type geothermal 1.11 0.82
Binary type geothermal 0.37 0.19
Woody biomass (30,000 kW class) 0.26 0.52
Woody biomass (5000 kW class) 2.19 2.29
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Facility (%) Operation (%)
Woody biomass (2000 kW class) 0.21 0.16
Methane fermentation (raw garbage) 0.61 0.02
Methane fermentation (sewage sludge) 0.02 0.01
Methane fermentation (livestock manure) 0.24 0.05
Waste incineration (large) 5.27 0.51
Waste incineration (medium) 7.63 0.61
Total 100.00 100.00
Based on the long-term energy supply-demand outlook (METI 2015a). Supplementary materials
(METI 2015c, 2018b) were used for seven types of biomass power generation. The composition
ratio of facility construction is that of facility construction cost calculated from the installed capacity
and the construction unit price (METI 2015b, 2018a)
Table 1 shows the types of power and their component ratios (equipment compo-
sition, power generation composition) in 2030 IONGES. Table 2 shows the speci-
fications of each type of power generation plants, which is basis for estimating the
input coefficients.6
In IONGES, the average producer price (17 JPY/kWh) in the MIC input–output
table is applied to existing power sources such as nuclear, thermal, and large-scale
hydro, and to renewable energy power sources. This follows the single price principle
adopted in the MIC input–output table. With this assumption, the value of electricity
can be easily converted to a physical quantity (kWh) using the producer price.
However, electricity from renewable energy is actually purchased at a price higher
than the producer price under the feed in tariff (FIT) scheme. In IONGES, the differ-
ence between the purchase price and the producer price is treated as a “subsidy”. In
other words, it represents a deduction item in the value added sector.7
To create the input coefficient vector for the construction of each renewable energy
facility or type of power generation, the total facility construction cost or total oper-
ation cost were determined based on the latest data at the time of creation. The total
amount was then divided into individual input elements with reference to technical
data from published papers and interviews for each type of renewable energy and
created input coefficient vectors.
At the 2030 IONGES, we carefully described the biomass fuel input in woody
biomass, methane fermentation gasification, and waste power generation sectors to
analyze the impact of biomass power generation on the regional economy more
accurately than it had been done before. For example, we described the input flow
of the intermediate goods “woody biomass power generation sector → biomass
6For the 2011 and 2030 IONGES preparation method, see Washizu and Nakano (2019). The 2011
and 2030 IONGES are published on the Institute for EconomicAnalysis ofNext-Generation Science
and Technology, Waseda University, website (http://www.f.waseda.jp/washizu/).
7In the woody biomass and the methane fermentation biomass power generation sectors, it is
assumed that part of the FIT subsidy is used to support fuel procurement.
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fuel sector → forestry” clearly. We estimated the input of methane gas from the
waste or sewage treatment sectors to the methane fermentation gasification power
generation sector and the steam input from the waste treatment sector to the waste
power generation sector.As a result,wewere able to analyze the production spillovers
that the demand for electricity from these power sectors induced in each fuel supply
sector.
The effective utilization of compost or fermentation heat produced as by-products
from waste treatment facilities is essential for the sustainable operation of power
generation frommethane fermentation of biomass (Yuyama et al. 2006;MLIT 2015).
In the 2030 IONGES, we described a situation in which compost and fermentation
heat are effectively used for regional agriculture, and the inputs of organic fertilizer
and fuel oil used to heat greenhouses aremitigated accordingly. The value of compost
and fermentation heat, which are by-products of waste treatment facilities, are not
described in the MIC input–output table. Therefore, the total production values of
the waste treatment sectors in 2030 IONGES became larger than that in the MIC
table. We considered that this increase value added in the waste treatment sector.
Fuel wood inputs are a major cost in the woody biomass power generation sector.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a certain percentage of the subsidy of the
power generation sector (defined as the difference between the FIT and the producer
price of electricity) is spent on securing fuel wood. In the 2030 IONGES, the subsidy
was allocated to the power generation sector and the fuel supply sector, and the fuel
input to the power generation sector was reduced by the amount allocated to the
latter.
Below, we outline the features of the IONGES by examining unit structures
defined in Eq. (6) for some renewable energy sectors. Figure 2 shows the unit struc-
ture of methane fermentation gasification power (livestock manure) calculated by
Eq. (6). It shows the trade structure of intermediate goods that one unit (one million
JPY) of this power generation activity produces for the entire economy. A dot in the
figure indicates that there is an intermediate goods transaction occurring, and the
diameter of the dot indicates the relative size of the transaction volume. The order
of the sectors in Fig. 2 is “order of triangularization” (Ozaki 1980).
Triangulation is the rearranging of input–output sectors in order of processing
degree. Goods and services produced by all sectors fall into the following cate-
gories: raw materials, intermediate processing products, final products, and energy
and business services used in all production processes (e.g., financial and informa-
tion services). Then, sectors are rearranged in the order in which the final products
are at the top. Such rearranging makes it easier to interpret the trade structure of
intermediate goods. Figure 2 shows the cyclical structure of the intermediate goods
transaction triggered by the following supply chain ofmethane fermentation gasifica-
tion power; briefly, it is as follows: waste treatment sector that supplies methane gas
for power generation activity → transportation sector that services the waste treat-
ment sector → repair sector that services these sectors → other sectors supplying
mechanical and chemical products to repair sectors. Figure 2 shows that intermediate
transactions in information goods and services cause a new economic circulation as
a result of recent digitization. Although the relative volume is small, there is also
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Fig. 2 Unit structure of power generation from methane fermentation (livestock manure). The
sector numbers are as follows: 1. Construction, 2. Machine, 3. Information machine, 4. Primary
information goods, 5. Other final industrial products, 6. Steel, 7. Non-ferrous, 8. Food, 9. Stone
products, 10. Textile, 11. Rubber/Plastic/Leather goods, 12.Wood products, 13. Chemical products,
14. Inorganic chemistry, 15. Ore, 16. Agricultural products, 17. Marine products, 18. Ceramic raw
materials, 19. Forestry, 20. Crude oil/Natural gas, 21. Fuel, power, 22. Metal products, 23. Repair,
24. Services, 25. Commerce/Finance/Insurance, 26. Secondary information services, 27. Primary
information services, 28. Education/Research, 29. Unknown
a supply chain from the agriculture sector to waste treatment sectors via through
livestock manure inputs. This chain will be important in analyzing the effects of
generating power from methane fermentation gasification on the local economy.
Figures 3 and 4 show the unit structure of facility construction and power gener-
ation of offshore wind power, respectively. In Fig. 3, we can identify a large-scale
triangularity structure for offshore wind power facility construction. Also, in Fig. 4,
we confirmed two triangularity structures for offshore wind power generation. One
of them is related to the material supply chain necessary for maintenance of facil-
ities, and the other is related to the non-material management service for power
generation activities. These two triangularity structures are closely linked through
the repair sector. Recently, the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development
Organization (NEDO 2019) developed a condition monitoring system (CMS) that
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Fig. 3 Unit structure of offshore wind power facility construction. The sector name corresponding
to each sector number is the same as in Fig. 2
utilizes artificial intelligence (AI) to make timely maintenance possible and stream-
line the operation costs of wind power generation. It is thought that, in the future,
when maintenance services using CMS become widespread, the triangular structure
related to management services, shown in the lower right of Fig. 4, will become
more substantial than it is now, the supply chain during operation will be extended,
and the ripple effect will be greater. In other words, new business opportunities in a
renewable-energy society cause a new economic cycle and have a positive impact on
the economy. Although the demand for facility construction is limited, the demand
for facility operation is persistent, so extending the supply chain during operation is
expected to have a significantly positive economic impact. It can be concluded that
the spread of smart social technology in a renewable-energy society should bring
about a sustainable economic cycle.
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Fig. 4 Unit structure of offshore wind power generation. The sector name corresponding to each
sector number is the same as in Fig. 2
5 Structural CO2 Emissions of Renewable Energy
To confirm the ripple effects of the CO2 emitted due to the construction and oper-
ation of renewable-energy plants, we calculated the “structural” CO2 emissions (t-
CO2) associated with the one unit (1 million JPY) of facility construction (k_C) or




ei · bik_m,m = C orG, (8)
where bik_m is an element of the Leontief inverse matrix. It shows the amount of
the i-th intermediate goods needed directly or indirectly as a structural input from
the economy for one unit of facility construction or renewable energy generation
of type k. ei is the CO2 emission intensity of producing one unit of the i-th goods.
Under the producer price of electricity (17 JPY/kWh), SCO2kG . (t-CO2) represents
the “structural” CO2 emissions for electricity generation of (1× 106 ÷ 17 = 5.88×
104 kWh). The structural operating CO2 emissions per unit of the power generation
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of this power plant can be calculated as follows:
SCO2k_G
∧
= SCO2k_G · 100
5.88
(CO2/kWh) (9)
With respect to the CO2 emissions from facility construction, assuming that the
unit price of facility construction of the k-th renewable energy type is αk (10,000
JPY/kW), the equipment utilization rate is βk , the lifetime power generation provided
by one unit (1 million JPY) of the k-th renewable energy facility is as follows:
100 × 1
αk
× 8760 × βk × γk = 8.76 × 105 × βkγk
αk
(10)
Here, 8760 is the total number of hours in a year. By dividing the “structural”
CO2 emissions associated with one unit of facility construction of the k-th renew-
able energy power generation facility by Eq. (10), the CO2 emissions from facility
construction per unit of lifetime power generation is defined as follows:
SCO2k_C
∧




(g − CO2/kWh) (11)
The assumed construction unit price αk (10,000 JPY/kW), the equipment utiliza-
tion ratio βk , and the useful life γk (years) assumed for each type of renewable energy
are shown in Table 2.
Equation (12) is used to calculate the total CO2 emissions that the power plant of

















is the CO2 emission induced by generating 1 kWh of thermal power.
The expression in parentheses in Eq. (12) indicates the CO2 emissions that the 1-kW
renewable-energy power generation equipment can reduce per hour with respect to
thermal power generation. Because the existing thermal power plant can be used,
the CO2 emissions induced by the construction of the thermal power plant are not
included in this calculation.
The vertical axis in Fig. 5 indicates the structural CO2 emissions per unit of
power generated, based on Eq. (9). The horizontal axis shows the structural CO2
emissions of constructing each type of power generation facility per unit of lifetime
power it generates, as calculated using Eq. (11). The diameter of the circle indicates
the relative magnitude of the power generation of each source assumed in 2030.
As shown in Fig. 5, the operation and construction of methane fermentation and
waste incineration power generation facilities have large structural CO2 emissions.
It should be noted, however, that these facilities perform waste treatment as well
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Fig. 5 Structural CO2 emissions. Diameter of a circle indicates the magnitude of the power gener-
ation composition ratio assumed in 2030. The average CO2 emission intensity during operation of a
thermal power plant is 641 g-CO2/kWh. Abbreviations: Shome solar power for homes, Sbusi solar
power for businesses,OnW onshorewind power,OffW offshorewind power, SHy small hydropower,
FGeo flash type geothermal, BGeo binary type geothermal, Wood woody biomass, Meth methane
fermentation,Waste waste incineration
as power generation functions, so the total structural CO2 emissions include those
produced from waste treatment. Since the structural CO2 emissions from thermal
power generation (operation) are 641 g-CO2/kWh, the values of renewable power
generation are clearly much lower, as shown by the vertical axis.
Figure 6 shows the calculation result of Eq. (12) for each type of renewable energy.
Renewable-energy types with relatively large equipment utilization rates and long
useful lives, such as small and medium hydropower, geothermal, woody biomass
power, and waste incineration generation, have a large total lifetime CO2 reduction
effect with respect to thermal power. The total lifetime CO2 reduction effect from
methane fermentation power generation is also large compared to solar and wind
power. By multiplying the amount of CO2 reduction shown in Fig. 6 by the projected
carbon tax (JPY/CO2-t), the total lifetime cost reduction from carbon tax per capacity
(kW) of each renewable energy power generation facility can be calculated.
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Fig. 6 Net lifetime CO2 reductions per kW for each power plant (compared to thermal power
plants). Abbreviations are same as Fig. 5
6 Analysis of the Carbon Taxation Method
Using the 2011 and 2030 IONGESdata,we analyzed the effects of the following three
carbon taxation methods on economic society: (i) Upstream taxation, (ii) Midstream
taxation, and (iii) Downstream taxation. Upstream taxation is a method of taxing raw
coal, crude oil, and LNG at the time of production or at the time of customs clearance.
The carbon taxwould be passed on to the price of the raw fuel. Furthermore, imported
petroleum products would be taxed at the time of customs clearance. Midstream
taxation is a method of taxing petroleum and coal products manufacturers, electric
power companies, and gas manufacturing companies. These vendors would pass the
carbon tax on the prices of petroleum and coal products, electricity and city gas
they sell. In this case, the energy end-user (such as a household) indirectly pays the
imputed carbon tax, as well as directly pays the tax when using kerosene, gasoline,
or city gas. Downstream taxation is a method of taxing those who ultimately use
petroleum and coal products, electricity, and city gas. In this case, unlike the case
of midstream taxation, no carbon tax is imposed on the power producer. Moreover,
end-users of energy (such as households) not only pay carbon taxes passed on to
consumer goods and services, but also on fossil fuel-produced energy contained in
electricity and direct use of kerosene, gasoline, and city gas. Tax collection costs are
expected to increase from upstream to downstream.
For this analysis, we created three types of CO2 emissions unit (CO2 emissions
per unit production value of each input–output sector) vectors. The 3EID database
from the National Institute for Environmental Studies has estimated CO2 emissions
of each MIC Input–Output sector, and we made it correspond to our IONGES. Here,
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we independently estimated the CO2 emissions of the renewable energy sectors
in IONGES. By recomposing it as shown in Figs. 7, 8 and 9, we have estimated
taxable CO2 emissions allocated to each input–output sector under each upstream,
midstream, and downstream taxation method.
In Fig. 7, taxable CO2 emissions are allocatedmainly to energy conversion sectors
(coal/petroleum products, electricity, and city gas sectors). In Fig. 8, taxable CO2
is allocated to sectors that ultimately consume fossil fuels and it is considered that
there is no CO2 emission associated with electricity consumption. In Figs. 7 and 8,
the sum of CO2 emissions of cells filled in the same pattern are equal to each other.
The allocation method of CO2 emissions of Fig. 8 corresponds with the framework
of 3EID. In Fig. 9, all CO2 emissions from electricity and city gas production are
allocated to the final consumers of these energies. In Fig. 8a, b (which are only
presented differently for convenience of explanation; the allocation of taxable CO2
is the same in both) and Fig. 9, the sums of taxable CO2 emissions in cells filled with
the same pattern are equal to each other.
By dividing the total taxable CO2 emissions allocated to each sector (indicated by
the cells filled with dots at the bottom) in Figs. 7, 8 and 9 by the output of that sector,
we have prepared three types of CO2 emission unit vectors. Using these unit vectors
and the 2011 or 2030 IONGES, taxable CO2 emissions are ultimately induced when









E(k), k = i, ii, iii (13)
E prod(k): Vector with elements of taxable CO2 emissions embodied in each good or
service under taxation method (k)








: Leontief inverse matrix of 2011 or 2030 IONGES.
Value of each element of vector E prod(k) is proportional to the amount of carbon
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Fig. 7 (i) Upstream taxation










Coal and petroleum products (domestic)
Coal and petroleum products (import)
00000yticirtcelE
City gas










Coal and petroleum products (domestic)
Coal and petroleum products (import)
00000yticirtcelE
City gas
Total taxable CO2 emissions














Total taxable CO2 emissions
Fig. 9 (iii) Downstream taxation
The taxable CO2 emissions induced by final demand were calculated by the
following equation. This calculation results show the carbon tax burden associated









F + D(k), k = i, ii, iii (14)
EFD(k): Vector with elements of taxable CO2 emissions induced by final
demand under taxation method (k)
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E(k)
∧
: Diagonal matrix with elements of CO2 emission units under taxation method
(k)
F: Vector of final demand
D(k): Vector with elements of taxable CO2 emissions fromfinal demand energy under
taxation method (k).
All elements of the vector E prod(k) are sorted in descending order and illustrated
in Fig. 10. The figure is the result of using the Leontief inverse matrix of IONGES
for 2030, and it shows the results under the taxation methods of upstream and down-
stream. Figure 10 can be interpreted as marginal carbon tax cost showing how much
cost of each good or service increases by one unit of carbon taxation. In the upstream
taxation method, the taxation effects of one unit of carbon tax are concentrated in
energy goods such as coal products and petroleum basic, while in downstream taxa-
tion method, the effects are relatively dispersed. In upstream taxation method, the
taxation effects on goods such as coal products and petroleum basic are great. Yabe
and Hayashi (2020) argued that if the carbon tax exceeds 10,000 JPY/t-CO2, coal-
fired thermal power generation will be replaced by LNG thermal power generation,
and CO2 emission unit of electricity will decrease. The Japan Center for Economic
Research (JCER 2019) states that under 10,000 JPY of carbon tax, CO2 emissions
can be reduced by 80% compared to 2013 in 2050. Figure 10 indicates the carbon
tax burden amount (JPY) for the production of every 100 JPY worth of each product
or service, when assuming carbon taxation of 10,000 JPY/t-CO2.
Figure 11 shows the calculation results of Eq. (14) using the 2030 IONGES under
three taxation method assumptions. The taxable CO2 emissions induced by final
demand are between 1.07 and 1.10 billion t-CO2. These values are 12% (under
midstream or downstream taxation method) to 13.3% (under upstream taxation
method) lower than the calculation results when using 2011 IONGES. In other
words, if renewable energy is introduced to the government target level in 2030,
taxable CO2 emissions will decrease by 12–13.3%. Assuming that the carbon tax is
10,000 JPY/t-CO2, there will be a tax revenue of 10.7–11.0 trillion yen in 2030.
Under the upstream taxation method, 90% or more of those tax revenues are
collected at time of sale of secondary products. On the other hand, under the
midstream taxation method, about 75% of carbon tax revenue is collected at time
of sale of the secondary product and about 24% is collected at the sale of the third
product. Under the downstream taxationmethod, their values are 61 and 32% respec-
tively. With the downstream taxation method, the carbon tax burden associated with
service consumption will increase. Compared with the upstream taxation method,
in the midstream and downstream taxation methods, the induced CO2 emissions are
distributed more evenly across various goods and services.
Under the upstream taxation method, the most taxable CO2 comes from the 529
million t-CO2 from household consumption and 293 million t-CO2 from exports.
Under the downstream taxation method, these amounts change to 544 million t-CO2
from household consumption and 270 million t-CO2 from exports. Compared to the
downstream taxation method, upstream taxation led to higher CO2 emissions from
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Fig. 11 Induced taxable CO2 emissions by final demand using 2030 IONGES
exports, but lower CO2 emissions from household consumption. This is because
energy-intensive industries such as machinery have high export ratios. This suggests
that the impact of a carbon tax on export competitiveness varies with the taxation
method.
Figure 12 shows taxable CO2 emissions induced by household consumption by
expenditure category. This is the result of a calculation where the final demand vector
F in Eq. (14) is replaced with Fhousehold , which indicates the final consumption in
households. In the figure, the bar corresponding to “Household” in Fig. 11 is cate-
gorized as per consumption item. The calculation results of taxable CO2 emissions
induced by household consumption using Eq. (14) is 529 (in the case of down-
stream taxation using 2030 IONGES) to 647 (in the case of midstream taxation
using 2011 IONGES) million t-CO2. The number of Japanese households in 2011
is 53.8 million, so this corresponds to 9.8–12.0 t-CO2 per household. Under the
upstream taxation method, the ratio of induced CO2 emissions from the energy
related expenditure category is large. The ratio is 52.2% (using 2011 IONGES)
and 51.7% (using 2030 IONGES) under upstream taxation, while it is around 48.0%
(using 2011 IONGES) and 46.5% (using 2030 IONGES) undermidstream and down-
stream taxation methods. Particularly under the downstream taxation method, the
ratio of CO2 emissions induced by electricity consumption is significantly small
(the ratio under downstream taxation is 5.5%, whereas the ratio under upstream and
midstream taxation is approximately 19.5%). Under the upstream and midstream
taxation methods, consumers will pay attention mainly to saving electricity, while
under the downstream taxation method, they will pay attention to saving goods and
services generally produced using energy, including electricity. Especially in the case
of downstream taxation, the energy used for power generation is apparently allocated
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Fig. 12 Induced taxable CO2 emissions by household expense category under 2011 and 2030
IONGES
to households. As a result, in the case of downstream taxation, households apparently
consume a wide variety of energy (including energy converted to electricity), which
cause households to become interested in fuels that generate electricity.
7 Discussion
The purpose of carbon taxation is summarized in Table 3. Its purpose is roughly
divided into three categories, and the purpose of each category is divided into two
according to the degree of innovation required to achieve the purpose. A relatively
large carbon tax introduction effect can be expected for purposes in the two lightly
filled cells. In order to minimize cost increase associated with introduction of carbon
tax, consumers will choose goods and services with as little embodied CO2 as
possible, or introduce home solar power generators. However, careful consideration
of the relationship between the carbon tax system and the system that has already
been introduced is required, for example the Feed-in Tariff system.
Changes in the industrial structure, such as the transformation of economic struc-
tures into services, will promote energy saving throughout society. While progress
in services is a phenomenon common to developed economies, we must also pay
attention to the economic importance of heavy industries such as steel and chemi-
cals. Ozaki (1980) clarified that the improvement in productivity of basic materials
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Table 3 Purpose of carbon taxation
Need for innovation Decarbonization Individual energy
saving
Social energy saving




• Change of industrial
structure
Much needed • Advanced use of
renewable energy
• Hydrogen utilization









Author created with reference to handouts of “Central Environment Council, Global Environment
Division, Subcommittee on the use of carbon pricing”
CCS carbon dioxide capture and storage, CCU carbon dioxide capture and utilization
industries increased the productivity of the machinery industries that used them
as raw materials. Furthermore, in recent years, the utilization of information and
communication technology has increased the equipment ratio in service industries.
As a result, the improvement in productivity of machinery industries will spread to
service industries. Specifically, the energy productivity of the Japanese steel industry
is the highest in the world (IEA 2014), so if the carbon tax system works effectively
on a global basis, the Japanese steel industry should have international competi-
tiveness. A single country’s carbon tax system cannot be expected to reduce global
energy consumption. An internationally coordinated carbon tax system is needed.
For the purposes of technological innovation, the carbon tax system alone cannot
achieve the goal, and collaboration with science and technology policy is important.
Since technological innovation requires a large amount of development funds, social
consensus building is essential with respect to which technological development
should be prioritized and which alternative technology paradigm should be chosen.
These problems cannot be solved only by a carbon tax system. However, it may affect
investors’ decisions to fund these innovations. The scheme of a carbon tax system
will differ depending on which targets in Table 3 are included in the policy targets.
8 Conclusion
In this study, we developed the 2011 and 2030 Input–output table for analysis of next
generation energy system (IONGES) to analyze the ripple effects of CO2 emissions
from the construction and operation of renewable-energy power plants. Using the
IONGES tables, we estimated the lifetime CO2 reduction of each renewable energy
power generation facility compared to thermal power generation. This allowed us
to compare the reduction in carbon tax costs of each renewable energy power plant
with respect to thermal power generation for a given capacity (kW).
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According to the calculation results, the lifetime CO2 reduction effect (from
thermal power generation) per capacity for each type of renewable energy power
generation facility varies significantly. In discussing the use of carbon tax revenues,
Takeda (2007) revealed that replacing tax revenues with capital tax cuts would have
a positive economic effect. Therefore, promoting investment in renewable energy
plants by reducing the capital tax will reduce carbon emissions in the long term, and
thus, it would be an economically and environmentally desirable policy. However,
strategies are needed regarding which renewable energy generation plants should
be invested in. Our results suggest that the environmental benefits obtained from
investing in power plants of the same capacity vary significantly depending on the
type of renewable energy.
Furthermore, according to the Japanese Ministry of the Environment (2018), an
emission trading system has been proposed as a measure to ensure businesses that
emit large amounts of CO2 reduce their emissions. Therefore, an emission trading
system should be used to promote the introduction of renewable energy to electric
businesses. In doing so, the quantitative evidence in Figs. 5 and 6 for renewable
energy power generation could be used to contribute to the design of these schemes.
Using the IONGES tables, we also conducted an analysis of the effects of the
differences in the upstream, midstream, and downstream methods. We found that
taxable CO2 emissions are ultimately induced when producing each good or service.
As a result, in the upstream taxation method, the effects of one unit of carbon tax are
concentrated in energy goods such as coal products and petroleum basic, while in
the downstream taxation method, the effects are relatively dispersed. In the upstream
taxation method, the taxation effects on goods such as coal products and petroleum
basic are significant.
We also calculated the taxable CO2 emissions induced by each final demand. The
results show the carbon tax burden associated with the final demand of goods and
services. If renewable energy is added to the government target level in 2030, taxable
CO2 emissions will decrease by 12–13.3%. Compared with the upstream method, in
the midstream and downstream methods, the CO2 emissions induced by each final
demand are distributed more evenly across various goods and services. Compared to
the downstream taxation method, upstream taxation leads to higher CO2 emissions
from exports, but lower CO2 emissions from household consumption. This is because
energy-intensive industries such as machinery have high export ratios. This suggests
that the impact of a carbon tax on export competitiveness varies with the taxation
method. Generally, it is said that upstream taxation reduces taxation costs. However,
the results of this study suggest that the effects of upstream taxation on Japan’s export
competitiveness must be carefully considered.
According to Sugino et al. (2013), to equalize the carbon tax burden among
industries, an 85% carbon tax rebate ratio should be applied to energy-intensive
trade-exposed (EITE) industries such as pig iron. In our analysis, the carbon tax
burden on energy goods will be higher under upstream taxation, so this rebate ratio
may need to be increased. Since a trade-off is expected between the magnitude of the
tax rebate ratio and the emission reduction effect, it is necessary to carefully consider
how upstream taxation should be implemented.
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We analyzed which expenditure categories contribute to the carbon tax burden
associated with household consumption. The result shows that the distribution of
induced CO2 emissions from various consumer goods and services differs greatly
depending on the taxation method. In other words, each taxation method delivers a
different message to households about the best energy saving behavior. In the case of
upstream taxation, households mainly focus on reducing electricity consumption. In
the case of downstream taxation, households reduce consumption of various energy-
intensive goods and services. In that case, households are also deeply interested
in the sources of their electricity. Institutional design of carbon pricing should be
made considering the effect different taxation methods can have on the message to
consumers.
Finally, we categorized our carbon tax targets. The carbon tax system alone cannot
achieve the goal, and collaboration with science and technology policy is important
for the required technological innovation. However, it may affect investors’ decisions
to fund these innovations. The schemes of a carbon tax system need to be carefully
considered according to their purpose, especially when achieving the goal requires
innovation. In this regard, analysis of the ripple effects of technological change using
input–output tables would have important implications.
We believe that the detailed and quantitative results from this input–output anal-
ysis will help determine the appropriate and specific institutional design for the
implementation of carbon pricing. In future research, we will use the 2011 and
2030 IONGES developed herein to quantitatively assess the social and environ-
mental effects when different goals are achieved, taking into consideration the best
combination of technological progress and economic schemes (e.g., carbon taxes).
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of the Japanese Economy Under Carbon
Pricing: A Computable General
Equilibrium Analysis of 2050
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Abstract Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, this paper inves-
tigates the impact of carbon regulations on the Japanese economy. We use an 11-
sector, 15-region global dynamic CGE model with a time span from 2011 to 2050.
We assume that Japan (along with other developed regions) reduces CO2 emissions
by 80% by 2050 and analyze the impact on the Japanese economy. In particular,
we consider multiple scenarios of CO2 reduction rates in less developed regions and
analyze how changes in CO2 reduction in these regions affect Japan. In addition,
we also consider multiple scenarios of the use of a border adjustment policy and
analyze its impact. Our simulation results are summarized as follows. First, an 80%
CO2 reduction in Japan generates large negative impacts on the Japanese economy
in terms of both the macroeconomy and individual sectors. Second, changes in the
reduction rates in less developed regions have only a small impact on Japan. Third,
the use of border adjustment in Japan has a small impact on the GDP and welfare
of Japan overall but a large impact on output in the energy intensive sectors. When
future climate change policies in Japan are discussed, much attention is usually paid
to climate policy in less developed regions. However, the second result of our anal-
ysis suggests that climate change policy in less developed regions has only a small
impact on Japan. In addition, the third result indicates that the effectiveness of border
adjustment is limited.
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The Paris Agreement aims to keep the global temperature increase below 2 °C (and
1.5 °C if possible) above the pre-industrial level. However, it has gradually been
proven that the level of “Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)” provided by
countries around theworld is not sufficient tomeet the ParisAgreement’s temperature
target. To achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal, the world needs to aim for
more ambitious reduction targets. However, in reality, many countries, including
Japan, seem to be reluctant to actively address climate change problems.
The government of Japan aims to reduce CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050.
However, the government has not yet determined which policy measures to use
to achieve the target and does not appear to be actively working on climate change
problems. The reason for such an equivocal or passive attitude is the government’s
concern about negative economic impacts generated by climate mitigation policies.
Since Japan has actively promoted energy saving activities, the marginal cost for
CO2 reduction is thought to be relatively high. The high marginal abatement cost
means that if Japan tries to reduce a large amount of CO2, the country will end up
with a heavy economic burden.
In the environmental economics of climate change, computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) analysis has been widely used to evaluate the economic impacts of
climate change policy. For example, the MIT EPPA model (Chen et al. 2015) and
OECD ENV-linkages model (Château et al. 2014) are representative examples of
CGEmodels for climate change policy analysis and have been used to analyze various
climate change policies around the world.With respect to Japan, there are studies, for
example, by Takeda et al. (2012, 2014). These studies have investigated how climate
change policy in Japanwill affect themacroeconomy and individual economic agents
in Japan. In addition, the studies analyzed howpolicies aiming to lessen the burden on
energy-intensive industries will affect the international competitiveness of Japanese
industries.
These studies have provided useful insights into Japan’s climate change policies.
However, there are some shortcomings in the approaches. First, their CGE model
was based on a static model, which makes it impossible to depict the dynamic path
of the economy with carbon regulations. In reality, many less developed countries
are rapidly growing, but at the same time, they are required to reduce their CO2
emissions. A static model is difficult to depict this kind of economic situation.
Second, only amodest CO2 reduction policy was analyzed. Recently, many devel-
oped countries have set long-term targets to significantly reduce their CO2 emissions
by 2050 (many developed countries have goals of at least 80% reduction by 2050).
However, previous studies assumed reduction rates of less than 30% for developed
countries, which is far lower than the long-term future reduction rates, with no CO2
regulations for less developed countries.
Using a global multiregion dynamic CGE model, this research aims to evaluate
the economic impact of the CO2 reduction policy in Japan. To overcome the short-
comings in previous studies, our study has the following features. First, we reflect the
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Table 1 List of sectors Symbol Sectors Symbol Sectors
COL* Coal ELE Electricity
CRU* Crude oil EIS Energy-intensive industries
GAS* Gas OTH Other industries
AFF Agriculture SER Services
FOO Food products TRS Transport
OIL Refined oil
Asterisks indicate fossil fuel sectors (primary energy sectors)
actual long-term reduction target in Japan; in other words, we assume that Japan will
reduce CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050. We investigate how this reduction policy
will affect the Japanese economy in terms of both the macroeconomy (GDP and
national income) and individual industries (e.g., outputs of industries).
Second, we analyze how the change in climate policy in other regions, in partic-
ular, less developed regions such as China and India, will affect Japan. When climate
change policy in Japan is discussed, we often have a strong interest in the climate
policy of less developed countries because many people, in particular, business
communities, have serious concern that if less developed countries do not take
aggressive countermeasures against climate change, CO2 reduction in Japan will
damage the competitiveness of Japanese industries and impose a heavy burden on
the Japanese economy. To determine whether this argument is indeed the case, this
study considers multiple reduction scenarios of less developed countries and then
analyzes how changes in reduction rates in less developed countries will affect the
Japanese economy. Finally, this study investigates whether border adjustment poli-
cies will affect the impacts of CO2 reduction. Although the use of border adjustment
can alleviate the burden of CO2 reduction, we analyze how the adoption of border
adjustment actually changes Japan’s burden.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the CGE model
and data used in our analysis, while Sect. 3 defines simulation scenarios. In Sect. 4,
we discuss the results of the analysis, and finally, we present our conclusions in
Sect. 5.
2 Model and Data
We use a simulation approach based on a CGE model. Our model is an extension
of the model used in Takeda et al. (2012, 2014, 2019). It is a multiregion model
based on the GTAP9 dataset (Aguiar et al. 2016), and we aggregate original regions
and sectors in GTAP data into 15 regions and 11 sectors in Tables 1 and 2.1 The
classification of regions is selected to be consistent with the classification of regions
1For the aggregation of GTAP data, we used GTAPinGAMS by Lanz and Rutherford (2016).
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Table 2 List of regions
Symbol Region List of countries included
JPN* Japan Japan
USA* United States United States of America
EUR* European Union Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania
NAM* North America excl. US Canada, Mexico, Rest of North America
RUS* Russia Russian Federation
BRA Brazil Brazil
CSA Other Central and South American regions Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Rest of South America, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, El Salvador, Rest of Central
America, Dominican Republic, Jamaica,
Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Rest
of the Caribbean
OEU Other European regions Switzerland, Norway, Rest of EFTA,
Albania, Belarus, Ukraine, Rest of
Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe, Israel,
Turkey
AFR Africa Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North
Africa, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Cote d Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria,
Senegal, Togo, Rest of Western Africa,
Central Africa, South Central Africa,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Rest of Eastern Africa, Botswana,
Namibia, South Africa, Rest of SACU,
Rest of the World
MDE Middle East Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, Rest of Western Asia
ERS Eurasia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rest of Former
Soviet Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia
(continued)
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Table 2 (continued)
Symbol Region List of countries included
CHN China China, Hong Kong
IND India India
SEA South East Asia Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Rest of
Southeast Asia
ASP Asia Pacific Australia, New Zealand, Rest of Oceania,
South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, Rest of
East Asia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia
Asterisks indicate “developed regions”, and other regions are “less developed regions”
in the World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2018 (IEA 2018). In the following, we label
five regions, JPN, USA, EUR, NAM and RUS, as “developed regions” and other
regions as “less developed regions”.2 The main difference between our model and
themodel in Takeda et al. (2012, 2014) is that (1) themodel here is a dynamic one and
(2) it considers both electricity generation by renewable energy and carbon capture
and storage (CCS) activity. The basic structure of the model is similar to that used
in Takeda et al. (2012, 2014). For details, see these papers.
In each region, there are three types of agents: a representative household, govern-
ment, and firms. We assume perfect competition in all markets, and production
is subject to constant-returns-to-scale technology. Since the different sectors have
different production structures, we assume different production functions for the
sectors. Following the approach in Takeda et al. (2012, 2014), we divide production
sectors into two types (fossil fuel and nonfossil fuel sectors) and assume that they
have different production functions.
The production of fossil fuel depends heavily on the endowment of natural
resources, and fossil fuel plays important roles in our analysis. Thus, we treat fossil
fuel sectors differently from other sectors.3 Fossil fuel production activities include
the extraction of the following three goods: coal (COL), crude oil (CRU), and gas
(GAS). Figure 1 depicts the structure of the nested constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function for fossil fuel sectors. This shows that the production func-
tion of fossil fuel sectors is a two-stage CES function. Fossil fuel output is produced
as a CES composite of natural resources and nonnatural resource inputs. In turn,
the nonnatural resource input is a Leontief composite of capital, labor and other
intermediate inputs. E_ES(j) indicates the elasticity of substitution (EOS) between
natural resource and nonnatural resource inputs for sector j . This specification of
2Note that some developed regions are included in “less developed regions”. For example, Australia
is included in “less developed regions” because it belongs to ASP in this classification.
3We consider only two types of production functions. However, some studies consider many types
of production structures for different sectors. For example, the MIT EPPA model uses several types
of production functions (Chen et al. 2015).
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Output 
Nonnatural resource inputs Natural resources 
Labor, capital, and intermediate inputs 
Leontief 
E_ES(j) 
Fig. 1 Production function of fossil fuel sectors
the production function indicates that natural resources play an important role in the
production of fossil fuel. In particular, the values of E_ES(j) greatly affect the change
in the output of fossil fuel. The values of E_ES(j) are determined so that the supply
elasticity of fossil fuel is equal to the target value.
Nonfossil fuel production (including electricity) has the structure shown in Fig. 2,
where numerical values indicate values of the EOS between intermediate inputs and
VA(j) indicates the EOS between primary factors in sector j . The production of
output is from the Leontief aggregation of nonenergy goods and an energy-primary
Output 













Fig. 2 Production function of nonfuel sectors
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Fig. 3 Utility function
factor composite. The energy-primary factor composite is a nested CES function of
energy goods and primary factors. We use this type of nested production structure
because we would like to consider the differences in values of the EOS between
various inputs.
In addition, with respect to the refined oil sector (OIL), we assume that crude
oil enters the production function at the top-level Leontief nest because most crude
oil serves as feedstock, which means that it is used as a material. The production
functions above include many EOS parameters, and their values are basically taken
from Takeda et al. (2012, 2014).4
The CES production function means that sector j’s technology in region r is
represented by a unit cost function c jr . Let p jr denote the price of goods j in region
r . Then, the zero profit condition (the first-order condition for profit maximization)
is given by c jr − p jr = 0, and it determines the output of sector j in region r .
To depict the demand side of the economy, we assume a representative household
in each region. The representative household is endowedwith primary factors such as
capital, labor, land, and natural resources and supplies them to industries. Then, the
household allocates its factor income to the purchase of goods and savings (invest-
ment). The household’s utility has the structure depicted in Fig. 3.We assume that the
representative household derives utility from saving, leisure and aggregate consump-
tion. Aggregate consumption is a CES aggregation of a nonenergy composite and
an energy composite. The nonenergy composite is a Cobb–Douglas aggregate of
nonenergy goods, and the energy composite is a Cobb–Douglas aggregate of energy
goods. E_CL indicates the EOS between aggregate consumption and leisure and is
determined as follows. First, for the Japan parameter, we use a value of 0.73, which
is estimated by Hatano and Yamada (2007) from leisure and labor data in Japan. To
4The different CGE studies use different production functions and EOS parameters. Note that these
specifications are not necessarily based on empirical evidence.
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derive the leisure-consumption elasticity and the leisure time for other regions, we
use the same approach as Fischer and Fox (2007).
The household chooses consumption, saving and leisure (labor supply) to maxi-
mize its utility subject to the budget constraint. Since we assume a Cobb-Douglas
function for the top nest of the utility function, the share of saving in total expenditure
(i.e., saving rate) is held constant. The household’s income consists of factor income
minus tax payments.
Our model is a recursive dynamic model from 2011 to 2050 in which each period
includes five years except for the first period (2011–2014), which includes only four
years. Investment in each region is financed by saving, and the capital stock owned
by the household accumulates over time according to the following formula:
Kt+φ = (1− δ)φKt + φ It
where Ks is the capital stock in year s, Is is investment in year s, δ is the annual
depreciation rate of capital and φ is the number of years included in a period (four
or five). We assume that the annual depreciation rate is 7%. In addition, we adjust
the volume of endowment of primary factors over time. First, the total time used
for leisure and labor in each region is adjusted proportionally with the change in its
population. Second, the endowment of natural resources used for the production of
fossil fuel is adjusted so that the supply of fossil fuel is close to the target value.
Our model is a multiregion global model that depicts international trade in goods
and services across regions. To model international trade, we use the Armington
assumption (Armington 1969), as many multiregion CGE models do; that is, we
assume that goods produced in different regions are imperfect substitutes. Goods
from different regions are aggregated through a two-stage CES function: First,
imports from different regions are aggregated into composite imports, and then
composite imports and domestic goods are aggregated.
Our model covers a long time span (from 2011 to 2050). In the model that
aims to analyze climate change policy in the long run, technology improvement
and new technology can play an important role. To capture these factors, we
consider the following technology improvement and new technology. First, we
assume total factor productivity (TFP) growth for every production sector. In addi-
tion, we assume autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI) for energy
inputs. These technology improvements are assumed to be exogenous. The rate of
technology improvement is determined by the method described in Sect. 3.
Second, we assume that electricity is generated not only by conventional energy
but also by renewable energy, which does not generate CO2 emissions. Electricity
from renewable energy is generated through a production function similar to that of
fossil fuel sectors.5 We assume that the cost of generating electricity from renewable
energy is higher than electricity from conventional energy, and thus, the supply of
5Electricity generation from renewable energy uses specific resource factors instead of natural
resources.
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electricity from renewable energy is small in the early period. However, this supply
gradually increases as the rise in carbon price increases the price of electricity.
Third, we consider CCS activity. In reality, CCS activity is usually connected
with coal-fired electricity generation. However, as with other production sectors, we
model CCS activity as an independent activity that provides capture and storage
of CO2 by using production factors and intermediate inputs. Since we assume that
the cost of providing CCS activity is relatively high, CCS is not supplied at first
because it is not profitable. However, the rise in carbon prices from more stringent
carbon regulation makes CCS activity profitable, and the amount of CCS increases.
We assume that the amount of CCS activity in each region is limited to half of the
CO2 emissions in the benchmark year 2011. For example, if CO2 emissions in the
benchmark year are 100 MtCO2, the upper limit of CCS is given by 50 MtCO2.
The existence of CCS activity means that net CO2 emissions are equal to gross CO2
emissions minus CCS.
Later, in the simulation, we analyze carbon regulations. We assume that CO2
emissions are regulated by cap-and-trade emissions permit trading. The government
in each region imposes a cap on emissions, and emissions permits are traded in
each region (no international trade in emissions permits). The market for emissions
permits is perfectly competitive, and the permit price is determined so that the permit
market is cleared. We assume that permits are initially allocated to industries and the
household by auction and that permit auction revenue is rebated to the household in
a lump-sum way.
3 Simulation Scenarios
In this section, we explain the scenarios for simulation. Table 3 shows the list of
scenarios. The BAU scenario is a reference scenario where no (explicit) carbon
regulation is executed. To depict the BAU equilibrium, we use the “current policies
scenario” in theWEO 2018; that is, we adjust the model so that the BAU equilibrium
replicates the situation of “current policies scenarios” in the WEO 2018. To do so,
Table 3 Scenarios
Scenarios Explanation
BAU Reference scenarios with no CO2 regulation
Reduction rate in LDRs MRR Middle reduction rate (40%) in LDRs
HRR High reduction rate (60%) in LDRs
LRR Low reduction rate (20%) in LDRs
Border adjustment NBA No border adjustment
BAA Border adjustment in all DRs
BAJ Border adjustment in Japan
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we adjust the TFP growth rate and the AEEI rate in individual regions so that the
paths of GDP and CO2 derived from the model replicate those in the WEO 2018.
Although there is no carbon regulation in the BAU equilibrium, improvements in
TFP and AEEI restrict increases in CO2 emissions (or reduce CO2 emissions in
some developed regions).
In other scenarios, we introduce carbon regulation (cap-and-trade emissions
permit trading). In particular, we assume that developed regions (DRs), including
Japan, reduce their CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050 from the 2020 level.6 In addi-
tion, we consider multiple scenarios in the following aspects: (1) reduction rates in
less developed regions (LDRs) and (2) the use of border adjustment policies.
Since we want to analyze how changes in climate change policies in LDRs affect
Japan, we consider three different scenarios of reduction rates in LDRs. Scenario
MRR is the scenario with a middle reduction rate, where LDRs reduce their CO2
emissions by 40% (which is half of the reduction rate in DRs). HRR is the scenario
with a high reduction rate, where LDRs reduce emissions by 60%. Finally, LRR is
the low reduction rate scenario, where LDRs decrease CO2 emissions by 20%.
With respect to border adjustment, we consider the following three scenarios.
First, NBA is the scenario with no border adjustment in any region. In this scenario,
we analyze the pure effects of carbon regulations. Next, we consider scenario BAA,
where border adjustment policies are adopted for EIS sectors in all DRs. Border
adjustment in this analysis is a combination of tariffs on the imports of EIS goods
and refunds for the exports of EIS goods.7 The details of border adjustment are
explained in Takeda et al. (2012). Scenario BAJ assumes that only Japan introduces
border adjustment. In addition to the BAU scenario, we consider nine scenarios that
combine the three reduction rate scenarios with the three BA scenarios.
4 Simulation Results8
In this section, we explain the results of the simulation. Before examining the impact
of carbon regulations, let us investigate the BAU equilibrium. Table 4 reports the
level of GDP and CO2 emissions in 2050 in the BAU scenario. Many regions in
the world, in particular LDRs in Asia and Africa, continue to grow toward 2050.
Although DRs reduce CO2 emissions gradually, CO2 emissions from LDRs increase
with their economic growth, and as a result, the world’s total CO2 emissions in 2050
reach 45,928 MtCO2 in the BAU scenario.
Table 5 reports GDP and CO2 emissions in Japan in the BAU scenario. In the
BAU scenario, while GDP increases, CO2 emissions decrease in Japan. The increase
in GDP is mainly due to capital accumulation and improvement in productivity and
6Note that what is regulated is net CO2 emissions (=gross CO2 minus CCS).
7The border adjustment in our simulation is the BIEDR type in Takeda et al. (2012).
8The simulation is conducted with GAMS. The simulation program and all simulation results are
available from the author upon request.
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Table 4 GDP and CO2 in 2050
Level Share (%)
GDP CO2 GDP CO2
JPN 8115 778 3.8 1.7
USA 32,991 4‚536 15.6 9.9
EUR 35,378 2‚632 16.7 5.7
NAM 7437 1‚352 3.5 2.9
RUS 4038 2‚006 1.9 4.4
BRA 7139 654 3.4 1.4
CSA 6938 1‚653 3.3 3.6
OEU 5706 1‚265 2.7 2.8
AFR 12,294 3‚048 5.8 6.6
MDE 13,053 5‚032 6.2 11.0
ERS 987 875 0.5 1.9
CHN 34,505 10,297 16.3 22.4
IND 14,496 5‚097 6.9 11.1
SEA 12,261 3‚964 5.8 8.6
ASP 15,985 2‚739 7.6 6.0
World 211,324 45,928 100.0 100.0
GDP is in billion US$, and CO2 is in MtCO2
Table 5 GDP and CO2 emissions in Japan in the BAU scenario
Level Annual growth rate (%)
GDP CO2 GDP CO2
2020 6,368 1,031
2025 6,593 975 0.7 −1.1
2030 6,827 941 0.7 −0.7
2035 7,117 920 0.8 −0.5
2040 7,426 903 0.9 −0.4
2045 7,736 810 0.8 −2.2
2050 8,115 778 1.0 −0.8
GDP is in billion US$, and CO2 is in MtCO2
efficiency (TFP growth and AEEI). On the other hand, the decrease in CO2 is due
to AEEI and the increase in renewable energy supply. As explained in the previous
section, the paths of GDP and CO2 emissions in BAU are adjusted according to the
WEO 2018 scenario.
Figure 4 shows the path of global CO2 emissions in the BAU and CO2 reduction













2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
BAU MRR HRR LRR
Fig. 4 Global CO2 emissions path (MtCO2)
CO2 emissions in the BAU scenario will increase in the early 2020s but will then
remain almost unchanged, i.e., at approximately 45,000MtCO2. The other three lines
indicate the paths of global CO2 in scenarios with CO2 regulations.
Next, let us examine the impact of CO2 regulation on Japan. Table 6 reports the
simulation results for 2050. Numerical values in the table represent the percentage
change from theBAUequilibriumvalues in 2050 unless otherwise indicated. First, let
us examine the scenarios without border adjustment (the threeNBA scenarios). In the
simulationwith CO2 regulations, Japan reduces CO2 emissions by 80%by 2050 from
the 2020 level, whichmeans that (net) CO2 emissions are reduced to 206.1MtCO2 by
2050. In scenario NBA-MRR, the level of CCS activity reaches approximately 160
MtCO2, and the emissions permit price is approximately US$850 in 2050. We obtain
almost the same values in other NBA scenarios. Because the permit price indicates
the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of CO2, this result means that the MAC in Japan
is hardly affected by the change in the reduction rates in LDRs.
Next, let us examine macroeconomic variables. In Table 6, we can see the
percentage change in consumption, investment, exports, imports, GDP and welfare.9
Because of the large reduction in CO2, consumption, exports and imports decrease
by approximately 6% in scenario MRR. As a result, GDP and welfare decrease
by approximately 3–4%. The rates of decrease in GDP and welfare are only slightly
changed in scenarios HRR and LRR. This means that the impact on GDP andwelfare
in Japan are not dependent on the rates of decrease in CO2 of LDRs.
Table 6 also reports the impact on output in four sectors: EIS, AFF, OTH and
SER. The results show that the output of the EIS sector, which uses energy inputs
9Welfare here indicates the level of utility of the representative household in each region.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































intensively, decreases significantly (by more than 11%). This means that energy-
intensive sectors in Japan are likely to experience a large negative impact from
an 80% CO2 reduction. On the other hand, the output of other sectors decreases
only slightly. Like the impact on macroeconomic variables, the impact on individual
sectors is hardly affected by the change in the reduction rates in LDRs.
We have thus far examined scenarios without border adjustment. Next, let us
examine scenarios with border adjustment. BAA is the scenario in which all DRs
adopt border adjustment for the EIS sector. Compared to the scenario without border
adjustment, the amount of CCS and the permit price increase. However, the changes
in CCS and the permit price are not that large, and there is only a small differencewith
andwithout border adjustment.With respect tomacroeconomic variables, the rates of
decrease inGDP andwelfare shrinkwith border adjustment, whichmeans that border
adjustment improves the macroeconomic impact. However, the difference with and
without border adjustment is also small in terms of macroeconomic variables. As
observed above, the impact on CCS, permit price and macroeconomic variables
changes only slightly with border adjustment. In contrast, the impact on the outputs
of EIS sectors changes to a large extent with border adjustment. To be more precise,
the decrease in EIS output is almost halved when border adjustment policies are
used.
Finally, let us examine scenario BAJ, where only Japan uses border adjustment.
The numerical results for this scenario are almost the same as those in scenario
BAA. This means that irrespective of whether other developed regions use border
adjustment, Japan is not affected.
Our simulation results show that the Japanese economy is hardly affected by the
change in reduction rates in LDRs. In particular, the macroeconomic impact in Japan
is almost the same whether the reduction rates in LDRs are high or low. There are
two possible reasons for this result. The first reason lies in the industrial structure of
Japan. In Japan, more than 70% of value added is generated in services sectors, and
the value added share of energy-intensive sectors is very low. Thus, the change in
foreign policies related to carbon restriction and thus energy-intensive sectors has a
small impact on Japan. Second, the share of trade (net exports) in GDP is relatively
low in Japan (less than 10%), which also makes it difficult for the change in foreign
policies to affect the Japanese economy.
5 Concluding Remarks
Using aCGEmodel, this paper investigates the impact of carbon regulations on Japan.
We use an 11-sector, 15-region global CGE model with a time span from 2011 to
2050. We assume that Japan reduces CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050 and analyze
the impact on the Japanese economy. In particular, we consider multiple scenarios
of CO2 reduction rates in less developed regions and analyze how changes in CO2
reduction in these regions affect Japan. In addition, we also analyze the impact of
border adjustment policies.
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Our simulation results are summarized as follows. First, an 80% CO2 reduction
in Japan generates a large negative impact on the Japanese economy in terms of both
the macroeconomy and individual sectors. Second, the change in the reduction rates
in less developed regions only has a small impact on Japan. Third, the use of border
adjustment in Japan has a small impact on GDP and the welfare of Japan but a large
impact on output in the EIS sector.
Finally, let usmention the policy implications of our research.When future climate
change policies in Japan are discussed, much attention is usually paid to climate
policy in less developed regions such as China and India. This is because climate
change policies in less developed regions are thought to have a large impact on Japan.
However, the second result of our analysis indicates that climate change policy in
less developed regions has only a small impact on Japan. In addition, in the context
of climate change policy in Japan, the need for border adjustment is often discussed.
The third result of our analysis suggests that border adjustment has a small effect
on mitigating negative macroeconomic impacts but a large effect on mitigating the
large negative impact on the EIS industry.
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Chapter 11
The Economic Effects of Equalizing
the Effective Carbon Rate of Sectors:
An Input-Output Analysis
Makoto Sugino
Abstract The 2 °C target of the Paris Agreement has stimulated the implementation
of carbon reducing policies such as carbon taxes and emission trading schemes,
which explicitly applies a price on carbon emitting fuels. However, OECD (2016)
reports that the effective carbon rate must be at least 30 Euros per ton of CO2. The
effective carbon rate includes the implicit carbon price, e.g. energy taxes, along with
the explicit carbon price. Previous studies have focused on the effects of explicit
carbon prices. In this chapter, we will focus on the effective carbon rate and estimate
the effects of carbon policies that increase the effective carbon rate to the 30 Euro
threshold. We find that the short-term effect of a carbon tax that raises the effective
carbon rate for all industries above 30 Euros will not only effect energy intensive
industries, but also downstream industries that already have high effective carbon
rates. Furthermore, we find that the carbon tax implemented in 2012 increase the
average effective carbon rate, but increases the difference between taxed emitters
and non-taxed emitters. Thus, tax exemption for energy intensive industries sacrifices
economic efficiency.
Keywords Effective carbon rate · Input output analysis · Carbon tax · Cost
containment measures · Energy tax · Tax exemption
1 Introduction
The emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) continued to increase even though the
Kyoto protocol came into effect. The increase in emissions was due to global
economic growth, which depends on fossil fuel usage, and voluntary emission reduc-
tions for developing countries. The -2 °C target, however, requires global reductions
of more than 50% compared to 1990 emission levels. The Paris agreement aims to
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reduce GHG emissions globally, by stimulating emission reduction for all countries
that have ratified the UNFCCC.
The countries that have signed the Paris agreement have been designing policies
that would fadeout carbon usage. The main policy instrument discussed has been
carbon pricing. A narrow definition of carbon pricing or explicit carbon pricing,
refers to carbon taxes and emission trading schemes (ETS), which sets a price on
carbon emissions. A broader definition of carbon pricing or implicit carbon pricing,
includes energy taxes, feed-in tariffs and other indirect policies or instruments that
effectively places a price on carbon.
Which definition of carbon pricing is important in reducing carbon emissions? To
answer this question, the concept of effective carbon rate has recently been used. The
effective carbon rate is the sum of taxes and tradable permits levied on carbon usage
(OECD 2016). Taxes refers to energy taxes along with carbon taxes. Energy taxes
are levied on energy based on volume, whereas carbon taxes are levied on energy
based on their carbon content. Thus, feed-in tariffs are included in the calculation of
the effective carbon rate.
Going back to the question above, the implicit carbon price is important in
reducing emissions, because they give direct and indirect signals to consumers about
the environmental damage caused by the use of carbon containing energy. On the
other hand, the explicit carbon price is useful in comparing countries/regions having
similar energy tax institutions.
Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (2017) suggests that the price on carbon
needs to be at least $50 to $100/t-CO2 by 2030 to achieve the Paris climate goals.
Similarly, OECD (2016) estimates that the minimum effective carbon rate of 30
Euros per ton of carbon dioxide emissions is needed to cover the damage caused
by the emissions. However, OECD (2016) shows that the average effective carbon
rate for 90% of emissions in 41 OECD and G20 countries is less than the minimum
requirement.
OECD (2016) also shows that the effective carbon rate differs greatly within a
country. The transport sector, in general, faces an extremely high effective carbon
rate with 46% of emissions priced higher than 30 Euros per ton. On the other hand,
other sectors face a low or no carbon price. For example, the manufacturing sector,
which includes energy intensive trade exposed (EITE) industries, are often given
special treatment because of the competitiveness and carbon leakage issues.
The carbon pricing gap, which is the percentage of emission without the 30 Euro
carbon price, for Japan was 75% in 2012. In 2015, the percentage has gradually
decreased to 69%. Compared to EU counterparts, such as France, Germany and the
United Kingdom, this percentage is 15–25% higher (OECD 2018). This means that
the Japanese economy does not pay enough for their carbon emissions, even though
an economy-wide carbon tax was introduced in October 2012.
Why kind of economy-wide carbon tax was introduced in Japan starting from
October 2012? The Japanese government introduced a carbon tax covering all carbon
emitting energy usages at the rate of ¥96/t-CO2. The tax rate was scheduled to be
raised to ¥192/t-CO2 inApril 2014 and reach ¥289/t-CO2 inApril 2016. The Japanese
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carbon tax can be consider to be an explicit carbon price because it is added on to
the price of energy.
In March 2018, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment (MOEJ) published a
report on the possibility of future carbon pricing policies in Japan. In this report,
three options were presented to reduce CO2 emissions. The first option makes use of
the economy-wide carbon tax introduced in 2012, by increasing the per ton carbon
price. The second option is a mixture of emission trading scheme (ETS) and carbon
tax. Under this option, large emitters will be regulated under the ETS while medium
and small-sized emitters will be regulated by increasing the per ton carbon tax. The
third option directly regulates each sector differently by setting individual targets.
In other words, the first two options aim at increasing the effective carbon rate and
reduce the carbon pricing gap.
The manufacturing industries, especially the EITE industries, have shown appre-
hension towards high carbon prices. Themain discussion of high carbon prices is that
the production costs will increase drastically, resulting in the loss of competitiveness
in the global market (Arimura et al. 2019). As a consequence, domestic jobs related
to manufacturing could be lost.
What will the short-term economic impact be if the effective carbon rate is raised
to 30 Euros per ton CO2? To answer this question, we will test two hypothetical
scenarios. The first scenario will assume that an economy-wide carbon tax of ¥289/t-
CO2 is implemented. This scenario will also assume that EITE industries are given
special treatment to reduce the burden of the carbon tax. The second scenario will
assume that an industry specific carbon tax is implemented to increase the effective
carbon rate to the minimum of ¥4000/t-CO2.1
2 Existing Literature
The short-run effect of carbon pricing (CP) has been analyzed in depth using input-
output (I-O) models. In I-O models the effect of CP is analyzed by changing the
value-added coefficients, because CP can be considered as indirect taxes, which
is part of value added. The direct and indirect effect of CP are then calculated as
increases in prices or costs.
Early research such as Sugimoto (1995) and Shimoda and Watanabe (2006)
analyzed the impact of an upstream carbon tax using highly aggregated data. An
upstream carbon tax is relatively easy to implement in Japan because more than
95% of primary fuel are imported from abroad. They find that CP will increase
prices of energy intensive industries more than their non-energy intensive industries
counterparts.
Recent research focuses on downstream carbon taxes using detailed industrial
classification data because they are consistent with the polluter pays principle
(Morgenstern et al. 2004; Sugino et al. 2012; Sugino et al. 2013). In addition, the
1This price is equivalent to a 30 Euro/t-CO2 effective carbon price.
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downstreamcarbon taxes aremore practical because the indirect emissions fromelec-
tricity usage can be taxed properly to users of electricity, when the carbon taxes are
implemented downstream. These studies have found that energy intensive industries
have higher price or cost increases.
To understand the source of the price or cost increase, Morgenstern et al. (2004)
and Sugino et al. (2013) decomposes the price increase into three components; direct
emission, indirect emission and intermediate goods. The decomposition provides
vital information on the source of the price increase. By determining the source
of the cost increase, policy makers can introduce cost containment measures that
effectively reduces the burden of carbon pricing policies. Their studies find that
even though direct and indirect emissions are initially taxed, industries that use large
quantities of intermediate goods also pays the burden of the tax. For example, the
pig iron experiences high price increases because this industry uses coal and pays
for the direct emissions. However, the crude steel (converters) industry uses large
amounts of pig iron produced by the pig iron industry. Thus, the major source of the
increase in price arises from intermediate goods.
Other research questions explored using I-O models concerning CP includes
the burden on households in different regions and income classes (Shimoda and
Watanabe 2006; Sugino et al. 2012), effect on GDP and employment (Nakamura and
Kondo 2004; Sugino et al. 2013) and the effectiveness of cost containment measures
(Chuo Kankyo Shingikai 2005; Sugino et al. 2013; Sato 2016).
These studies discussed above are similar in that they calculate the effect of a
newly employed uniformed explicit CP. Energy related taxes, however, exists which
differs among fuel types. Thus, the existing energy related taxes can be considered
as a carbon tax with different per ton price. In this chapter, we will examine the effect
of an explicit CP that differs between industries, which raises the effective carbon
rate above 30 Euros. We will also estimate the effect of the carbon tax implemented
in 2012 and compare the results using the I-O model.
3 Energy Related Taxes
Energy related taxes in Japan are imposed at the national and local level. At the
national level there are six indirect taxes; gasoline tax, local gasoline tax, liquefied
petroleum gas tax, aviation fuel tax, petroleum and coal tax and promotion of power-
resources development tax. In addition, there is the light-oil delivery tax imposed as
a local tax. Thus, there are 7 energy related taxes imposed in Japan along with the
carbon tax as of January 2020.
The gasoline tax and local gasoline tax is imposed on gasoline at the rate
of ¥48,600/kL and ¥5,200/kL, respectively. Thus, gasoline is taxed a total of
¥53,800/kL, which is equivalent to a ¥23,000/t-CO2 carbon tax. The Liquefied
petroleum gas tax is imposed on LPG at the rate of ¥17,500/t, whereas the avia-
tion fuel tax is implemented on aviation fuel at the rate of ¥26,000/kL. These four
taxes are imposed on the transportation sector.
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Other than the taxes on transportation, the petroleum and coal tax is imposed
upstream on crude oil, petroleum products, coal and LNG/LPG, when these fossil
fuels are imported to Japan or extracted within Japan. The tax rates for crude oil,
LNG/LPG and coal are ¥2,040/kL (¥780/t-CO2), ¥1,080/t (¥400/t-CO2) and ¥700/t
(¥290/t-CO2), respectively.
The final indirect tax on energy is the promotion of power-resources development
tax which is imposed on the usage of electricity at the rate of ¥0.375/kWh. This
tax covers all economic agents that purchase electricity from the 10 major power
companies in Japan, including self-consumption of power companies.
The light-oil delivery tax is imposed on light-oil (diesel fuel) because fuel taxes
differs greatly between gasoline and diesel fuel. The tax rate is ¥32,100/kL, which
is equivalent to a ¥12,000/t-CO2 carbon tax, that is less than the tax imposed on
gasoline.
The energy related taxes in Japan puts a high carbon price on transportation fuels
and a low carbon price for fuels used for electricity and the manufacturing industry.
Thus, it can be anticipated that the effective carbon rate for the industrial sector is
lower than the effective carbon rate, as reported in OECD (2016).
Other than the taxes discussed above the Japanese government implemented a
carbon tax at the rate of ¥289/t-CO2, which is added to the existing energy tax. The
tax rate seems to be small compared to carbon taxes imposed in Europe. However,
the coverage of the Japanese carbon tax is greater than 66% of total CO2 emissions.
Thus, the carbon tax should increase the effective carbon rate of the entire Japanese
economy.
The taxes discussed above are considered to raise costs for energy intensive indus-
tries. For example, the agriculture and fisheries sector use large amounts of light-oil,
heavy oil and kerosene. Thus, production costs increase due to the taxes, in turn
raising the prices of these products. As a countermeasure, tax exemptions and tax
rebates are applied for those industries facing competitiveness issues and those who
will suffer greatly due to the energy related taxes.
The petroleum and coal tax provide tax rebates for specific industries to ease the
burden of the tax. For example, the coal for producing iron and steel, coal used to
produce corks, coal used to produce cement and coal used to produce electricity in
Okinawa prefecture are subject for tax rebates.
Similarly, the carbon tax implemented in 2012 also provides exemption and refund
measures for the rates added by the carbon tax along with the petroleum and coal tax
exemption for the following 5 cases.
1. Imported and domestic volatile oil for petrochemical products production
2. Imported specific coal
3. Specific coal for electric generation in Okinawa
4. Imported and domestic bunker A heavy oil for agriculture, forestry and fishery
5. Domestic oil asphalt.
In addition, the exemption and refund measures are provided only for the tax rates
added by the carbon tax for the following 6 cases.
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1. Imported coal used for home generation of electricity for caustic soda production
in caustic soda manufacturing industry
2. Heavy oil and light oil used for domestic cargo ships and passenger ships
3. Light oil used for railway
4. Aviation fuel for domestic flight
5. Imported coal used for home generation of electricity for salt production in salt
manufacturing industry by the ion exchange membrane method
6. Light oil used for agriculture, forestry and fishery.
These countermeasures will lower the effective carbon rate. From the economic
efficiency point of view, all economic agents should face the same effective carbon
rate. Thus, the countermeasures provided by the government lowers economic
efficiency of the energy related tax.
4 Model and Data
4.1 Model
The model used to estimate the increase in total cost due to CP applies the concept
of embodied environmental burden emissions intensity discussed in Nansai and
Moriguchi (2012). The embodied environmental burden emissions intensity uses the
data provided by the input-output table and the emission intensity of each industry.
The embodied environmental burden emissions intensity is calculated by using the
quantity determination model, which depicts the relationship between final demand
and domestic production as,
X = (I− A)−1F (1)
where X is the vector of total production, I is the identity matrix, A is the input
coefficient matrix and F is the vector of final demand. The inverse matrix, (I− A)−1,
is known as the Leontief inverse, which represents the amount of additional input
that is required to produce an additional unit of output for each industry. The Leontief
inverse is calibrated by using the figures in the input-output table. Thismodel does not
distinguishbetweendomestic and importedgoods.Thus, the additional domesticfinal
demand will be satisfied by increases in domestic production, rather than importing
goods from abroad to meet the additional domestic final demand.
Next, the Leontief inverse is used to estimate embodied environmental burden
emissions intensity for each industry, Bi as,
Bi = E(I− A)−1ii (2)
where E is the emission intensity vector and ii is a unit vector where the component
equals one for industry i and zero otherwise.
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Using Eq. 2 and a carbon price t , the total cost due to the carbon price can be
calculated as,
Ci = tE(I− A)−1ii (3)
where, Ci is the total cost increase of industry i . Total cost increase calculated by
using Eq. 3, includes direct and indirect effects of the implemented CP. Indirect effect
refers to the indirect cost increase caused by the price increase in intermediate goods.
The direct effect is the cost increase caused by the implementation of CP.
By changing the carbon price t , we can estimate the effect of a newly implemented
tax on each industry by using Eq. 3. In the simulation, we will use a uniformed tax
increase to depict the carbon tax implemented in 2012, while we use an industry
specific carbon tax to raise the effective carbon rate above the ¥4000/t-CO2 threshold.
The details of the simulation scenario will be discussed in the next subsection.
4.2 Simulation Scenario
We will conduct two simulation scenarios; implementation of the carbon tax of
¥289/t-CO2 and carbon pricing that increases the effective carbon rate over ¥4000/t-
CO2.
The first scenario examines the effect of the carbon tax implemented in 2012,
which covers the entire Japanese economy. The cost containment measure will also
be included in this scenario. Thus, the cost increase calculated will depict the cost
increase associated with the implementation of the carbon tax of 2012.
The second simulation scenario is the case where all emitters are confronted by a
new carbon tax with an ununiformed tax rate. In this scenario, emitters that presently
face a high effective carbon rate will face a low newly implemented carbon tax. On
the other hand, industries that have low effective carbon rates will be taxed heavily
by the new carbon tax.
4.3 Data
The newest input-output table available is the 2015 Japanese national input-output
table. However, we will make use of the 2011 Japanese national input-output table
due to the following reason. The economy-wide carbon tax was introduced in 2012.
If we use the 2015 data, we will need to accurately determine the payment of the
carbon tax for each industry. If we use the 2011 data, then we do not need to calculate
the additional carbon tax payment for each industry. In other words, the 2011 data
does not include the effect of the carbon tax whereas the 2015 data will include the
effect of the carbon tax.
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The Japanese national I-O table list more than 400 industries that produce over
500 products. When calculating the direct and indirect effects of the CP, we need
to aggregate the industries/products so that 1 industry produces 1 product, in other
words we aggregate the data so that the matrix is a square matrix. The dimension
of the square matrix for the 2011 data is 393 by 393. Of the 393 industries, 237
industries belong to the manufacturing industry.
Tax revenues are reported annually by the National Tax Agency in the “National
Tax Agency Annual Statistics Report.” In this report, energy related tax reported
are (1) gasoline tax and local gasoline tax, (2) aviation fuel tax, (3) liquefied
petroleum gas tax, (4) petroleum and coal tax and (5) promotion of power-resources
development tax.2
One shortcoming of this data set is that the tax payments are not aggregated at the
sector level. Thus, the tax payments of the entire economy can be observed, but not
in detail. To overcome this shortcoming, we need to estimate the amount of energy
related tax payments for the year 2011.
The Japanese national I-O table provides the quantities of fossil fuels, electricity
and other products purchased by each industry in the “Value and Quantity table.”
Using these values, we could estimate the CO2 emissions for each industry along
with the energy related tax payment. However, it is known among researchers that
the values for coal is inaccurate. To over come this problem, we make use of Nansai
(2019).3
3EID estimates the amount of energy used along with the CO2 emitted by fuel
type for industries listed in the 2011 Japanese national I-O table. Since the industrial
classification is identical, we can estimate the amount of energy related tax payment
for each industry with high accuracy. In addition, the tax system is very complex, as
discussed in the previous section, tomodel precisely.We estimate the tax payment for
each industry by using the emission data and fuel usage provided by 3EID because
we can determine whether the emissions are taxed.
Direct emissions are calculated by using the information provided by 3EID, but
we use the “Value andQuantity table” provided as supplementary data in the Japanese
input-output table. We allocate the direct emissions from the electricity and private
power generation to the industries that uses electricity produced by these two indus-
tries. Thus, we treat total emissions by each industry as the sum of direct and indirect
emissions.
We will focus on the six indirect taxes (gasoline tax, local gasoline tax, liquefied
petroleum gas tax, aviation fuel tax, petroleum and coal tax and promotion of power-
resources development tax) and the carbon tax in our analysis.
2There are other energy related taxes imposed by the local authority. However, we will omit these
local taxes in the simulation due to data restriction.
3Nansai (2019) is also refer to as 3EIDwhich is the abbreviation of “Embodied Energy andEmission
Intensity Data for Japan Using Input-Output Tables”.
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Table 1 Effective carbon
rate w/and w/o carbon
tax(¥/t-CO2)
Sector Effective carbon rate
w/o carbon tax w/carbon tax








5.1 Effective Carbon Rate
The 3EID data reports that the total CO2 emission from combustion of fossil fuels
was 1.235 Gt-CO2 for 2011. Thus, if the minimum carbon price of ¥4,000/t-CO2 is
applied to all of Japan’s CO2 emission, then the total tax revenue will be 4.942 trillion
yen. The tax revenue in our model for 2011 is 3.996 trillion yen.4 This means that the
present energy related tax falls short by 22% to reach the minimum threshold. The
carbon tax implemented in October 2012 increases the total tax revenue to ¥4.269
trillion, which is still 15% short of the minimum requirement.
The effective carbon rate for the entire Japanese economy is calculated to be
¥3,236/t-CO2, before the implementation of the carbon tax. The carbon tax raises
the effective carbon rate to ¥3,457/t-CO2 (Table 1). Thus, an additional tax of ¥543/t-
CO2 is need to reach ¥4000/t-CO2. Therefore, this implies that the present energy
related tax seems to be quite high.
The effective carbon rate for each sector, however, tells a different story. The
effective carbon rate is ¥2,045/t-CO2, if we exclude the energy related tax paid by
householdswhich is ¥7,549/t-CO2 (Fig. 1). The household effective carbon rate raises
to ¥7,715/t-CO2 with the carbon tax. Thus, the household faces a higher effective
carbon rate compared to other parts of the economy.
Looking at each individual sector we can observe that the effective carbon rate
differs greatly. For example, the transportation sector faces an effective carbon rate
of ¥6,798/t-CO2 as of 2011, which is higher than the minimum effective carbon
rate. On the other hand, the manufacturing sector faces an effective carbon rate of
only ¥411/t-CO2. Thus, the difference in the effective carbon rate is more than 16
times. Furthermore, only the transportation sector and the households face more
than the minimum effective carbon rate of ¥4,000/t-CO2. This means that the prior
































































Fig. 1 Effective carbon rate by sector
to 2012, energy related taxes focuses on taxing transportation and heating rather than
production activities.
The carbon tax implemented in 2012 increases the effective carbon rate for all
sectors because the tax is imposed on 66% of Japan’s emissions at the rate of ¥289/t-
CO2.However, the difference between the top and bottom industry becomes ¥6,391/t-
CO2 from ¥6,387/t-CO2. From the equity point of view, the carbon tax increases the
inequality of the energy related tax burden. This is the result of the special treatment
given to certain industries that faces the competitiveness issue.
What does the distribution of the effective carbon rate look like? Figure 1 shows
the distribution of the effective carbon rate, including the carbon tax, for the entire
Japanese economy. The vertical axis shows the effective carbon rate (yen per ton
CO2) and the horizontal axis shows the number of industries. From the figure, only 27
sectors face an effective carbon rate over ¥4,000/t-CO2 and 21 sectors with effective
carbon rate between ¥3,000 and ¥4,000/t-CO2. On the other hand, 346 sectors out of
393 sectors (88% of the industries) face an effective carbon rate less than ¥2,000/t-
CO2, of which 154 sectors face effective carbon rates below ¥1,000/t-CO2. This
result confirms the findings reported in OECD (2016), which reported that only a
fraction of sectors faces more than the minimum requirement, whereas most of the
sectors face a low or no effective carbon rate.
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5.2 Cost Increase Due to Carbon Tax (¥289/t-CO2)
In the previous subsection, it was shown that the effective carbon rate differs greatly
among industries. In this subsection, the effects of the carbon tax implemented in
2012 are presented.
The cost increases due to the implementation of the carbon tax of ¥289/t-CO2 is
shown in Table 2. The highest cost increase is estimated as 3.951% for electricity.
Electricity is followed by compressed and liquified gas, self-transport (freight), self-
transport (passengers) and road freight transport. The top 20 sectors include energy
intensive industries that are not given special treatment towards competitiveness and
leakage issues within the carbon tax.
The average cost increase, due to the ¥289/t-CO2 carbon tax is 0.385%. Thus,
the cost increase for the top 20 industries ranges from 2 to 10 times the average
cost increase. As for the energy intensive industries, such as pig iron and cement,
the cost increase was estimated at 0.553% and 0.643%, respectively. These two
industries have cost increases above the average, implying that the special treatment
Table 2 Cost increase due to
carbon tax (Top 20 sectors)
Sector Carbon tax (%)
Electricity 3.951
Compressed gas and liquefied gas 1.604
Self-transport (freight) 1.471
Self-transport (passengers) 1.427
Road freight transport (except
self-transport)
1.313
Petrochemical basic products 1.271
Retail trade 1.103
Aliphatic intermediates 1.076
Petroleum refinery products (including
greases)
1.046




Wheat, barley and the like 0.952
Crude steel (electric furnaces) 0.926
Thermoplastics resins 0.924
Industrial soda chemicals 0.881






for these industries does not completely exempt them from production cost increase.
However, the cost increase calculated in Sugino et al. (2013) for pig iron showed that
the expected cost increase was more than 30% when a ¥4,000/t-CO2 carbon tax is
implemented. Thus, the estimated cost increase without the special treatment will be
approximately 2% using the results from Sugino et al. (2013).5 Therefore, a 0.553%
increase is much lower than the 2% if there were no exemption program in the carbon
tax.
The carbon tax scenario is not fictitious, because the Japanese government imple-
mented the ¥289/t-CO2 tax in 2012. Thus, we can check if the cost increase calculated
above was actually experienced.
The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy reports the average electricity
price for household usage and industrial usage. The figures for the year 2011 were
¥21.3/kWh and ¥14.6/kWh for households and industry, respectively. These figures
changed to ¥22.3/kWh and ¥15.7/kWh in 2012, which is an increase of 4.7% and
7.5%. These figures seem to indicate an increase higher than the estimated cost
increase, but caution is needed in interpreting the figures. In other words, these
figures, i.e., real electricity prices, includes the cost increase in inputs such as oil
prices. In addition, eastern Japan experienced an earthquake of M9 on the Richter
Scale in 2011, which lead to the meltdown of the nuclear power plant in Fukushima.
After the earthquake, nuclear power plants were shut down and were substituted by
carbon emitting power plants. Thus, the price increase between 2011 and 2012 may
reflect these incidents. The carbon tax rate was raised twice between 2012 and 2016
from approximately ¥96/t-CO2 to ¥289/t-CO2, However, the electricity prices were
¥22.4/kWh and ¥15.6/kWh in 2016. Thus, the change between 2012 and 2016 was
-¥0.1/kWh for both household and industrial usage. Fossil fuel prices during this
period fell, which contributed in the fall in electricity prices.
The Bank of Japan database reports the prices of domestically traded products.
The price increase for compressed gas and liquified gas between 2011 and 2016 was
3.5%, whereas the price decreased for petrochemical basic products by 28% during
the same time span. Thus, the cost increase calculated using the input output model
is only a small aspect of the “real” price. The cost increase calculated here are not
realized in the real world, because firms do not always pass through the carbon cost
to consumers, because of the risk of losing the market share. Another reason why the
estimated figures are not realized is because the model assumes that the technology
is fixed. In reality, firms may invest in newer technology that are energy efficient,
which may lower production costs even though the carbon tax is levied on fossil
fuels.
5The cost increase calculated using the I-O model increases linearly with the carbon tax rate.
Therefore, the results can be compared by adjusting the tax rate. In Sugino et al. (2013), the tax
rate used was ¥4,000/t-CO2. The estimated cost increase is calculated by multiplying 30% with
¥289/t-CO2 and dividing by ¥4,000/t-CO2, which is approximately 2%.
11 The Economic Effects of Equalizing the Effective Carbon Rate … 209
5.3 Cost Increase Due to Increasing the Effective Carbon
Rate
What will the cost increase be if an industry specific carbon tax is implemented
to raise the effective carbon rate to ¥4,000/t-CO2? The cost increase for the top 20
industries, due to a tax that raises the effective carbon rate over ¥4,000/t-CO2 is shown
in Table 3. Pig iron is estimated to experience the highest cost increase of 40.383%
when the effective carbon rate is raised to the minimum price. Other industries that
are estimated to experience high cost increases is international shipping, crude steel
(converters), hot rolled steel and cold-finished steel at 35.545%, 29.996%, 24.730%
and 18.891%, respectively.
Ten out of the twenty industries listed in Table 3 belong to the iron and steel
industry. The high cost increase of the iron and steel reflects the indirect cost increase
associatedwith theminimum effective carbon rate also shown in Sugino et al. (2013).
These industries have high cost increases because their intermediate products are
mainly from the pig iron industry, which will face a high carbon tax to meet the
Table 3 Cost increase due to
effective CR (Top 20 sectors)
Sector Effective CR (%)
Pig iron 40.383
International shipping 35.545
Crude steel (converters) 29.996
Hot rolled steel 24.730
Cold-finished steel 18.891
Petrochemical basic products 17.370
Steel pipes and tubes 16.019
Petroleum refinery products (including
greases)
15.891
Iron and steel shearing and slitting 15.351





Cast and forged materials (iron) 12.703
Miscellaneous iron or steel products 12.009
Cyclic intermediates 11.940






Metal products for construction 10.193
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minimum effective carbon rate, because they have been granted special treatment in
existing energy related taxes.
The average cost increase in the minimum effective carbon rate scenario was
3.789%. The pig iron and international shipping industry is more than ten times
the average, meaning that these industries will suffer the most from the minimum
effective carbon rate policy. Other industries listed in Table 3 have cost increases
higher than two times the average.
The results above show that if the Japanese government chooses to implement a
new tax or raises taxes to close the carbon pricing gap to zero, then EITE industries
such as the iron and steel sector will experience a price increase ranging from 10%
to 40%. The cost increase has a possibility of deteriorating the competitiveness of
EITE industries in the domestic and international market, if the cost increase due
to the carbon price is increased to cover the minimum damage of CO2 emissions.
Thus, the cost increase will not be acceptable or actions against the implementation
of carbon prices may arise, at least in the short-run, where production processes are
not adjustable.
What kind of options are available to lower the burden of carbon pricing for EITE
industries to accept new carbon pricing schemes?One obvious option is the exclusion
of EITE industries altogether from carbon pricing. This option, however, will reduce
the economic efficiency of the carbon pricing scheme and shift the burden to other
parts of the economy. The second option is the use of cost containmentmeasures such
as free allocation or output-based allocation discussed in Fischer and Fox (2007) and
Takeda et al. (2014).
In the third phase of the EU-ETS, industries defined as EITE, can receive free
allocation of emission permits. The free allocation of permits will lower compliance
costs for EITE industries, resulting in lower product prices. Firms that receive free
permits are not required to produce the same amount after implementation of the
carbon price. Thus, firms may reduce the amount of production and sell the over
allocated permits, which increases net profits of the firm.
To tackle this problem, in an output-based allocation (OBA) program, firms
receive emission permits for free based on the amount of products produced. Thus,
OBA will not lower the supply of goods produced as in the EU-ETS allocation
regime.
In any case, cost containmentmeasuresmay be needed in the short-run for firms to
adjust to the expected cost increase brought by the carbon price. The cost containment
measure will lower the effective carbon rate and increase the carbon pricing gap for
the EITE industries. Policy makers will need to understand the tradeoffs associated
with the cost containment measure and carefully plan the fading out of such measure
to increase the effective carbon rate in the future.
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics
of cost increase due to carbon
tax and effective CR
Carbon tax Effective CR
Mean 0.385% 3.789%
Median 0.332% 2.953%





5.4 Comparison of the Two Simulations
The previous two sub-sections presented the results of the two simulation scenarios.
In this sub-section we will compare the two simulation results.
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the two simulation results. The
average cost increase differs greatly for the two scenarios. The carbon tax scenario
and effective carbon rate scenario differs by the order of magnitude. This is because
the additional tax needs to raise the effective carbon rate is 10 times greater than the
carbon tax implemented in 2012. Thus, the average cost increase is approximately
10 times greater for the effective carbon rate scenario.
Likewise, the minimum and maximum cost increase differs by the order of 10.
Thus, the effective carbon rate aims at increasing the burden equally by 10 times of
the carbon tax.
The figures for kurtosis and skewness, shows that the distribution of the cost
increase for both carbon tax and effective carbon rate will not be symmetric around
the mean with fat tails. In other words, the distribution will be positively skewed and
have a long tail to the right. The effective carbon rate, however, has a smaller value
for skewness, meaning that the cost increases are more symmetric than the carbon
tax. This result arises from the fact that the carbon tax gives special treatment to
energy intensive industries, while the effective carbon rate taxes the energy intensive
industries heavily because the present energy related tax lowers the effective carbon
rate well below ¥4,000/t-CO2.
What kind of energy tax reforms are need to meet the minimum effective carbon
rate requirement? The present energy tax implemented in Japan, provides tax cuts
and tax exemptions for industries that are highly affected by the energy tax, i.e.,
mainly EITE industries. If these measures are abolished, then the effective carbon
rates are expected to rise. The minimum will not be met by taking away the tax
cut/exemption. Therefore, further measures will be need to raise the effective carbon
rate. One option will be the raise in tax rates for coal, because coal has the highest
carbon content with the lowest tax rate in Japan. By raising the tax rate for coal,
electricity and iron and steel prices are expected to raise because of their heavy use
of coal.
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As Table 1 shows, the effective carbon rate for themanufacturing sector is approx-
imately ¥600/t-CO2 which falls short of the ¥4,000/t-CO2 minimum. Another option
is to raise the carbon tax rate or implement a cap-and-trade type emission trading
scheme for themanufacturing sector. The formerwill raise the effective carbon rate of
the transportation and household sector, which is already higher than the minimum.
The latter, will raise the effective carbon rate for those that are subject to the emission
trading scheme. Thus, only the effective carbon rate of the manufacturing sector is
affected. The latter seems to be a better choice from the perspective of equality, but
from a political perspective the former seems to be the better choice.
6 Conclusion
The results of the two simulation scenarios show that the cost increase of industries
will differ greatly. The carbon tax will increase the cost for the non-energy inten-
sive industries more that their energy intensive counterparts. On the other hand, the
effective carbon rate scenario will increase the cost of energy intensive industries,
because these industries are excluded from the energy related taxes including the
carbon tax.
If a new taxwhich raises the effective carbon rate above the ¥4,000t/CO2 threshold
is implemented, then the energy related industries will experience high production
costs. Thus, these industries may resist or lobby against the implementation of an
industry specific carbon tax. For example, the iron and steel industry will suffer the
most if the effective carbon rate gap is filled by the new carbon tax, because the
iron and steel sector is responsible for approximately a quarter of direct emissions
in Japan.
Caution is needed in interpreting the results for the cost increase. First, the cost
increase estimated can be consider as the upper estimate of the carbon tax. The
I-O model assumes a Leontief production function where the input requirements
cannot be adjusted, at least in the short-run. This assumption will increase the cost
of production because firms are unable to adjust their inputs to cheaper substitutes
or install new and efficient technology. Furthermore, the I-O model assumes that
the increase in costs are 100% passed through to the products. Some industries,
however, may not be able to pass the increased cost through because the demand for
their products could be elastic. Thus, if they passed the increased cost through to their
products, the demand will drop significantly, leading to drops in market shares home
and abroad. These industries may not increase the price even though the production
cost is levied, by reducing profits or jobs. In addition, as discussed in Sect. 4.2,
the actual cost increase in production is affected by other aspects other than carbon
pricing, such as fuel prices and mineral prices.
Secondly, the cost increase calculated using the I-O model assumes that the tax
revenues are not redistributed or used to increase government expenditure. If the
tax revenue from CO2 emission is used to reduce corporate taxes, social security
payments or other taxes imposed on firms, then the cost of production will not
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increase as estimated by the model because subsidies and the like will lower the
value-added vector. In addition, these tax reductions can also increase economic
efficiency (double dividend) as discussed in Chap. 13.
Thirdly, the effective carbon rate calculated in this chapter omits the feed-in tariff
(FIT), which was implemented in 2009. The data used to calculate the cost increase
was 2011. Thus, the burden of FIT is included in the original data. However, the
volume of renewable energy has increased, leading to a higher kW/h price increase
for electricity users. The inclusion of FIT may lower the additional industry specific
carbon tax needed to fill in the gap between the current effective carbon rate and the
minimum effective carbon rate. This will in turn, lower the cost increase calculated
in this chapter.
Finally, the effective carbon rate calculated in this chapter may be lower than
predicted due to hidden and/or indirect subsidies. Subsidies can be considered as a
negative carbon tax rate, which will lower the actual effective carbon rate, If this is
the case, raising the effective carbon rate will increase the cost even more than shown
in this chapter.
In any case, the effective carbon rate of ¥4,000/t-CO2 is a minimum requirement
to internalize the damages caused by CO2 emissions. The cost increase caused by the
internalization of the externality will properly signalize the environmental impacts
of the goods produced by the industries. The final demand, mainly the households,
could change the consumption bundle from energy intensive goods to less energy
intensive goods if the prices of goods properly presents the environmental impacts.
However, the present energy related taxes have not priced carbon equally, leading to
inefficient carbon reductions.
The unequal effective carbon price arises from the fear of the loss of international
competitiveness. Thus, one solution is to implement an international carbon tax that
assures that all internationally traded goods faces the minimum effective carbon rate
of ¥4,000. Then, EITE industries will at least pay the minimum carbon price even
though they a given special treatment within their own country, while non-traded
goods and services will face the effective carbon rate by domestic energy related
taxes and the carbon tax.
Recently, the EU has restarted the discussion of implementing border tax adjust-
ment measures for countries that do not have compatible carbon prices with the EU.
The compatibility can be based on the effective carbon price or the carbon pricing
gap. If the effective carbon price is used as a measure of compatibility, Japan may
be penalized for not taxing EITE industries the minimum carbon price. If so, further
carbon pricing within Japan may be stimulated from the threat of border adjustment
measures. The border adjustment measure has not materialized, but may stimulate
implementation of carbon pricing schemes in the near future.
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Chapter 12
Inequalities in the Impact of the Carbon
Tax in Japan
Nozomu Inoue, Shigeru Matsumoto, and Minoru Morita
Abstract Although Japan’s current carbon tax rate is much lower than the rates
applied in European countries, the Japanese government may increase the tax rate
in the near future, in order to strengthen measures to combat global warming. Since
a country’s carbon-pricing policy does not distort its economy, it is considered to
be an efficient policy measure. However, the burden of carbon pricing varies across
regions and across households. Since low-income households generally allocate a
larger proportion of their disposable income to energy costs than high-income house-
holds, the burden of carbon taxes on low-income households tends to be higher than
for high-income households. In addition, households in cold regions spend more
money for space heating, and those in rural areas spend more money for gaso-
line. Unless the government objectively analyzes the impact of carbon pricing and
proposes convincing countermeasures to dealwith these unequal impacts, the govern-
ment is unlikely to obtain public support for a carbon tax increase. In this study, we
analyze microlevel data from the Japanese National Survey of Family Income and
Expenditure (NSFE) collected from 1989 to 2014, and examine how past energy
price changes affected the welfare of different types of households. We then propose
countermeasures to address the problems arising from the regressive nature of taxing
energy use.
Keywords Distributional impacts · Japanese national survey of family and
expenditure ·Welfare
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 18K01578.
N. Inoue
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Tokyo, Japan
S. Matsumoto (B)
Faculty of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University, Room 828, Building 8, 4-4-25 Shibuya,
Shibuya, Tokyo 150-8366, Japan
e-mail: shmatsumoto@aoyamagakuin.jp
M. Morita
Faculty of Regional Policy, Takasaki City University of Economics, Takasaki City, Gunma, Japan
© The Author(s) 2021
T. H. Arimura and S. Matsumoto (eds.), Carbon Pricing in Japan,
Economics, Law, and Institutions in Asia Pacific,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6964-7_12
217
218 N. Inoue et al.
1 Introduction
Although carbon taxes were introduced in European countries in the early 1990s,
the Japanese government spent a quarter century debating the issue until finally
introducing a carbon tax, refered as “global warming countermeasure tax (Chap. 1)”,
in 2012. The present carbon tax rate in Japan is very low, equal to USD 2.63 per CO2
ton, which correspond to USD 0.007 per kilo liter of gasoline, USD 0.007 per liter of
kerosene, and USD 0.001 per kWh of electricity, which is much lower rates observed
in European countries (Cabinet Office of Japan 2009). According to estimates by the
Ministry of the Environment (2012), the burden of the new carbon tax remains at
USD 11.2 per year on the average household in Japan.
Prior to introducing the new carbon tax, various energy taxes had been imposed
in Japan. Both a crude oil tariff (USD 0.0015 per liter) and a petroleum coal tax
(USD 0.019 per liter) are levied on energy imports. At the sales stage, energy taxes
are imposed on gasoline (USD 0.49 per liter), diesel oil (USD 0.29 per liter), jet fuel
(USD 0.24 per liter), and LP gas (USD 0.09 per liter), in addition to a consumption
tax (5%).1 Even if the “effective carbon rate” that includes the above-mentioned
energy-related taxes is used, the tax rate in Japan is still lower than the rates in many
European countries. For instance, gasoline and diesel fuel taxes in Germany are USD
0.83 and USD 0.60 per liter, respectively (Cabinet Office of Japan 2009). Despite
the large differences in tax rates between Japan and European countries, there is no
significant difference in the retail energy prices that households actually pay. This
is due to the large difference in energy prices before taxation (see Sect. 3 for more
detail).
One of the major differences between the new carbon tax introduce in 2012 and
the energy taxes which existed before its introduction would be the consideration
of the energy use purpose. Energy use purposes are considered in Japan’s existing
energy taxes, as the rates are differentiated according to energy use purposes. In
contrast, energy use purposes are not a factor in the carbon tax; the tax rates are
simply based on a CO2 basis. Therefore, the new carbon tax is economically more
efficient than the existing approach. On the other hand, the new carbon tax would
impose different burdens across regions and households. Households living in cold
regions spend substantiallymoremoney for heating than households inwarmer areas,
as the energy bill must be paid even if prices increase since heating is an essential
service in winter time. Private motor vehicles are used intensively in rural areas
where public transportation networks are inadequate. Consequently, households in
rural areas consumemore gasoline than those in urban and suburban areas. However,
if gasoline prices were to increase due to a carbon tax without an increase in alter-
native transportation services, the mobility of rural households will be restricted.
Low-income households generally allocate a larger proportion of their disposable
income to energy services than high-income households. Thus, if the carbon tax is
increased, the tax burden will tend to fall disproportionately on low-income house-
holds compared to high-income households. In addition, even though certain energy
1The consumption tax rate is 10% in 2020.
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services are required to live a normal life, a carbon tax increase could make such
energy services unaffordable for low-income households.
In order to gain public support for a higher carbon tax, the government would have
to propose convincing countermeasures to mitigate the regressive nature of a carbon
tax. To propose feasible and convincing countermeasures, we need to understand how
much energy different types of households use as well as for what purposes they use
energy. The purpose of this study is to analyze household energy consumption data
over the last 25 years and to propose countermeasures to mitigate the regressive
nature of a carbon tax.
For this analysis, we use micro-level data from Japan’s National Survey of Family
Income and Expenditure (NSFIE). In Sect. 2, we explain our data construction.
Households use various types of energy and their usage patterns have changed over
time. In Sect. 3, we report historical changes in household energy consumption.
We also examine how the pattern of energy consumption also varies across regions.
For example, households in colder regions use energy differently than households
in warmer regions. Finally, previous studies reveal that household characteristics
affect energy usage patterns, so Sect. 3 also examines family composition, age of the
head of household, and household income. We also examine how these household
characteristics are related to household energy consumption.Our data analyses reveal
a considerable variation in the pattern of energy consumption across regions as well
as across households, and how large the difference in the tax burden can be across
households. In Sect. 4, we make policy proposals to mitigate the regressive nature
of the carbon taxation.
2 Data
Our primary data source is Japan’s National Survey of Family Income and Expendi-
ture (NSFIE) for 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 (Statistics Bureau of Japan
Statistical Bureau of Japan 1989a–2018a). TheNSFIE is a nationwide cross-sectional
survey that was initiated in 1959 is conducted every five years. Each survey covers
more than 55,000 households that are asked about their expenditures for electricity,
city gas, gasoline, kerosene, and propane gas use from September to November.
Energy prices vary between regions and over time.We identify the location of each
household surveyed in the NSFIE and obtain the energy prices that household faced
from the Retail Price Survey provided by Statistics Bureau of Japan (1989–2014b).
By dividing the expenditure by these energy prices, we calculate the energy consump-
tion for each household in the appropriate unit of measure, such as kWh, liter, and
m3.
Although gasoline, kerosene, and propane gas are sold by volume, electricity and
city gas have a “base charge” that does not depend on usage and a “meter charge”
that increases with usage. Moreover, block pricing is applied for the meter charge.
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Fig. 1 An example of electric pricing scheme
Figure 1 is an example of the block pricing from the Retail Price Survey in 1989 and
1994.2
In the first block, from 1 to 120 kWh, the lowest unit price was charged. In the
second block, from 121 to 250 kWh, the unit price is higher than in the first block.
The maximum unit price is charged if monthly electricity consumption is greater
than 250 kWh. We account for the price variation in the block pricing scheme in
estimating electricity consumption for each household.3
Next,we converted the energy consumption based onphysical units to energy units
(mega joules (MJ)), using the Fact-finding Survey on Estimation of Carbon Dioxide
Emissions from Homes by the Ministry of the Environment Japan (see appendix for
details).
Figure 2 shows the change in total energy consumption for the average household
Fig. 2 The change in the total energy consumption
2The threshold value in block pricing has been changed since 1999.
3We made seasonal adjustments for the CPI time series data.
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Fig. 3 Historical change in household energy expenditures Source “Consumption Expenditure”
from Family Income and Expenditure Survey (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications),
“Electricity”, “Natural Gas”, “LPG”, “Kerosene” and “Gasoline” from NSFIE. Note 1. “Consump-
tion Expenditure” is the average per month for all worker-households. Note 2. Using the 2011 GDP
deflator, we initially convert all nominal values into real values. We then convert Japanese yen into
US dollars, assuming that one USD is equivalent to 110 yen
in each prefecture in Japan from 1989 to 2014. The figure clearly shows that overall
energy consumption increased from 1989 to 2014.
3 Analysis
3.1 Historical Changes in Household Energy Expenditure
Figure 3 shows the historical changes in monthly consumption expenditures of all
worker-households and the expenditures for each type of energy (electricity, city gas,
LP gas, kerosene, and gasoline). Total monthly expenditures are shown by the bars
in the graph and are measured on the left vertical axis. The expenditures for each
type of energy are shown by the lines and are measured on the right vertical axis.
The line graphs show that all energy expenditures increased over the sampling
period.4 The figure further shows that expenditures for electricity and gasoline were
two to three times greater than for other types of energy throughout the sampling
4Even when the data are broken down by region, we confirm that monthly energy expenditures
increased in all regions.
222 N. Inoue et al.
period.5 This reflects the fact that as the Japanese economy has matured, many
households own and use a greater variety of electric appliances (e.g. air conditioners,
refrigerators, and TVs, etc.) and own private automobiles. Taking a closer look at
the changes in the expenditure for each type of energy, we find that expenditures for
kerosene increased by 2.1 times from1989 to 2014,while expenditures for electricity,
city gas, and gasoline increased about 1.5 times and expenditures for LP gas increased
about 1.3 times.
As shown by the bar graph, monthly total expenditures for the average Japanese
household increased only 1.1 times from 1989 to 2014, due to sluggish growth after
the end of the bubble economy. However, despite slowing growth in overall spending,
Japanese households did not reduce energy expenditures and still spend a substantial
amount of money on electricity and gasoline; the average household spends about
USD60–90 permonth. This amount ismuch larger than the amount spent for city gas,
LP gas, and kerosene; the expenditures for those energies are about USD 15–45 per
month. These facts suggest that the expenditures for electricity have been becoming
relatively more important for Japanese households in recent years.
3.2 Historical Change in Household Energy Consumption
Figure 4 presents the historical changes in average monthly energy consumption
for the average Japanese household, in terms of mega joules (MJ). Total energy
consumption per month is represented by the bars in the graph and is measured on
the right axis. Consumption for each type of energy is shown by the lines in the graph
and is measured on the left axis.
The figure shows that total energy consumption increased from 1989 to 1999,
then started to decline. Specifically, total energy consumption increased by about
6% from 1989 (7045 MJ) to 1999 (7453 MJ), then decreased to 5874 MJ in 2014.
The decrease from peak consumption in 1999 to 2014 is about a 21%.
Next, we look at the line graphs to examine the consumption change by energy
type. Electricity consumption has been increasing steadily since 1989; average
monthly consumption was 1.086 MJ in 1989 and rose to 1.467 MJ in 2014, an
increase of roughly 35%. In contrast, the consumption of city gas, LP gas and
kerosene decreased over the period. In particular, the decline in city gas consumption
is remarkable, decreasing from 1910MJ in 1989 to 837MJ in 2014, a 56% reduction.
As for LP gas and kerosene, LP gas decreased by 28% (from 194 MJ to 139 MJ),
and kerosene decreased by 25% (from 1669 MJ to 1256 MJ). Although gasoline
consumption increased from 1989 (2187 MJ) to 2004 (2690 MJ), it then started to
decline. Average monthly consumption in 2014 was 2175 MJ, a 19% reduction from
2004. These results suggest energy consumption in the household sector has been
declining since the 2000s.
5In all regions, expenditures for electricity and gasoline are higher than for other types of energy.
However, kerosene expenditures tend to be larger in cold regions.
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Fig. 4 Historical change in household energy consumption. Note 1 The total is the sum of
consumption for all types of energy
Energy consumption is primarily affected by energyprices6 and thus it is important
to know how energy prices have changed during the sample period. Below we report
the historic change in energy prices in Japan.
As mentioned in Sect. 2, electricity costs for Japanese households consist of a
“basic charge” and a “meter charge.” To determine the basic charge, Japanese power
companies use two types of systems: an ampere rating system and a basic charge
system.7 In the ampere rating system, households pay a base fee according to the
number of amperes contracted for with the power company. Households that want to
use many appliances at once are required to contract for a higher number of amperes.
In the basic charge system, households pay a minimum fixed fee regardless of their
electricity consumption level. Although the lowest base fee in the ampere system
and the minimum fixed fee in the basic charge system both remained between USD
2.4 and USD 3.0 during the sampling periods, since 2009 power companies have
rapidly increased the unit price for electricity applied in the meter charge.8 These
price increases are largely due to the rise in crude oil prices, the expansion of thermal
6All prices below, including electricity prices, have been converted to real values using a 2011-based
GDP deflator. USD 1 is assumed to JPN 110.
7Hokkaido Electric Power Company, Tohoku Electric Power Company, Tokyo Electric Power
Company,HokurikuElectric PowerCompany,ChubuElectric PowerCompany, andKyushuElectric
Power Company use the ampere rating system. Kansai Electric Power Company, Chugoku Electric
Power Company, Shikoku Electric Power Company, and Okinawa Electric Power Company use the
basic rate system.
8Japanese electric companies are increasingly using a block pricing system, in which the unit price
increases as consumption increases. For example, since 2009TokyoElectric Company has increased
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power generation caused by the shutdown of nuclear power plants after the Great
East Japan (Fukishima) Earthquake in 2011, and the promotion of renewable energy
sources.
Next, we summarize the changes in kerosene and gasoline prices. The price of
kerosene had remained around USD 0.35 per liter from 1989 to 2004, but increased
to USD 0.96 per liter between 2004 and 2014. A similar price increase was observed
for gasoline prices; the gasoline price had been around USD 1.03 per liter from 1989
to 2004, but had increased to USD 1.50 per liter by 2014. These price increases are
mainly caused by increases in crude oil prices.
Finally, we look at the price changes of city gas and LP gas. The minimum or
basic monthly charge for city gas had been set at less than USD 10 from 1989 to
1999, but exceeded USD 10 in the 2000s, and in 2014, the price reached to about
USD 13. Although the unit price of city gas was less than USD 1 per m3 in 1999,
it was approaching USD 2 per m3 in 2014. In contrast, the price of LP gas has not
changed much over the period we analyzed, remaining between USD 4.0–6.0 per m3
from 1989 to 2014.
From the analyses above, we can draw the following two important inferences.
First, prices for all types of energy have been rising in recent years. Second, Japan’s
household sector has become increasingly dependent on electricity over the years. In
1989, the shares of electricity, city gas, kerosene, LP gas, and gasoline as a percentage
of total energy consumption were 15.7%, 27.1%, 23.7%, 2.8%, and 31.0%, respec-
tively. However, the share of electricity rose sharply to 25.0% in 2014 while the share
of city gas dropped to 14.2% over that period. Clearly, Japan has already experienced
a rapid household electrification but this shift is expected to further advance in the
future.
3.3 Comparison of Energy Consumption Across Regions
We divide the country into 10 regions presented in Fig. 5 and compare monthly
energy consumption for the average household across these regions in Fig. 6.9,10
Total energy consumption is shown by the bars as measured on the right vertical
axis, while consumption by type of energy is shown by the line graphs, measured on
the left axis.
The bars show that the region with the highest overall energy consumption was
the Tohoku region, and that the average Tohoku household consumed 8452 MJ of
energy per month. Households in Hokuriku and Hokkaido regions were also high
its unit price by USD 0.02 per kWh in the initial block of 1–120 kWh and by USD 0.03 per kWh
in the block beyond 120 kWh.
9Prior to liberalization in 2016, the Japanese electricity market was a regional monopoly system.
We divided the country into 10 regions on the basis of the previous monopoly system.
10The value of each type of energy consumption presented in Fig. 11.5 is the average of the monthly
consumption from 1989 to 2014 for each region.
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energy consumers; Hokuriku households consumed an average of 8081 MJ while
the Hokkaido households consumed 8016 MJ of energy per month, on average. In
contrast, the lowest energy consumptionwas observed in theKansai region,where the
average household consumed only 5849 MJ.11 We can see that, energy consumption
is higher in northern regions than in southern regions, and that the difference between
the two is large.
Next, we compare energy consumption across regions by type. Figure 6 shows
there are large differences in kerosene consumption across regions. The Hokkaido
region had the highest kerosene usage (3416 MJ), the Tohoku region consumed
2646 MJ while the Hokuriku region consumed 1901 MJ. These three regions used
much larger amounts of kerosene than the other regions, most likely because these
three regions are located in the northern part of Japan where temperatures throughout
the year are lower than in other regions and kerosene-fueled oil stoves tend to be used
more frequently for space heating. As a result, kerosene consumption accounts for
42.6% of total energy consumption in the Hokkaido region and 31.3% in the Tohoku
region. These percentages are far greater than in other regions. This suggests that
carbon pricing would be a significant burden to households in the northern regions
since they use a large amount of kerosene for heating purposes. It is worth noting
that kerosene consumption has decreased in the southern part of Japan over the last
two decades and now accounts for only about 20% of total energy use.
There was no significant difference in the amount used for the remaining types of
energy across regions. The highest consumption of electricity, 1658 MJ per month,
was observed in Hokuriku region, while the lowest consumption of 1064 MJ was
observed in the Hokkaido region. The relatively large electricity consumption in the
Hokuriku region may be due to the relatively low cost of electricity provided by
Hokuriku Power Companies, which generates much of its electricity through hydro
power. The dependence on electricity as a percent of all energy sources was roughly
20% in all regions, except for Hokkaido (13.3%) and Tohoku (15.8%), where the
large usage of kerosene makes energy consumption patterns different than the other
regions.
Given the fact that many Japanese households rely heavily on electricity, it is
important to know how household electricity consumption responds to changes
in electricity prices. There are several studies that compare the price elasticity of
household electricity demand across regions in Japan. Tanishita (2009) used elec-
tricity consumption data at the prefectural capital level from 1986 to 2006 and
conducted a panel data analysis. They calculated electricity consumption by dividing
the electricity bill by the unit electricity price and estimated short-run price elas-
ticity at approximately −0.9 to −0.5, and long-run price elasticity at about −2.7
to −1.0. They also estimated price elasticities for each region and confirmed that
Hokkaido, Tohoku, Hokuriku, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu have relatively low
price elasticities, while Kanto, Kansai, and Chubu have relatively high price elas-
ticities. Mizobata et al. (2011) used electricity consumption data for multi-person
11Households in the Kanto region, including Tokyo, used 6444 MJ, one of the lowest consumption
levels.
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households from 1986 to 2010 and conducted a panel data analysis. They estimated
the price elasticity of electricity for each power company region and reported a
large variation in the price elasticity of demand for electricity across regions. They
reported that short-run price elasticity ranged from −0.96 in the Hokuriku region to
−0.28 in the Chubu region, while the long-run price elasticity ranged from−2.30 in
the Hokuriku region to −0.95 in the Chubu region.12
Although the averageprice elasticity of demand for electricity in Japan as indicated
in the above mentioned studies is similar to the averages found in previous studies
conducted outside Japan (Espey and Espey 2004), there is a huge variation across
regions within the country.
As for city gas, households in the Tohoku region consumed the greatest amount,
1744MJpermonth,while those in theHokkaido region consumed the lowest amount,
1064 MJ. The dependence on city gas was about 20% in all regions except in
the Hokkaido region. As for LP gas, households in the Kanto region consumed
the greatest amount, 180 MJ while those in the Hokkaido region consumed the
lowest amount, 116MJ.With respect to gasoline, households in the Hokuriku region
consumed the greatest amount, 2881MJ per month, while those in the Kansai region
consumed the lowest amount of gasoline, 2132MJ per month. There is no significant
difference in LP gas or gasoline consumption between the regions; the percentage
of energy consumption using LP gas is about 2–3% while that of gasoline is about
30–40%.
3.4 Household Income and Energy Consumption
Since household energy consumption depends not only on price but also on house-
hold income, in this sub-section we examine the relationship between household
income and energy consumption. For this purpose, we classified households into
seven income classes: (1) less than 2.0million yen per year, (2) 2.0million yen to less
than 3.5 million yen, (3) 3.5 million yen to less than 5.0 million yen, (4) 5.0 million
yen to less than 7.0 million yen, (5) 7.0 million yen to less than 10.0 million yen,
(6) 10.0 million to less than 15 million yen, and (7) 15 million yen or more. We then
calculated the monthly energy consumption of the average household in each income
category. Income distribution among Japanese households is presented in Fig. 7.
Figure 8 shows the monthly energy consumption in each income category.13 Total
energy consumption is presented by the bars and is measure on the right axis, and
energy consumption per type of energy is presented by the lines, measured on the
left axis.
12The estimated price elasticity is similar to findings in studies conducted in other countries (Espey
and Espey 2004; Narayana et al. 2007; Krishnamurthy and Kriström 2015).
13The energy consumption presented in Fig. 11.6 is the monthly energy consumption averaged over
between 1989 and 2014.
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Fig. 8 Household income and energy consumption
Figure 8 shows that total energy consumption generally increases as income rises.
Average energy consumption was 5853 MJ in the lowest income group and slightly
less, at 5565 MJ, in the second lowest category. Thereafter, energy use increased
with income; the average monthly energy consumption of the highest income group
was 9181 MJ.
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We can see that monthly consumption of each type of energy follows the same
pattern as total energy consumption. This suggests that there is an overall positive
relationship between household income and energy consumption for each type of
energy.
Next, we discuss the relationship between household income and relative
consumption of each type of energy. The data clearly show that the ratio of elec-
tricity to total energy consumption increases as income increases. In contrast, we
observe an inverted U-shaped relationship between household income and the ratios
of the remaining types of energy to total energy consumption. For example, the ratio
of gasoline consumption to total energy consumption initially increases as household
income increases, then reaches a peak when annual household income is between
JPY 7-10 million. After that, the ratio starts to decline. In the case of city gas, the
ratio rises initially, then starts to decrease after annual household income reaches JPY
3.5–5 million. The ratio of LP gas to total energy consumption, and also kerosene,
start declining once household income reaches JPY 2.0–3.5 million. These results
show that electricity dependence increases consistently as income increases, but
dependence on the remaining types of energy peak, and then decline after house-
hold income reaches a certain threshold. This suggests that as their income levels
rise, households allocate additional more of that income to purchase of appliances,
computers and other devices that require electricity to power them. This phenomenon
is not observed for LP gas, kerosene, or city gas. Indeed, high-income households
consume relatively less of those types of energy compared to middle-income house-
holds. Households use these energies primarily for heating and cooking, but energy
consumption for such purposes does not increase significantly with income rise.
Otsuka et al. (2013) estimated price and income elasticity of demand for elec-
tricity. When a model that includes a lag term is used, they found that short-run price
elasticity was −0.483 while long-run price elasticity was −1.541, while short-run
income elasticity was estimated to be 0.086 while long-run income elasticity was
0.273. They found that the Hokkaido region had the lowest response to price change
while the Hokuriku region had the highest response. In addition, they reported that
income elasticity was highest in the Kyushu region and lowest in the Kanto region.
Using micro-level data from the Survey on Carbon Dioxide Emission from House-
holds (SCDEH), Onuma et al. (2019) estimated the income elasticity of demand
for electricity after controlling for appliance ownership. According to their esti-
mates, the income elasticity of demand for electricity among Japanese households
is approximately 0.07. Espey and Espey (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of 36
studies published between 1971 and 2000 and reported that short-run income elas-
ticities ranged between 0.04 and 3.48 in previous studies. They further found that
the short-run elasticity tends to be lower when controlling for appliance ownership.
Their results suggest the income elasticity of Japanese households similar to that
of other countries. In addition, Onuma et al. (2019) compared the price elasticity
of electricity demand across different income categories and found that it has an
inverted U-shaped. In other words, price elasticity increases until income rises to a
certain level and then decreases.
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3.5 Household Characteristics and Energy Consumption
Here we examine the relationship between household characteristics and energy
consumption.We focus specifically on two types of household characteristics: family
composition and age of the head of household. Japan is facing a declining birth rate
and aging population; in 2019 the percentage of the country’s population aged 65 and
older was over 28% (Cabinet Office Japan 2019). The declining birth rate and aging
population are affecting the family structure, and the proportion of married couples
without children and elderly single-person households relative to all households has
been increasing in recent years. Although the Japanese government has introduced
various policy measures to address the problems of the declining birthrate and aging
population, those policies have not yet been successful. Thus, it is important to know
how household energy consumption relates to family composition and the age of the
head of household.
We classify households into nine types and calculate monthly energy consump-
tion of each type. The average energy consumption across all households was
6843 MJ in 2014. Households composed of a couple with one child consumed an
average of 6800 MJ of energy per month, which is very close to the overall average
amount. Larger households consumed much more energy. Three-generation house-
holds composed of a couple with their children and their parents consumed 9028 MJ
per month, while households composed of a couple with three or more children
consumed 7544 MJ per month. Households composed of a couple with two chil-
dren, or a couple with their parents consumed slightly more energy than average; the
former consumed 7097 MJ and the latter consumed 7459 MJ per month. In contrast,
consumption by single-person, single-parent, and couple-only households consumed
much less energy, using 4563 MJ, 5584 MJ, and 5822 MJ per month, respectively.
It is natural to expect energy consumption to increase as household size increases.
However, it is worth noting that there is an economy of scale in household energy
consumption. Household members share some energy services and therefore energy
consumption per capita decreases as family size increases.
The same trendwas observed for energy consumption by type of energy as for total
energy consumption. Single-person, couple-only, and single-parent households all
consume less energy than average across all types. However, we find that households
composed of a couple with children or parents consumed more kerosene than other
types of households.14
The usage of each type of energy as a percent of the total energy consumption was
35–40% for gasoline and 15–25% for electricity, kerosene and city gas. However,
single households tended to consume relatively more gasoline and kerosene than
14Energy consumptions of single-person household were 721MJ for electricity, 693MJ for city gas,
102 MJ for LP gas, 1273 MJ for kerosene, and 1775 MJ for gasoline. Consumption for couple-only
household were 1223 MJ for electricity, 1111 MJ for city gas, 137 MJ for LP gas, 1332 MJ for
kerosene, and 2019MJ for gasoline. Those of single-parent household were 1169MJ for electricity,
1235 MJ for city gas, 147 MJ for LP gas, 1188 MJ for kerosene, and 1845 MJ for gasoline.
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other households. In contrast, their electricity consumption is relatively lower than
in other types of households.
Next, we examine the relationship between energy consumption and the age of
the head of household. We categorize households into six age groups: (1) up to
29 years old, (2) 30–39 years old, (3) 40–49 years old, (4) 50–59 years old, (5)
60–69 years old, and (6) 70 years old and older. We then calculate average monthly
energy consumption for each age group.
Wefind that energy consumption increases fromhouseholds headed by those in the
youngest age groups to those in themiddle age groups, then decreases from themiddle
to the oldest age groups. Specifically, energy consumption increases from 5245 MJ
for households where the head of household is age 29 or younger to 7437 MJ where
the head of household is age 50–59. This pattern can be explained by an individual’s
life cycle. Households headed by younger adults typically live in small houses and
do not own many energy-consuming appliances. However, as family size increases
for adults in their 30s and 40s, the number of energy-consuming appliances and the
frequency of use increases. When adults are in their 50s and children typically leave
the household, the family size decreases and the use of energy-consuming appliances
begin to decrease.
Finally, we compare consumption of each type of energy across different head
of household age groups. The result reveals that households rely on electricity
and kerosene more as the age of the head of household increase. Previous studies
have shown that seniors prefer warmer room temperature and use more energy for
space heating, and the higher electricity and kerosene consumption by households
headed by older adults reflect this. In contrast, we find that households headed by
seniors consume proportionately less gasoline, city gas and LP gas than households
headed by younger adults. This makes sense, as seniors tend to drive less and thus
consume less gasoline. Although both city and LP gases are used for cooking, seniors
cook less often than young or middle-age heads of households, explaining why gas
consumption declines in households headed by seniors.
4 Conclusion
Although the carbon tax rate is currently low in Japan, it could be increased in
the near future. A carbon tax solely based on carbon content is an economically
efficient that would provide an incentive to reduce energy use, but it may impose
very different burdens across regions and types of households. In this study, we
used household energy consumption data from NSFE to examine (1) how household
energy consumption has changedover time, (2) howenergydependence differs across
regions, and (3) howenergy consumption patterns vary across households. The results
of our analyses reveal that the burden of a higher carbon tax based on carbon content
would vary widely between regions and households.
Although households living in cold regions use more kerosene for space heating
in winter time than households in warmer regions, the tax rate for kerosene had
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been set at much lower rate than for other forms of energy. If the energy tax is
increased simply based on carbon content, the burden among rural households in
cold regions could become much larger. Given that kerosene is indispensable for
these households, countermeasures to reduce the burden would be necessary. One
potential approach would be to differentiate a basic deduction based on weather
conditions; the government increases the base deduction in cold regions for space
heating in wintertime while it decreases it in warm regions. If such a countermeasure
was applied, regional equity could be insured without increasing the pre-existing
distortion of the energy tax.
We also show that although electrification has progressed among Japanese house-
holds over the past 25 years, the level of electrification differs according to household
income levels. Low-income households still depend primarily on kerosene and gas
and we need to carefully examine the effect of a carbon tax on the prices of these
forms of energy. Previous studies in Japan have focused on electricity demand and
studies that include demand for kerosene and gas are lacking. Obviously, such studies
are needed.
It is expected that the average age of Japanese householdswill continue to increase
and the size of householdswill shrink. Elderly people drive less and thus consume less
gasoline. Therefore, an aging population will result in lower gasoline consumption.
However, an aging population may increase energy consumption inside the home
since elderly people spendmore time at home and use more energy for space heating.
Given the fact that higher income, healthy seniors are able to go out but poor and
unhealthy older people are likely to stay at home, it may be necessary to reconsider
the taxation of energy use at home versus energy use outside home. Finally, we
confirmed that household size significantly affects energy efficiency, with smaller
households exhibiting less energy efficiency. Although aging is expected to increase
the number of single-person households, it may be worth considering a preferential
tax treatment to encourage seniors to live with their adult children or with other
seniors.
Appendix
Conversion from Physical Units to Energy Units
We converted energy consumption given in physical units to energy units (mega
joules (MJ)), using the following table (Table 1).
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Table 1 Conversion from
physical unit to energy unit
Type of energy Conversion rate
Electricity 3.6 MJ/kWh
City gas 44.8 MJ/m3
LP gas 50.8 MJ/kg
Kerosene 36.7 MJ/L
Gasoline 34.6 MJ/L
Light oil 37.7 MJ/L
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Chapter 13
Double Dividend of the Carbon Tax
in Japan: Can We Increase Public
Support for Carbon Pricing?
Kenji Asakawa, Kouichi Kimoto, Shiro Takeda, and Toshi H. Arimura
Abstract Carbon pricing is difficult to introduce in many countries because it is not
easy to obtain public support for carbon pricing due to the burden associated with it.
Oneway to overcome this difficulty is to rely on the double dividend of a carbon tax. If
a government uses revenue from a carbon tax to reduce existing distorting taxes, such
as corporate taxes or labor taxes, a carbon tax can improve economic efficiency while
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This chapter examines the net burden of
a carbon tax with revenue recycling (RR) for two types of stakeholders: firms and
households. Using dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling, we
examine the carbon prices needed to achieve the emission targets set for 2030 and
2050. Then, we simulate two types of RR: corporate tax reduction and a reduction in
social security payments. We compare the benefit of the tax reduction to the increase
in the burden from the carbon tax in scenarios for 2030/2050. In the scenario of
corporate tax reduction, by selecting firms from the land transportation sector and
power sector, we examine how profit changes due to the carbon tax. We find that the
tax burden for a firm in the land transportation sector can be eased greatly with the
corporate tax reduction. In the scenario of the social security payment reduction, we
find that some households are better off under carbon pricing despite expenditure
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increases due to the carbon tax. Thus, we show that RR can increase support for the
carbon tax.
1 Introduction
Carbon pricing is known as the most efficient way to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions in an economy. As shown in the previous chapters, carbon pricing
at the regional level in Japan, namely, the Tokyo emissions trading system (ETS)
(Chap. 6) and Saitama ETS (Chap. 7), has been successfully reducing GHG emis-
sions. The national government, however, has not introduced an ETS. Moreover, the
carbon tax introduced at the national level in 2012 was only 289 yen per ton of CO2
(Chap. 1), which is equivalent to 0.78 yen per liter of gasoline.
In Japan, the current level of the carbon tax is still not enough to achieve the
long-term emission reduction goal set for 2050 (Chap. 1); thus, it is expected that the
government will increase the tax rate (or introduce a nationwide emissions trading
scheme) in the near future. However, when increasing the carbon tax, policymakers
often face strong opposition from various stakeholders, who bear the burden of
the direct price increase due to carbon pricing (Carattini et al. 2017). Overall, the
opposition from the economic sector ismost prominent. The economic cost, however,
can be eased if the revenue from carbon pricing is used wisely. For example, if the
revenue of the carbon tax is used to reduce the corporate tax, we can expect an
expansion in investment because the net return of the investment increases as the
corporate tax rate is reduced. This increase in investment will lead to an increase in
production and hence an increase in the GDP. Alternatively, governments can use
the revenue of the carbon tax to reduce the social security burden of employers. In
this case, we can expect an increase in employment, which also leads to an increase
in the GDP through an expansion in production activities. In this way, the revenue
recycling (RR) of the carbon tax can lead to economic growth.
This revenue recycling process is known as the “double dividend” of carbon
pricing1. When the gains from RR offset the cost of the price increase due to carbon
pricing, GDP or welfare can improve to a level better than that without carbon
pricing. The introduction of carbon pricing with RR is also known as “environmental
tax reform” because environmental tax (carbon tax) revenue is used to reduce the
existing distorting tax. A carbon tax with RR can even increase the GDP or welfare
if the strong double dividend holds.
Various studies have investigated the possibility of the double dividend. Saveyn
et al. (2011) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the EU and
investigated the impacts of carbon regulations on economies. They found a double
dividend when permit revenues are used to reduce the social security contribution
1There are two types of double dividends.When the net gain is positive, it is referred to as the “strong
double dividend”. Otherwise, it is known as the “weak double-dividend”. See Goulder (1995) for
the details.
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of employees. Carbone et al. (2013) developed a dynamic CGE model for the US
economy and found a double dividend when recycling revenues are used to reduce
capital taxes (i.e., corporate taxes or personal income taxes on interest, dividends,
or capital gains). Jorgenson et al. (2013) also examined the possibility of a double
dividend by developing a CGE model for the US economy and found a double
dividend when carbon tax revenues are used to reduce capital tax. Furthermore,
Pereira et al. (2016) constructed a dynamic CGE model for Portugal and examined
the carbon tax policy. They found a double dividend when carbon tax revenues are
used for the policy, including the cut in social security contribution and personal
income taxes. Thus, researchers validated the idea of the double dividend for several
countries with economic models. One can refer to Freire-González (2017) for the
literature of the double dividend
The idea of the double dividend has been adopted in the reforms of other coun-
tries. When Germany adopted energy tax reform in 1999, tax revenue was used to
reduce statutory pension contributions (Beuermann and Santarius 2006). The United
Kingdom adopted this idea as well (Agnolucci 2009). Recently, the province of
British Columbia in Canada has adopted this idea. They used carbon tax revenue to
reduce corporate taxes and successfully achieve economic growth andGHGemission
reduction (Yamazaki 2017).
In the case of Japan, using a CGE model, Takeda (2007) shows the possibility of
double dividends using RR for corporate taxes. Lee et al. (2015) also assesses the
double dividend for the Japanese economy using a macroeconometric model. More
recently, to achieve the long-term goal of emission reduction, Takeda and Arimura
(2020) characterize the nature of the double dividend for the Japanese economy and
confirm that corporate tax reduction using carbon tax revenue can lead to economic
growth by 2030. However, even if economic growth is achieved at the macro level,
the tax burden varies among strong stakeholders. Some may win or some may lose.
To increase public support for the carbon tax with RR, it is useful to illustrate
how the tax burden can be eased with RR. To address the concerns of industrial
stakeholders, it is important for policy makers to show how much tax burden would
be reduced for each sector.However, it is often the case that firmswouldnot appreciate
an analysis conducted at the sector level. Industrial stakeholders often want to see
the results of an analysis at the firm level showing how their profit would be affected
by the carbon tax with RR (IGES 2016). Thus, by selecting specific firms from two
sectors, this chapter investigates how the profit would change under the carbon tax
with RR in 2050.
Another important stakeholder that affects the public support of carbon pricing
is households. The tax burden from carbon pricing can be eased with RR. There are
several ways to improve the economic efficiency of household behavior through RR.
One way to do so is to use carbon tax revenue to reduce social security payments. In
this case, households have incentives to increase their labor supply. Moreover, under
this scenario, households’ payments to social security would decrease, and hence,
households may be better off even with the increase in the carbon tax burden. We
investigate whether this can be case for the Japanese economy while aiming for a
long-term reduction in CO2.
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The analysis in this chapter is conducted in the following way. First, we conduct a
CGE analysis of carbon pricing needed to reach the 2050 long-term reduction target.
We calculate the carbon tax rate necessary to achieve the 2030 and 2050 targets. In this
simulation, wemake several assumptions. In the BAU scenario (where the carbon tax
is not introduced), we adopted the current policies scenario inWorld EnergyOutlook
2018 (IEA 2018), i.e., an average annual GDP growth rate of 0.7% and an average
CO2 emission reduction rate of 0.6%. By employing the CGEmodel, we can identify
the output for each sector in 2050 and use the results for the simulation for corporate
tax reduction.We also use the tax revenue obtained fromCGEmodeling to determine
the size of a feasible corporate tax reduction. Regarding the social security payment
reduction scenario, we use carbon pricing needed to achieve the 2030 target. Again,
we use the CGE simulation results to calculate a social security payment reduction
that is feasible with the carbon tax revenue. Furthermore, we use the results from
the input-output analysis conducted by Kameoka & Arimura (2019) to identify the
increase in household expenditures. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the CGE model used to calculate the macro outcome of the carbon tax to
achieve the 2050 long-term goal. In Sect. 3, we analyze the impacts of the corporate
tax reduction under the carbon tax on firms in selected sectors. Section 4 examines the
impacts of the social security tax reduction under carbon tax reform on households.
The final section concludes the chapter by discussing public support for carbon
pricing.
2 A Dynamic CGE Model for the 2050 Long-Term Target
and the Results
2.1 A CGE Model
We use a dynamic CGE model for the Japanese economy, which is constructed in
Takeda and Arimura (2020), and analyze the impacts of environmental tax reform
under a scenario that includes the long-term emission reduction target for the year
2050. Using the CGE model, we derive the quantitative impacts of environmental
tax reform on aspects of the macroeconomy, such as the GDP, national income and
tax revenue, including carbon tax revenue. In addition, we calculate the sectoral
impacts such as the output and price of individual sectors. These results are used in
later sections. In this section, we explain the simulation based on the CGE model.
Because of space limitations, we provide only a brief summary of the analysis. The
complete description of the analysis is presented in Takeda and Arimura (2020). For
details, see this article.
Our model is a forward-looking dynamic general equilibrium model for the
Japanese economy. To perform a CGE analysis, we need to construct a benchmark
dataset. For this, we use 2011 input-output data on Japan (MIC 2016). To analyze
CO2 regulations, we also need CO2 emissions data associated with the energy use
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of production sectors and households. For CO2 emissions data, we use the 3EID
(EmbodiedEnergy andEmission IntensityData for JapanUsing Input-OutputTables)
dataset (Nansai et al. 2018). Our model is a general equilibriummodel with 49 goods
and 39 sectors including 14 energy goods and four electricity sectors. We aggregate
the original input-output (IO) data for Japan and create the aggregated datasets. To
analyze the role of energy goods in detail, we highly disaggregate the energy goods
and sectors. Basically, one sector produces one good. However, some sectors, such as
the petroleum goods sector and coal products sector, produce multiple energy goods.
Moreover, some goods, such as electricity, are produced by multiple sectors. Thus,
there is not always a one-to-one relation between goods and sectors.
All markets are perfectly competitive, and all agents behave as price takers. We
assume that all producers have “constant returns to scale” technology, and producers
maximize their profit by choosing the quantity of output and input (primary factors
and intermediate inputs).We employ two types of production functions: the fossil fuel
production function and the nonfossil fuel production function. Fossil fuel production
activities include the extraction of coal, crude oil, and natural gas. However, nonfossil
fuel production activities are used for all other sectors, including the electricity sector.
To represent the demand side of the economy, we use a representative house-
hold. The period utility (utility in a period) of the representative household depends
on consumption and leisure. Because it is under a budget constraint, the house-
hold chooses values for consumption, leisure and saving (= investment) that will
maximize lifetime utility, which is the sum of discounted period utility. Household
income consists of primary factor income minus tax payments. In this model, the
household labor supply is determined by the choice between leisure and labor supply.
Thus, labor supply is an endogenous variable. The decreasing population of Japan
is captured by the decreasing endowment of time that the representative household
can use for leisure and work.
For CGE analyses on climate change policy, a recursive dynamic model is often
used. In a recursive dynamic model, investment is determined by myopic agents and
thus not affected by policy changes in the future (only affected by the past and current
policy). In this analysis, we would like to analyze a scenario in which corporate tax is
reduced. To capture the effects of a change in corporate tax, we use a forward-looking
dynamic model used in the macroeconomic literature. In a forward-looking model,
investment is determined by the dynamic optimization behavior of the household, and
the capital stock owned by the household accumulates gradually through investment.
Our model covers a long time span (from 2011 to 2050). In the model that aims to
analyze climate change policy in the long run, technology improvement and new tech-
nology can play important roles. To capture these factors, we consider the following
technology improvement and new technology. First, we assume total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) growth for every production sector. TFP here means the efficiency of the
inputs of primary factors, and it is captured by a parameter in the production func-
tions. In addition, we assume autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI)
for energy inputs in production and consumption. These technology improvements
are assumed to be exogenous. Second, we assume that electricity is generated not
only by conventional energy (fossil fuel, hydropower and nuclear energy) but also by
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renewable energy. Although the supply of electricity by renewable energy is limited
at first due to its high cost, it increases gradually as the price of electricity rises.
Third, we consider carbon capture and storage (CCS) activity. CCS activity is
modeled as an independent production activity that uses production factors and inter-
mediate inputs. As electricity can be generated by the use of renewable energy, CCS
activity is not supplied at first because it is not profitable. However, the increase in
carbon prices caused by carbon regulation makes CCS activity profitable, and the
amount of CCS will gradually increase. Due to the existence of CCS activity, we
calculate net CO2 emissions as gross CO2 emissions minus CCS.
Although ourmodel focuses on Japan,we need to consider international tradewith
other regions. Tomodel international trade, we employ the small country assumption,
where the terms of trade of Japan are kept constant. In addition, we use the so-called
Armington assumption, which means that imported goods are imperfect substitutes
of domestic goods. To incorporate the Armington assumption, we use the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) function to aggregate imported and domestic goods.
In the simulation, we analyze the regulation of CO2 emissions. To regulate CO2
emissions, we use a carbon tax. The carbon tax generates additional revenue for the
government, andwe consider the following two uses. First, we assume that carbon tax
revenue is directly rebated to the representative household. Second, we assume that
carbon tax revenue is used to reduce existing taxes such as the income tax, corporate
tax and consumption tax. The latter case indicates environmental tax reform (the
combination of a carbon tax and the reduction in existing taxes). We assume that
the (net) CO2 emissions in Japan are reduced by 80% by 2050, which is the actual
reduction target of Japan. CO2 emissions are gradually reduced to achieve the target
level in 2050.
2.2 Scenarios
In this subsection, we explain the scenarios employed in the simulation. Table 1 lists
the scenarios. The BAU scenario is a reference scenario where no (explicit) carbon
regulation is executed. In the other three scenarios from LMP to COR, a carbon tax
is adopted to regulate CO2 emissions. In scenario LMP, we assume that carbon tax
revenue is rebated to the household in a lump-sum way. In the other two scenarios,
carbon tax revenue is used to reduce the existing taxes. In scenario SSC, we reduce




BAU Reference scenario (without carbon tax)
LMP Carbon tax + lump-sum rebate
SSC Carbon tax + social security contribution cut
COR Carbon tax + corporate tax cut
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Table 2 Simulation results of a dynamic CGE
LMP SSC COR
2030 GDP −0.59 −0.10 0.38
Income −0.83 −0.34 0.44
Carbon tax revenue 10,287 10,651 10,364
Rebated revenue 0 7,634 6,707
2050 GDP −2.06 −1.44 −0.95
Income −2.93 −2.25 −1.51
Carbon tax revenue 14,055 14,403 14,499
Rebated revenue 0 8,509 7,480
GDP, Income → %
Carbon tax revenue and rebated revenue → billion yen
contribution of the employer is not a tax. However, it is similar to a tax on labor
because employers have to contribute to the social security of their employees. The
reduction in the social security contribution will stimulate employment and the labor
supply, thereby increasing production. The results of scenario SSC are presented in
Sect. 4.
Scenario COR assumes that the carbon tax revenue is used to reduce the corpo-
rate tax. The corporate tax in this model is a tax on return on capital.2 Therefore,
the reduction in the corporate tax stimulates investment (accumulation of capital
stock), thereby increasing production. The results from scenario COR are discussed
in Sect. 3.
2.3 Simulation Results
Although our simulation derives various quantitative economic impacts, we present
only the results relevant for the analyses in later sections. Table 2 reports the simu-
lation results. “GDP” and “Income” indicate the percentage change in the GDP
and national income caused by the values (%) used in scenario BAU in 2030 and
2050. “Carbon tax revenue” indicates carbon tax revenue (billion yen), and “Rebated
revenue” (billion yen) indicates howmuch the existing taxes are reduced. In scenario
LMP, carbon tax revenue is rebated directly to the household, and the value of the
“rebated revenue” is zero. Carbon tax revenue is used to reduce the existing taxes
in scenarios SSC and COR. The value of the “rebated revenue” is less than that of
“carbon tax revenue” because carbon regulation decreases other tax revenue (revenue,
for example, from the income tax, consumption tax and so on), and we cannot use
all of the carbon tax for reducing the existing taxes.
2In the CGE analysis, “profit” is captured as payment toward capital. Thus, the corporate tax is
understood as a tax on the return on capital.
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Let us examine the results. In scenario LMP, the carbon tax decreases the GDP
and income in 2050 by 2.06% and 2.93%, respectively. This is the pure impact of
CO2 regulation, and this result indicates that an 80% reduction in CO2 has large
negative macroeconomic impacts on the Japanese economy. The GDP and income
also decrease in SSC. However, the size of the decrease is less than that in scenario
LMP. This is because scenario SSC with the reduction in the social security contri-
bution generates a RR effect that increases employment and the labor supply. This
RR effect offsets some of the negative impacts of CO2 regulations, thus reducing the
decrease in GDP and income.
Similarly, in scenario COR, the GDP and income decrease in 2050, and as in
scenario SSC, the size of the decrease in the GDP and income is less than that in the
previous simulation. However, CO2 regulation in scenario COR has positive impacts
on the GDP and income in 2030; in other words, we have the strong double dividend
effect in scenario COR in 2030. This is because the RR effect in scenario COR
significantly stimulates investment and thereby increases the GDP and income.
Finally, let us see the value of the carbon tax. Carbon regulations generate carbon
tax revenue of approximately 10 trillion yen in 2030 and 14 trillion yen in 2050. In
scenarios SSC and COR, a part of this carbon tax revenue is used to reduce social
security contributions and corporate taxes. These values are used in a later section.
In Sect. 3, we evaluate the impacts of RR on individual sectors in detail. For
that analysis, we use other simulation results not shown in this section, for example,
impacts on sectoral outputs and prices.Due to space limitations,weomit these results.
3 Double Dividend Through Corporate Tax Reduction
This section discusses the impact of the corporate tax reduction under the carbon
tax reform examined in the previous section. We focus on the financial impacts on
selected industries. The most common method for assessing the impact of carbon
pricing on industry is employing economic simulation models to quantify the impact
on each industrial sector. The information regarding the overall impact on each
sector obtained through this method can be useful for planning measures such as tax
exemptions.
However, carbon pricing has often been understood only as a short-term increase
in the cost of energy and raw materials for firms (IGES 2016). This is also true even
if the economic simulation models predict the possibility of some sectors having
increased profits or a very small negative impact on profits. Individual firms are
rarely aware that profits can increase as a result of a positive economic effect and the
tax RR effect. These firms can understand the benefit of RR only after they see the
simulation for each individual firm.
We analyze the financial impact of carbon pricing on individual firms by reflecting
the effects of the carbon tax predicted by the economic simulation model in Sect. 2.
In the analysis, we build on the results provided in Sect. 2.
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Fig. 1 Methodology used to assess the results of the economic simulationmodel on firm accounting
3.1 Analysis Method
1. Analysis indicators and methodology
This analysis assumes that the carbon tax proposed in Sect. 2 is employed and
examines the financial impact on individual firms. To indicate financial performance,
we employ operating profit (or operating loss) and the operating profit ratio.3
Figure 1 shows the methodology used to calculate the results of the economic
simulation model (CGE model) that is described in Sect. 2 on firm accounting.
As shown in Fig. 1, first, data on the sales and operating expenses, which are
the two factors to calculate the operating profit, were obtained from the financial
disclosure reports of the firms targeted for the analysis. Data on the energy cost,
which is a part of the operating expenses, and the consumption structure of each type
of energy were obtained from the corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports of
the targeted firms.
Next, for each sector, each component of the operating profit, i.e., the production
amount, energy cost by energy type, and corporate tax cost, was calculated from 2020
to 2050 (in 10-year intervals) by applying the growth rate from 2017 calculated by
3Operating profit and the operating profit ratio are the financial indicators of the core business of
the firm and affect its decision-making; they are not affected by financial factors unrelated to the
core business, such as the corporate tax. Therefore, even if the collection of a carbon tax results
in a reduction of the corporate tax, operating profit and the operating profit ratio would remain
unchanged. To overcome this issue, this analysis includes in its calculations the corporate tax
reduction in addition to the variation in operating profit. In this way, the analysis compares the
impact of the corporate tax reduction when there is a decrease in operating profit.
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2.30 40,000 1540,000 30,000 1470,000 10,000
Electric
power
4.40 110,000 2,600,000 710,000 1,770,000 20,000
Note regarding land transportation, operating costs apart from “Energy purchasing costs”, such as
vehicle depreciation costs, leasing costs, etc. are included in “Other operational costs”
the CGE model simulation in Sect. 2. We use data from 2017 as the reference year.
For instance, the growth rate of the production in each sector was used to calculate the
sales and the wages/administrative cost. The growth rate of the intermediate inputs,
energy costs and the coporate tax paid in each sector were used to calculate the raw
material cost, energy cost and corporate tax, respectively.
2. Scenarios and the target sectors
To analyze the effects of the carbon tax as well as the tax RR effect, the following
two scenarios were analyzed. One is a scenario where a carbon tax is not introduced
(BAU). Another is a scenario where a carbon tax is introduced, and tax revenue is
used to reduce the corporate tax (COR).
Out of the 17 sectors that are included in the economic simulation models (CGE
models) in Sect. 2, we target the land transportation sector and the electric power
sector. These two sectors were chosen for this analysis for two reasons. First, the
firms in these sectors focus on the activities in that sector and do not conduct business
activities in other sectors. In this sense, they are highly homogeneous. Second, these
two sectors could be directly affected by the carbon tax because they use a large
amount of fossil fuel.
3. Firms targeted for analysis
We target one firm from each sector chosen for the analysis, as shown in Table 3.
We selected firms that mainly focused on their own main sector and conducted few
activities in other sectors.4
4For example, firms in the paper and pulp industry often are involved in business activities outside
the paper and pulp industry. In this case, the analysis of the carbon tax burden becomes complex.
We avoid those sectors.
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3.2 Impacts of the Corporate Tax Reduction Under a Carbon
Tax on the Selected Sectors
To assess the effect of this corporate tax reduction on operating profit, a comparative
analysis between the BAU and COR scenarios was carried out for the year 2050
focusing on the profits and losses resulting from the carbon tax (Figs. 2 and 3).
1. Land transportation sector
Figure 2 illustrates how profit changes due to the carbon tax and the corporate tax
reduction for a firm in the land transportation sector. The increase in energy costs due
to the carbon tax equals 38.6% of the operating profit in scenario BAU. However,
the increase is neutralized by other profits, namely, increased profit from an increase
in sales. Thus, the reduction in the operating cost is 29.4% before the corporate tax
reduction.
In the COR scenario, however, the reduction in the corporate tax will financially
help the firm financially by the amount of 10.9% of the profit. Consequently, the
profit loss is reduced to 18.5%. The corporate tax reduction significantly eases the
economic burden.
2. Electric power
Figure 3 illustrates how profit changes due to the carbon tax and the corporate tax
reduction for a firm in the electric power sector. The increase in energy costs due to
the carbon tax equals 52.2% of the operating profit in scenario BAU. However, the
Impacts on operating profit








Operating profit                 Energy cost               Other proft and loss          
(BAU)                                                                                                            (COR)
Operating profit         Corporate tax reduction
Fig. 2 Comparative analysis of operating profits in the BAU and COR scenarios (Land transport
in 2050)
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Impacts on operating profit








Operating profit                Energy cost               Other proft and loss          Operating profit         Corporate tax reduction
(BAU)                                                                                                            (COR)
Fig. 3 Comparative analysis of the operating profits in the BAU and COR scenarios (electric power
in 2050)
increase is neutralized by other profits, namely, increased profit from an increase in
sales. Thus, the operating cost is reduced by 33.5%before the corporate tax reduction.
In the COR scenario, however, the reduction in the corporate tax will financially
help the firm by the amount of 1.6% of the profit. Consequently, the profit loss is
31.9%. The corporate tax reduction eases the economic burden only slightly in this
case compared to the case of land transport.
3.3 Discussion on the Corporate Tax Reduction
Our analysis shows that the increase in energy costs is neutralized by the corporate
tax reduction in the COR scenario to a certain degree, although the operating profit
decreases as a result of the carbon tax. Thus, we confirm the benefits of the double
dividend policy for industry stakeholders. By showing these results, we may be able
to obtain more public support for carbon pricing from industry stakeholders.
We would like to note that the benefit of the corporate tax reduction depends on
the size of the corporate tax on the operating profit. It is expected that the effect
of the corporate tax reduction on profit will increase as the ratio of the corporate
tax to operating profit increases. Moreover, the costs resulting from the carbon tax
increase as the level of carbon intensity increases. When we consider these two
factors together in the COR scenario, the net cost of the carbon tax would follow the
patterns shown in Table 3. In fact, firms in some sectors, such as the service sector,
may earn more “profit” when the effect of the tax reduction is larger than the costs.
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Table 4 Level of the net cost of carbon tax in the COR scenario
Low Medium High














When we consider the carbon intensity and the ratio of corporate tax per operating
profit of the targeted firms, the values in the land transport sector could be low and
those in the electric power sector could be high in terms of the level of net cost of
the carbon tax under the COR scenario (Table 4).
4 Revenue Recycling to Households Through the Social
Insurance System
4.1 Significance of Revenue Recycling to Households:
Viewpoint of Labor Market Efficiency
This sectiondiscusses the impacts of theRRof carbon tax through the social insurance
system. There are two channels in which RR can stimulate economic activities by
removing distortions in markets. First, RR can increase the labor demand of firms.
RR through the social insurance system encourages firms by providing incentives to
hire more employees. The financial resources of the social insurance system mainly
consist of taxes and social insurance premiums. If the insured is an employee, there
is an employer burden. In Japan, social insurance premiums are borne equally by
workers and employers (50% each) basically. For firms, the employer burden is
only reflected as labor costs. firms are less willing to hire employees if they face
a greater insurance burden. The presence of social insurance premiums has created
inefficiencies in the labor market. Therefore, if government revenue from carbon
pricing is used to reduce social insurance premiums, labor costs will decrease, and
firms will have more incentives to hire employees. In other words, RR through the
social insurance system increases the efficiency of the labor market.
Second, RR through the social insurance system can encourage households
to increase their labor supply. Households supply labor and earn wages in the
labor market. However, wages are different from disposable income. Households
obtain disposable income when the government deducts taxes and social insurance
premiums from wages. The determination of the household labor supply depends
on disposable income. The burden of taxes and social insurance premiums basically
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increases as income increases. Therefore, to avoid the burden of social insurance
premiums, employees often suppress their labor supply. Social insurance premiums
work as a disincentive for the labor supply of households, creating labor market
inefficiencies. If government revenue from carbon pricing is used to reduce social
insurance premiums, disposable income will increase, and household labor supply
will increase. In other words, the recycling of government revenue through the social
insurance system increases the efficiency of the labor market.
4.2 Revenue Recycling Through the National Pension System
1. Structure of the public pension system in Japan
There are three ways we can recycle carbon tax revenue through the social insurance
system: (1) the public pension system, (2) the public health insurance system, and
(3) the long-term care insurance system. In this study, the public pension system is
considered.
Japan’s public pension system is a universal pension system. Figure 4 illustrates
the basic structure of the national pension system in Japan. An employee joins the
employee’s pension insurance system and simultaneously becomes an insured person
of the national pension system. In the national pension system, the person insured
through the employee’s pension is called aCategory II insured person. The dependent
spouse of a Category II insured person is a Category III insured person. If s/he is not
a Category II or the Category III insured person, s/he will be a Category I insured
person, basically a self-employed person, unemployed person, student, part-time
worker, etc.
A person insured by the employee’s pension bears an insurance premium in
proportion to his or her wages. This premium includes the national pension premium.
Similarly, a person insured by the employee’s pension receives pension benefits in
proportion to his or herwages. This pension benefit includes the benefit of the national
pension (basic pension). The employee’s pension premium is equally borne by the
workers and employers (50% each). However, Category I insured persons with only
the national pension system basically bear a fixed premium (¥ 16,410 in FY2019).
Employees'Pension
Na onal Pension(Basic Pension)
(self-employed persons,etc...) (private and public workers) (dependent spouse of the Category II insured persons) 
 Category I insured persons  Category II insured persons Category III insured persons
Fig. 4 Structure of the Public Pension System in Japan. Source Drawn by the Author
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Category III insured persons can benefit from the national pension (basic pension)
without paying premiums.5
2. Revenue recycling method in the public pension system
In the discussion of RR through the public pension system, it is assumed that the
insurance premium burden for the national pension system will be reduced.6 This is
because the national pension system forms the basis of the universal pension system
and can be widely recycled to the insurance of the public pension system. Based on
the basic pension contribution structure, the government revenue from carbon pricing
is recycled to the insured of the employee’s pension system (for Category II insured
persons) and Category I insured persons in the national pension system according to
the number of insured persons. According to the basic pension contribution structure,
the number of Category III insured persons is the number of insured persons under the
employees’ pension insurance system. For Category I insured persons, the insurance
premium is reduced by dividing the government revenue by the number of insured
persons covered by the national pension system. For Category II insured persons, the
insurance premium will be reduced in consideration of the number of Category III
insured persons. However, since the insurance premium burden is equally borne by
workers and employers (50% each), the reduction in the insurance premium burden
for Category II insured persons will be 50%. In this way, the government revenue
from carbon pricing is recycled to households in the form of reducing the insurance
premium burden for the national pension system. For firms, the burden of social
insurance premiums is also reduced.
The Japanese economy is facing a decreasing and aging population. Therefore,
it is important to clarify the assumption regarding the structure of the population.
We adopt a scenario based on government planning for the pension system. Specifi-
cally, in this analysis, we use the median estimate of the number of insured persons
as shown in the fiscal verification published in 2019 by the Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare. Fiscal verification is employed to examine the sustainability of
the public pension system in several cases with respect to economic assumptions
regarding factors such as the population and labor participation. The case used in the
analysis is a case where labor participation progresses. The population is based on
the median estimates published by the National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research, where the sustainability of the public pension system as indicated
in the 2004 pension reform will be maintained. The government should employ this
economic assumption. Therefore, this case is used as a premise of the analysis here.
A detailed discussion of the 2004 pension reform is beyond the scope of this book.
The total amount of RR is 8.5 trillion yen in 2030 and 7.6 trillion yen in 2050.
5This is called the problem of Category III insured persons. This problem can be divided into two
parts. The first part concerns the fairness of the burden and benefits. The second part concerns
a reduction in working hours to avoid the premium burden. Please see Kimoto (2016), which
elaborates on this problem, for a detailed discussion.
6Thebenefit from revenue recycling is the reduction in the premiumburden.However, if the premium
is exempted, and the burden is less than the benefit from revenue recycling, the difference will be
paid in cash.
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Table 5 Decrease of the Burden under Revenue Recycling through the National Pension System
(yen)
Year RR to category I RR to category II The revenue to employers (Trillion)
(1) (2) (3)
2030 137,346 78,710 3.4
2050 159,070 90,187 3.1
Source Authors’ own calculation
3. Simulation results
The simulation results are shown in Table 5. Column (1) shows the decrease in the
burden for a Category I insured person. Similarly, column (2) shows the decrease
in the burden for a Category II insured person. Finally, column (3) exhibits the
decrease of the payment for the employer sector. The employer sector refers to firms
that employ Category II insured persons.7 All figures are shown in nominal amounts.
According to the simulation results, the payment for the national pension for
Category I insured persons would decrease by 137,346 (159,070) yen annually in
2030 (2050) if they are paying the premium fully without any exemptions. Similarly,
column II shows that the payment of the premium for Category II insured persons
would decrease by 78,710 (90,187) yen annually in 2030 (2050). Column (3) shows
the decrease in the payment for the employers. The burden for the employer would
decrease by 3.4 (3.1) trillion yen in 2030 (2050).
4. Discussion
First, Table 5 shows that the amount of RR to a Category I insured person is greater
than that to a Category II insured person. Category I insured persons are better off
than those in Category II. The reason for this difference is that, for a Category II
insured person, the amount of the RR will be split with the employer. That is, some
portion of the revenue is given to employers, while employees would receive only a
part of the revenue.
The total amount of the recycled revenue will be lower in 2050 than in 2030.
However, the amount of recycled revenue to the insured will be larger in 2050 than
in 2030 for both (1) and (2). This is because the number of insured persons decreases
simply due to the declining birthrate, and the amount per person increases. However,
the amount of RR to the employer is not affected by the declining birthrate, so the
amount of RR is higher in 2030 than in 2050.
Let us consider the following three types of households based on the simulation
results for 2030: (1) self-employed married households (family type I), (2) married
households of firm employees (family type II), and (3) married households of firm
employees and full-time housewives (family type III). The self-employed married
households (family type I) consist of two Category I insured persons, so the amount
of RR is 274,692 yen, doubling the benefit of Category I insured persons. For the
7Therefore, this sector includes not only firms but also the government sector.
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Family type I Family type II Family type III
Benefit 274,692 157,420 78,710
Net benefit 120,239 2967 −75,743
Source Authors’ own calculation
married households of firm employees (family type II), the amount of RR is 157,420
yen. Here, we also assume that both the wife and husband work full-time. The
married households of firm employees and full-time housewives (family type III) are
composed of a Category II insured person and a Category III insured person, so the
amount of RR is only 78,710 yen. As a result, households with a Category I insured
person receive a generous benefit. The results of this simulation for all three types
of households are illustrated in the first row of Table 6.
Meanwhile, households face an increase in expenditures if firms pass all the costs
of the carbon tax to their customers. Using IO table analysis, Kameoka and Arimura
(2019) examined the impacts of the cost increase from a carbon tax on the Japanese
economy. They simulated a carbon tax of 2905 yen per ton of CO2 and found that
the expenditures of a typical household consisting of two family members or more is
28,968 yen annually. In the CGE analysis, the level of carbon tax in 2030 is 15,489
yen. Given the linear nature of the IO analysis, we can infer that the expenditures of
a typical household increases by 154,453 yen. Using this estimate, we can compute
the net benefit of RR under carbon pricing. The net benefit for each family type by
subtracting this increase in expenditures from the benefit of RR is shown as the “net
benefit” in the second row of Table 6.
What will be the outcome of RR be for each family type? Family type I is better
off with a carbon tax if RR is adopted for the national pension system. Thus, family
type II is not worse off even under carbon pricing.We expect that the government can
gain public support for the carbon tax from these types of households if the revenue
is recycled in this way. In contrast, the burden for family type III will increase by
75,473 yen annually.
RR can have an impact on the labor supply. The RR method described above
provides incentives for the labor supply of Category III insured persons. Category
III insured persons can receive benefits from the national pension (basic pension)
without incurring premiums. Therefore, the labor supply is adjusted such that Cate-
gory III insured persons will remain in their position to avoid the premium burden.
In this situation, what will happen if RR through the national pension system is
implemented? If Category III insured persons remain in their position, they will
not benefit from RR. Therefore, there is a possibility to shift to Category II insured
persons without adjusting the labor supply to benefit fromRR. Of course, if Category
III insured persons shift to Category II insured persons, insurance premiums will be
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incurred, so even ifRR is considered, disposable incomewill not necessarily increase.
However, if Category III insured persons become Category II insured persons, they
will obtain pension benefits proportional to their wages. This pension benefit is
greater than that of the basic pension. Considering this pension benefits when they
become the elder, the workers determine the labor supply. If RR through the national
pension system is implemented, the labor supply will be encouraged, and thus, they
could receive this pension benefits and also benefit from RR. Thus, RR through the
national pension system will promote the labor supply.
The RR in this section is consistent with the current government policy regarding
social security reform. The setting of RR is intended for “insured persons” of the
national pension. Pensioners (basically the elderly) are not eligible for this benefit.
The RR considered in this study benefits the working generation. Until now, social
security in Japan has been concentrated on the elderly, but in recent years, the govern-
ment has started to pay attention to younger generations. Thus, social security for the
working generation has been emphasized. The RR envisaged in this study is targeted
at the working generation and is consistent with government policy regarding social
security reform.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the impacts of environmental tax reform on households
and firms in selected sectors with the aim of reducing GHG emissions by 80% in
2050. Specifically, based on the simulation results of a dynamic CGE model, we
investigated the impacts of two types of RR. One is corporate tax reduction for firms,
and the other is a reduction in social security payments.
To assess the corporate tax reduction, we examined two sectors: the land trans-
portation and the electric power sectors. We found that even when employing a high
carbon price to achieve the national emission reduction target, the cost increase from
the carbon tax can be offset to a certain degree with RR through a corporate tax
reduction.
For the case of a reduction in social security payments, we found that some
households are better off if the government uses the revenue from the carbon tax to
reduce social security payments. Thus, RR from a carbon tax is an attractive option
for some firms and households.
In many cases, the introduction of carbon pricing faces opposition from various
stakeholders. However, the simulations conducted in this chapter illustrate that, at the
individual firm level or at the household level, some stakeholders that are better off
with RR. Therefore, providing information on these micro data analyses can increase
support for carbon pricing.
We should mention some caution should be taken when interpreting these results.
Regarding the corporate tax reduction,we should pay attention to the following. First,
we should scrutinize the benefit for firms more carefully. That is, it is necessary
to further divide the operating costs of the target firms to increase the accuracy
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of the future projection of operating costs. However, published data on the land
transportation sector and electric power sector, which were targeted for this analysis,
are limited at this time. As a result, almost all operating costs apart from energy costs
had to be included in “other operating costs” and managed in the same way, and the
accuracy of the projections may have decreased. In the future, it would be desirable
to use detailed data on operating costs.
In addition, regarding the effect of the corporate tax reduction on profits, as noted
in an article published in a Japanese newspaper (Shimbun NK 2019),8 the tax burden
rate (the ratio of taxes paid to profit) varies largely between firms due to an adjust-
ment in the tax standards (from under 10% to approximately 40%), and this may also
be true for the corporate tax. This variation can result in a large difference between
the predicted and real effects of the corporate tax reduction. Therefore, when imple-
menting corporate tax reduction measures, it will be necessary to be careful and use
more detailed data.
Regarding the effect of the reduction in taxes on the labor supply, we should
examine other channels of RR. Specifically, in addition to the national pension
system, Japan has a public health insurance system and a long-term care insurance
system. The government can recycle carbon tax revenue using these systems as well.
This can be a topic for further study, as the discussion on RR through these systems
will also be important.
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Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
Toshi H. Arimura & Shigeru Matsumoto
Summary and Findings
The objective of this book is to review Japanese CO2 emission mitigation policies
in various sectors and assess their effectiveness. The book also aims to offer future
mitigation policy options to achieve the long-term 2050 emission goal, with a focus
on the role of carbon pricing. To fulfill these objectives, the book first reviewed
mitigation policies in selected sectors and discussed the pro and cons of those poli-
cies in each sector. Second, focusing on the carbon pricing already implemented in
Japan, we examined the impacts of two local ETSs in Japan on CO2 emissions using
appropriate econometric techniques. Finally, the book assessed the policy options
of carbon pricing using the economic model of input-output analysis or computable
general equilibrium models. More precisely, the book consisted of the following
three parts.
Part I reviewed the mitigation policies implemented across various sectors in
Japan. Our review reveals that both national and local governments in Japan have
already adopted various mitigation policies in the sectors of manufacturing, office
buildings, households, transport and electric power. We found that these policies
have increased implicit carbon pricing and have contributed to CO2 mitigation in the
corresponding sector. However, we also demonstrate that there is room for further
reductions in each sector. Furthermore, energy efficiency can be improved from the
perspective of the effective carbon rate. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we found
that carbon pricing and feed-in tariffs can be complementary in the power sector
characterized by an oligopolistic market structure. In sum, carbon pricing can play
an important role in the further reduction of CO2 emissions in a more efficient way.
Part II empirically reviewed the carbon pricing instruments implemented in Japan.
The examination of the effectiveness of ETS is a critical issue in climate policy
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021
T. H. Arimura and S. Matsumoto (eds.), Carbon Pricing in Japan,
Economics, Law, and Institutions in Asia Pacific,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6964-7
257
258 Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
politics because some stakeholders are skeptical of its effectiveness andoftenopposed
to its introduction. Our analyses provided solid empirical evidence that the two
local ETSs in Tokyo and Saitama have effectively reduced CO2 emissions through
the promotion of energy efficiency. Although the ETS studies conducted outside of
Japan have focused primarily on the manufacturing sector, the analysis of this book
revealed that ETS can be an effective policy not only for the reduction of electric
power consumption from the manufacturing sector but also for the reduction of such
consumption from the service sector. It is also worth reporting that the Saitama ETS
was successful in reducing carbon emissions in the manufacturing sectors, despite
its voluntary nature. It was also shown that ETS can reduce emissions from facilities
that it does not cover through spillover effects. All these results suggest that ETSs
can be effective policy instruments if they are properly operated.
Part III proposed several policy options and assessed the potential impacts of
carbon pricing for further emission reduction.We offer a policy option of a carbon tax
with revenue recycling, aimed at the long-term emission reduction of 80% by 2050.
We examined the impacts of the revenue recycling on the household expenditures
and profits of firms in the selected sector. It was shown that the economic burden can
be eased with revenue recycling both for households and for the selected industries.
Regarding the household sector, we found that carbon prices generate significant
heterogeneity in the tax burden across geographical regions and income classes. Our
analyses show that low-income households living in cold regions will be affected
very severely. If the redistribution policies proposed in the book are successfully
implemented, then the regressiveness problem of carbon taxes can be resolved to a
great degree.
Policy Implications and Messages for the Government
Several policy implications can be drawn from the findings in the book. First, the
assessment of the Tokyo ETS demonstrates that the ETS works for service sectors.
As in the case of EUETS, many emission trading schemes cover the manufacturing
sector and the power sector. Thus, countries or regions without regulation of the
service sector can consider ETS as a candidate for the major policy instruments.
Second, the Saitama ETS is a Target-Setting Emissions Trading (TSET) program,
a unique ETS that imposes no financial penalty on facilities that fail to achieve
the emission target. Despite the voluntary nature of the scheme, it was effective in
reducingCO2 emissions in themanufacturing sector. Therefore, for those countries or
regions that consider a mitigation policy but cannot adopt a stringent ETS, the TSET
program implemented in Saitama is a useful policy measure that can be adopted as
a first step.
For the national and local governments in Japan, the findings for the two ETSs
in this book have an important and direct implication. Because these two schemes
worked well at the local level, it is natural to extend these schemes to the remaining
45 prefectures. If ETSs are introduced into other prefectures, then facilities in the
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energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) sectormay face the risk of carbon leakage
and competitiveness issues. However, the findings in Chaps 10 and 11 will be useful
and effective in dealing with the competitiveness issue that the EITE may face in
regard to carbon pricing. Moreover, there is plenty of literature, including that of
the authors of these chapters, showing ways to deal with this competitiveness issue
(Takeda et al. 2012, 2014; Sugino et al. 2013).
The reduction and fairness of the burden become a point of issue in regard to
the carbon tax. Another important policy implication obtained from this book is that
the carbon tax with revenue recycling is an attractive policy option for long-term
emission reduction goals. This is an important message for the Japanese govern-
ment. The negative impact on the Japanese economy can be significantly offset by
including revenue recycling schemes. Moreover, for countries/regions aiming for
deeper GHG emission reduction, the carbon tax with revenue recycling is a useful
option to consider.
Future Directions
There are several directions we can consider in our future work. First, designing
carbon pricing instruments with the consideration of effective carbon rates is another
important direction. Japan has already imposed an energy tax on various fossil fuels
at different levels. We know that the tax rate per ton of CO2 emissions varies widely
across fuel types. Thus, the future carbon tax for the long-term emission reduction
goal should take a form in which the effective carbon rate is equalized across fuel
types to pursue efficiency.
Second, this book focuses on efficiency rather than equity. Carbon pricing can
incur the burden disproportionally for some stakeholders. Given that energy is essen-
tial to modern life, it is worth investigating how to reconcile efficiency and equity
under carbon pricing.
Although our empirical studies identify the effectiveness of ETSs, the amount of
the emission reduction is far below the level of the reduction required to achieve
the long-term emission goal. Although this book finds that ETSs in Japan promoted
energy efficiency, they did not promote the renewable energy that is necessary tomeet
the Japanese long-term emission reduction target. Thus, there is still a gap between
what the Japanese economy has to reduce in the long run and what the ETSs have
achieved so far. Research to fill this gap can be the third direction.
Fourth, for the analysis of the long-term goal, we must model new and future
technologies in more detail. The model in this book does not incorporate certain
new technologies. For example, the model in this book does not capture hydrogen
fuel, which is an important energy source to realize decarbonization. However, the
diffusion of hydrogen fuel is expected to be important in 2050. This is particularly true
for transportation. Electric vehicles or fuel cell vehicles that make use of hydrogen
fuel need to be incorporated in detail. The modeling of new and future technologies
would be another direction for future research.
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Feed-in tariffs have increased the effective carbon rate and have contributed to
the diffusion of renewable energy in the Japanese electric power sector. We have
not examined the impact of FIT quantitatively. It is worth assessing the impact of
FIT on CO2 emission reduction. Moreover, we should investigate the interaction of
explicit carbon pricing and FIT/feed-in premiums in promoting renewability in the
long-term model.
Japan has implemented various carbon pricing programs since the Rio de Janeiro
Earth Summit and has introduced newprograms since the ParisAgreement.However,
it seems that these programs have not been fully reported to overseas researchers,
and the effectiveness of these programs has not been adequately assessed. We hope
that this book will contribute to the understanding of carbon pricing programs in
Japan.
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